IN RE VALERIE MICHELLE PORTER MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
__________________________________________
In the Matter of V.M.P., D.M.V., and N.J.M.V.,
Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
October 18, 2002
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 238539
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-047001-NA
NATALIE JANE PORTER,
Respondent-Appellant.
In the Matter of V.M.P., Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 239021
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-047001-NA
SEAN ANDREW PORTER,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Markey and R.S. Gribbs*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondent-mother appeals by right from the trial court
order terminating her parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g),
and (j), and respondent-father appeals by right from the trial court order terminating his parental
rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), (h), and (j). We affirm.
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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We have carefully reviewed the lower court record and conclude that the trial court did
not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and
convincing evidence with respect to both respondents. MCR 5.974(I); In re Miller, 433 Mich
331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Furthermore, the evidence did not show that termination of
each respondent’s parental rights was clearly not in the children’s best interests. MCL
712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
In addition, respondent-mother argues that the trial court deprived her of her
constitutional right to parent her children. Once there is clear and convincing evidence that at
least one statutory ground for termination has been established, the liberty interest of the parent
no longer includes the right to custody and control of the children. Trejo, supra at 355. Because
clear and convincing evidence exists to support terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights,
she no longer has a constitutional right to parent her children.
Respondent-mother also argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over V.M.P.
and D.M.V. because she had placed them in a limited guardianship with her mother. The limited
guardianship was not in place when the trial court took jurisdiction over V.M.P. and D.M.V.
Therefore, the children were “without proper custody or guardianship” within the meaning of
MCL 712A.2(b)(1), and the trial court had a statutory basis to assert jurisdiction over the
children.
Respondent-father argues that the Family Independence Agency failed to establish a
parent-agency agreement for him and failed to provide services to him. The Family
Independence Agency was justified in its decision not to establish a parent-agency agreement for
respondent-father or provide services to him because respondent-father was incarcerated and will
remain incarcerated until the minor child is nineteen years old. MCL 712A.18f(1)(b).
Therefore, the trial court did not err in terminating respondents’ parental rights to the
children.
We affirm.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
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