DEBORAH NORRIS V ANTHONY JEROME MUNNO
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DEBORAH NORRIS, f/k/a DEBORAH MUNNO,
UNPUBLISHED
October 18, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 237087
Oakland Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 93-452994-DM
ANTHONY JEROME MUNNO,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Bandstra and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from the trial court’s order denying his motion for a change
in custody. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erroneously concluded that he did not
demonstrate proper cause to warrant review of the custody order, that the trial court erred in
finding that a custodial environment was established with plaintiff, that the trial court erred in its
application of the statutory best interest factors, and that, therefore, the trial court abused its
discretion in denying defendant’s motion to modify the custody order. We disagree.
In child custody proceedings, we review the trial court’s findings of fact to determine
whether they are contrary to the great weight of the evidence, and will affirm a trial court’s
factual determinations unless the record evidence “clearly preponderates in the opposite
direction.” Phillips v Jordan, 241 Mich App 17, 20; 614 NW2d 183 (2000). The trial court’s
ultimate decision regarding custody, however, is a dispositional ruling that we review for an
abuse of discretion. Mogle v Scriver, 241 Mich App 192, 196; 614 NW2d 696 (2000).
A custody award may be modified only upon a showing of proper cause or change of
circumstance that establishes that the modification is in the child’s best interest, as determined by
the factors set forth in MCL 722.23. MCL 722.27(1)(c); Foskett v Foskett, 247 Mich App 1, 5;
634 NW2d 363 (2001). The party seeking change must establish such cause or change in
circumstance before the best interest factors may be considered. Rossow v Aranda, 206 Mich
App 456, 457-458; 522 NW2d 874 (1994).
In this case, the trial court determined that defendant had not shown either proper cause
or a change of circumstance warranting modification of the custody order. Although the trial
-1-
court’s inquiry should have ended there, see id., the court went on to address the statutory best
interest factors. While we conclude that it is at least arguable that defendant demonstrated
proper cause,1 which would require an analysis under the best interest factors, we further
conclude that regardless of whether defendant demonstrated such cause, any error in the trial
court’s determination in this regard was harmless because defendant has failed to demonstrate
that the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite direction with regard to the court’s
findings concerning the statutory best interest factors. Phillips, supra; see also MCR 2.613(A)
(reversal is not required unless the failure to do so would be “inconsistent with substantial
justice”).
Before making a determination regarding the best interest of a child, a trial court must
determine if a custodial environment exists. Mogle, supra at 197. A custodial environment is
established if:
over an appreciable time the child naturally looks to the custodian in that
environment for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort.
The age of the child, the physical environment, and the inclination of the
custodian and the child as to the permanency of the relationship shall also be
considered. [MCL 722.27(1)(c).]
“If the trial court finds that an established custodial environment exists, then the trial court can
change custody only if the party bearing the burden presents clear and convincing evidence that
the change serves the best interests of the child.” Foskett, supra at 6. In the instant case, the trial
court determined that an established custodial environment existed with plaintiff. We find no
error in this conclusion as, contrary to defendant’s assertion, the trial court’s finding in this
regard is not against the great weight of the evidence. As noted by the trial court, the evidence
offered at the custody hearing indicated that plaintiff has been the child’s primary custodian
since 1993 and, although both parties have provided guidance, discipline and the necessities of
life to the child since that time, plaintiff has done so on a daily basis since the child’s birth.
Because the trial court’s finding that an established custodial environment existed is
supported by the evidence at the hearing, the trial court could change custody only if defendant
presented clear and convincing evidence that the change would serve the best interests of the
child. Id. In order to make this determination, the trial court analyzed the best interest factors
enumerated under MCL 722.23 and set forth its findings on the record. See Mixon v Mixon, 237
Mich App 159, 163; 602 NW2d 406 (1999).2 For the majority of factors, the trial court either
1
Defendant testified regarding several of his concerns, including the child’s behavioral problems
at school and the fact that plaintiff had many men in her life, which defendant believed had an
adverse effect on the child. Defendant also alleged that plaintiff’s poor health affected her ability
to adequately care for the child.
2
Although the trial court stated no facts in support of its conclusions regarding the factors listed
in MCL 722.23(e) and (i), we reject defendant’s argument that this failure is legal error requiring
reversal. As noted by this Court in LaFleche v Ybarra, 242 Mich App 692, 700; 619 NW2d 738
(2000), although the trial court must generally consider and explicitly state its findings and
(continued…)
-2-
determined that the parties were equal or found in favor of plaintiff. Essentially, the trial court
acknowledged plaintiff’s daily presence in the child’s life, plaintiff’s participation (both
curricular and extra-curricular) in the child’s schooling, and the established nature of the
relatively stable environment provided by plaintiff. After a careful review of the record, we are
not convinced that the trial court’s findings on these factors were against the great weight of the
evidence. Phillips, supra. Although the record contains evidence in favor of both plaintiff and
defendant on most of the challenged factors, we cannot say that the evidence clearly
preponderates in the opposite direction of the trial court’s conclusions. Id. We are similarly not
convinced that defendant has shown by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best
interest of the child to change custody. MCL 722.27(1)(c). Accordingly, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to grant defendant custody. MCL 722.28; Mogle, supra.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by not allowing Judith Froemke, an
employee of the friend of the court, to testify regarding her findings and reasoning in her
recommendation to change custody to defendant. Again, we disagree. We review a trial court’s
evidentiary decision for an abuse of discretion. Hilgendorf v Saint John Hosp & Medical Center
Corp, 245 Mich App 670, 700; 630 NW2d 356 (2001).
In Truitt v Truitt, 172 Mich App 38, 43; 431 NW2d 454 (1988), this Court explained that
the trial court’s custody decision must be based upon its own evidentiary hearing, rather than the
friend of the court’s hearing and conclusions:
“[I]t is clear from the statute that the circuit court must, upon motion by either
party, conduct a ‘de novo hearing,’ rather than simply provide de novo review.
MCL 552.507(5)[ ]. . . . The distinction is one that has meaning and, in the
context of trial, has been extensively discussed by this Court. . . . Where a trial de
novo is required, the circuit court is required to proceed as if no ‘prior
determination had been made and arrive at an independent decision.’ We hold
that the de novo hearing guaranteed under MCL 552.507(5)[ ] . . . requires the
circuit court, on motion of any party dissatisfied with a recommendation of the
friend of the court, to conduct a hearing as if no friend of the court hearing had
been conducted previously and arrive at an independent conclusion.” [quoting
Marshall v Beal, 158 Mich App 582, 591; 405 NW2d 101 (1986). (Citations
omitted).]
We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by preventing Froemke from
testifying regarding her conclusions and recommendations. The trial court was to conduct a de
novo hearing. The trial court permitted Froemke to testify regarding her personal knowledge of
the instant case. Further, defendant actually utilized this exact rule to prevent plaintiff’s counsel
from introducing evidence regarding the friend of the court referee’s recommendation in this
case. In accordance with the reasoning and analysis in Truitt, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by not allowing Froemke to testify as to her findings and the reasoning for her
recommendation regarding custody of the child. See id.
(…continued)
conclusions regarding each fact, the trial court need not comment on every matter in evidence or
declare acceptance or rejection of every proposition argued.
-3-
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to “assess” against plaintiff a
negative inference stemming from plaintiff’s failure to produce her medical records during
discovery. However, because there was sufficient other evidence presented at trial regarding
plaintiff’s health, we do not conclude that the trial court’s error in this regard, if any, warrants
relief. MCR 2.613(A).
We affirm.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.