PEOPLE OF MI V ALLEN F BUNNELL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 18, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 224413
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 99-004547-FC
ALLEN F. BUNNELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Markey and R.S. Gribbs*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of four counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct
(CSC), MCL 750.520b(1)(b), and one count of third-degree CSC, MCL 750.520d(1)(a). He was
sentenced to concurrent prison terms of twenty-five to fifty years each for the first-degree CSC
convictions and seven to fifteen years for the third-degree CSC conviction. He appeals by right.
We affirm.
Defendant was convicted of sexually abusing his daughter. The victim’s parents were
divorced. The victim formerly lived with her mother, but, when she was thirteen years old, she
moved in with defendant. At the time, the victim was having disciplinary problems at home and
had a reputation for lying and stealing from her mother. According to the victim, when she was
about to turn fourteen years old, she spoke to defendant about being able to have boyfriends.
Defendant told the victim that the sooner they “experimented,” the sooner she would be allowed
to have boyfriends. The victim claimed that defendant subsequently engaged in various sexual
activities with her. Defendant denied the allegations of sexual abuse and theorized that the
victim was lying because of her disciplinary problems and because she was told that she might
have to leave defendant’s home because of her behavioral problems.
I
During trial, the trial court permitted defendant’s former wife, who was the victim’s
mother, to testify about certain sexual practices that she engaged in with defendant while they
were married. Defendant argues that the court erroneously permitted the testimony under MRE
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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404(b). We disagree.
The decision whether to admit or exclude evidence is within the trial court’s discretion.
People v McAlister, 203 Mich App 495, 505; 513 NW2d 431 (1994). This Court will find an
abuse of discretion only when an unprejudiced person considering the facts on which the trial
court acted would say there was no justification or excuse for the ruling made. Id.
At trial, the victim testified that defendant once penetrated her with a “dildo,” that he
once made her watch an x-rated video before engaging in sexual activity, and that he engaged in
anal intercourse. Over defendant’s objection, defendant’s former wife was permitted to testify
that, while married, they engaged in anal sex, watched the Playboy Channel, and used a vibrator,
all at defendant’s request. During the second episode of anal intercourse, defendant’s former
wife asked defendant to stop because of the pain, which defendant did.
MRE 404(b) prohibits evidence of other bad acts by a defendant unless offered to prove
something other than the defendant's bad character and the probative value of the evidence is not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. MRE 404(b). The logic behind this
rule is that a jury must convict a defendant on the facts of the crime charged, not because the
defendant is a bad person. People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 384; 582 NW2d 785 (1998).
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is admissible under MRE 404(b) if the evidence is (1)
offered for a proper purpose and not to prove the defendant's character or propensity to commit
the crime, (2) relevant to an issue or fact of consequence at trial, and (3) sufficiently probative to
outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice, MRE 403. People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 74-75;
508 NW2d 114 (1993), amended 445 Mich 1205 (1994). Additionally, upon request, the trial
court may provide a cautionary instruction. Id. at 75.
In this case, the evidence of defendant’s past sexual behavior with his former wife was
offered for a proper purpose under MRE 404(b), to show defendant’s scheme or plan relative to
his sexual activities and to bolster the credibility of the victim, who testified regarding similar
conduct by defendant. It was not offered for the improper purpose of showing defendant’s bad
character. Further, because the victim’s credibility was a central issue in the case, the evidence
was relevant to an issue of fact of consequence at trial. Also, the probative value of the evidence
of defendant’s sexual practices with his former wife was not substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice. MRE 403. Defendant’s past sexual interests and activities with his
former wife occurred in the context of a marital relationship, were consensual, and did not
involve any criminal activity. As such, the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial. Furthermore,
the trial court gave a cautionary instruction regarding the limited purpose of the evidence.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing defendant’s former wife’s
testimony.
II
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to hear that he
voluntarily released his parental rights to the victim before trial. Defendant argues that the
evidence was not relevant and unfairly prejudicial. We disagree.
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Relevant evidence is generally admissible. MRE 402; People v Campbell, 236 Mich App
490, 503; 601 NW2d 114 (1999). Evidence is relevant if it tends to make the existence of a fact
at issue more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. MRE 401; Campbell,
supra. Under MRE 403, however, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. People v Sabin (After Remand), 463
Mich 43, 57-58; 614 NW2d 888 (2000). Unfair prejudice does not mean any prejudice; it refers
to “the tendency of the proposed evidence to adversely affect the objecting party's position by
injecting considerations extraneous to the merits of the lawsuit, e.g., the jury's bias, sympathy,
anger, or shock.” People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 336-337; 521 NW2d 797 (1994), quoting
People v Goree, 132 Mich App 693, 702-703; 349 NW2d 220 (1984). See also People v Vasher,
449 Mich 494, 501-502; 537 NW2d 168 (1995).
In this case, the evidence was relevant in light of the defense theory that the victim
fabricated the allegations of sexual abuse because she wanted to leave defendant’s home. The
evidence that defendant had released his parental rights to the victim established that
reunification was no longer possible and, therefore, made it more probable than not that the
victim was not fabricating the allegations because of a concern over the possibility of being
returned to defendant. Further, we are not convinced that the probative value of the testimony
was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. MRE 403. Defendant explained
that he released his parental rights because he thought he had no chance at establishing a
relationship with the victim in the future. He said he regretted the decision and did not realize it
was a permanent separation at the time he agreed to release his parental rights.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing this
evidence. McAlister, supra. See also People v Larry Smith, 456 Mich 543, 550; 581 NW2d 654
(1998) (where a trial court's ruling on an evidentiary issue is a close question, it is not for the
appellate court to reverse simply because it would have reached a different result).
III
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred by excluding evidence that the victim
made false accusations of sexual abuse against others.1 Again, we review the trial court’s
decision for an abuse of discretion. McAlister, supra.
At trial, the defense wanted to call certain family members to testify that the victim had
previously accused a neighbor and other family members of sexual abuse. Although defendant
argues on appeal that the testimony was admissible under MRE 801(d), he did not identify this
evidentiary rule as a basis for admitting the evidence at trial. Thus, defendant failed to establish
that the victim’s past accusations of sexual abuse were admissible.
1
As part of its ruling, the trial court agreed that the witnesses could testify as to the victim’s
reputation for truthfulness in general, but could not testify about specific instances of conduct to
prove that she was not being truthful. See MRE 608(a). Defendant does not address this portion
of the court’s ruling.
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Defendant also argues that evidence that the victim had sexual relations with others could
explain the absence of the victim’s hymen. The trial court apparently disallowed the testimony
under the rape-shield statute, MCL 750.520j. Except for the two narrow exceptions set forth in
MCL 750.520j, the rape-shield statute bars evidence of sexual activity of the victim not incident
to the charged offense. As our Supreme Court observed in People v Adair, 452 Mich 473, 485;
550 NW2d 505 (1996):
“The determination of admissibility is entrusted to the sound discretion of
the trial court. In exercising its discretion, the trial court should be mindful of the
significant legislative purposes underlying the rape-shield statute and should
always favor exclusion of evidence of a complainant's sexual conduct where its
exclusion would not unconstitutionally abridge the defendant's right to
confrontation.” [Quoting People v Hackett, 421 Mich 338, 349; 365 NW2d 120
(1984).]
The rape-shield statute also provides that such evidence is admissible only to the extent that it is
“material to a fact at issue in the case” and “its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not
outweigh its probative value.” MCL 750.520j(1); Adair, supra at 485.
In the case at bar, defendant never made a credible offer of proof that the proposed
evidence fell within one of the statutory exceptions. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
barring the proposed evidence.
IV
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by prohibiting his wife and stepdaughter
from testifying about the stepdaughter’s history of sexual abuse by her own natural father.
Through this testimony, defendant intended to show that both witnesses had a special sensitivity
to the issue of sexual abuse, so if the victim were being sexually abused, they would have noticed
warning signs that others may have missed. The court excluded the evidence under MRE 403
because any probative value was minimal and outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and
confusion of the issues.
We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court. McAlister, supra. The court allowed
both witnesses to testify that they had not observed any signs of sexual abuse and, if they had,
they would have reported it. To allow the witnesses to go beyond the scope of that testimony to
explain that they had a special understanding of sexual abuse situations because of their own
prior experiences would have injected collateral issues into the case. In any event, defendant
failed to sufficiently establish that the witnesses had a special expertise in this area. At best, the
witnesses could only offer that they did not observe any signs of sexual abuse and would have
reported it if they had, which is what the trial court permitted.
V
Next, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial because he was shackled during trial
and because the prosecutor brought attention to that fact by questioning him about his restraints.
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A defendant’s freedom from shackling is an important part of the right to a fair trial.
People v Dixon, 217 Mich App 400, 404; 552 NW2d 663 (1996). As a result, shackling of a
defendant during a trial is permitted only under extraordinary circumstances. Id. Ordinarily,
shackling should be permitted only to prevent escape, to protect bystanders or officers of the
court from injury, or to maintain a quiet and peaceable trial. People v Dunn, 446 Mich 409, 426;
521 NW2d 255 (1994). The trial court must find that there is record evidence to support the use
of restraints. Id. at 427. In this case, however, there is no indication on the record that defendant
objected to the use of restraints during trial. Because defendant failed to preserve this issue with
an appropriate objection at trial, we review this issue for plain error affecting defendant’s
substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 761-767; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
It is not plainly apparent that restraints were not justified in this case. Apart from the fact
that defendant never complained about having to wear restraints, the record discloses that the
court later instructed the jury that the restraints were something required of all jail inmates as a
security device to guard against escape, which is a recognized purpose for allowing restraints.
Defendant has not shown that the use of restraints in this case was plain error. Furthermore, even
if error, defendant has not shown that his substantial rights were affected. The record indicates
that the jury could not see the restraints. Where restraints are unobtrusive, this Court will
generally not conclude that the defendant was prejudiced. People v Robinson,172 Mich App
650, 654; 432 NW2d 390 (1988); People v David Johnson, 160 Mich App 490, 493; 408 NW2d
485 (1987).
Defendant argues, however, that he was prejudiced because the prosecutor subsequently
questioned him about the leg restraints. On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned
defendant about why he limped and alluded to a leg brace that defendant was wearing:
Q. [The prosecutor:] One other thing. You walked up with this leg brace, I
mean, with what we would see as a limp. But that’s not a physical condition,
that’s because of the security measure.
MR. BRECZINSKI [defense counsel]: Hey, I object.
MR. BERKMAN: No, wait, wait, wait.
MR. BRECZINSKI: This is totally improper.
MR. BERKMAN: This whole thing is standard to every person.
THE COURT: Please, please, Mr. Berkman.
MR. BERKMAN: Okay.
THE COURT: He’s made an objection, so you stop when he makes an
objection.
MR. BERKMAN: I apologize.
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Breczinski, both of you approach, please.
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(3:01 p.m., bench conference off the record.)
THE COURT: And I’m gonna sustain your objection, Mr. Breczinski.
MR. BRECZINSKI: Thank you, your Honor.
Q. (By Mr. Berkman, continuing:) Physically you can walk just fine; correct?
A. I can walk fine.
The prosecutor subsequently explained that he had questioned defendant about his limp because
the jury was already aware that defendant was in jail, and defendant’s wife had testified about
defendant having a physical disability. The prosecutor wanted to clarify the reason for the limp
because it had been alleged that defendant could not negotiate the steps to the basement of his
home, which was where some of the sexual abuse allegedly occurred. The court indicated that it
would give a special instruction on this point so that the jury was not misled.
The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether the defendant was denied a fair and
impartial trial. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 266-267, nn 5-7; 531 NW2d 659 (1995).
Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are decided case by case. People v McElhaney, 215 Mich
App 269, 283; 545 NW2d 18 (1996). Prosecutorial misconduct, however, cannot be based on
good faith efforts to admit evidence. People v Noble, 238 Mich App 647, 660; 608 NW2d 123
(1999); People v Missouri, 100 Mich App 310, 328; 299 NW2d 346 (1980). The prosecutor, as
an advocate for the state, is entitled to attempt to introduce evidence which he legitimately
believes will be accepted by the court so long as that attempt does not actually prejudice the
defendant. Absent a showing of bad faith by the prosecutor, this Court will not reverse simply
because defense counsel was required to do his job and object. Id. at 328-329.
Here, defendant’s physical condition was an issue in the case, and the prosecutor was
seeking to establish that defendant’s limp was not attributable to his physical condition. Thus,
there is no indication of bad faith by the prosecutor. Furthermore, we are satisfied that defendant
was not prejudiced by the prosecutor’s question. First, the trial court sustained defendant’s
objection to the question, so the jury should have disregarded the reference to the leg restraint.
Second, the jury was already aware from the testimony that defendant was a jail inmate. Third,
the court subsequently gave a special instruction to the jury in which it clarified that all county
inmates were required to wear leg restraints and that the restraints were not to be considered as
evidence of defendant’s guilt. The court’s instruction sufficiently served its purpose of curing
any prejudice caused by the prosecutor’s question. See People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687;
521 NW2d 557 (1994). Accordingly, this issue does not require reversal.
VI
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by not allowing him to reopen the proofs
in order to present evidence that a witness, Nurse Hartwig, was biased against defendant.
Shortly before closing arguments, defense counsel informed the court that defendant’s
family members had allegedly overheard Hartwig state in the hallway “that Allen [defendant]
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may as well hang himself as to pull him [sic] in here away from her patients.” Defendant wanted
to have his stepdaughter testify to the statements she overheard Hartwig make. The trial court
declined to reopen the proofs because of the confusion it would create. Further, the court had
questions about the accuracy of the proposed testimony and also was concerned because it did
not relate to the ultimate issue in the case.
Whether to allow the reopening of proofs is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
People v Keeth, 193 Mich App 555, 560; 484 NW2d 761 (1992). In deciding whether to allow
the proofs to be reopened, the trial court must consider whether the party moving to reopen the
proofs, would have obtained an undue advantage and whether there is any showing of either
surprise or prejudice to the opposing party. Id.
Here, the court’s reasons for refusing to reopen the proofs do not reveal an abuse of
discretion. In addition, as the prosecution argues, defendant appeared to be relying on extrinsic
evidence for the purpose of attacking the witness’ credibility, which is prohibited by MRE
608(a).
VII
Next, defendant argues that the jury’s verdict was against the great weight of the evidence
and, therefore, the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. We disagree.
A trial court's decision on a motion for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
People v Stiller, 242 Mich App 38, 49; 617 NW2d 697 (2000). A trial court may grant a motion
for a new trial based upon the great weight of the evidence only where the evidence
preponderates heavily against the verdict so that a miscarriage of justice would result if the
verdict was allowed to stand. People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 642; 576 NW2d 129 (1998).
Here, any inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony were not significant or prevalent
enough to justify setting aside the jury’s verdict. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying defendant’s motion for a new trial.
VIII
Defendant argues that other misconduct by the prosecutor requires reversal. Defendant
concedes that he did not object to the prosecutor’s challenged comments and questions.
Therefore, we review this unpreserved issue for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial
rights. Carines, supra; People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 720; 613 NW2d 370 (2000).
Reversal is not warranted if a cautionary instruction could have cured any prejudice. Stanaway,
supra at 687.
A prosecutor is afforded great latitude in closing arguments and is permitted to argue the
evidence and reasonable inferences in order to support his theory of the case. Bahoda, supra at
282. However, the prosecutor must refrain from prejudicial remarks, and may not intentionally
inject inflammatory comments with no apparent justification except to arouse the jurors'
prejudice. Id. at 266, 283. A prosecutor also may not vouch for the credibility of his witnesses
by suggesting that he has some special knowledge of the witnesses' truthfulness. Id. at 276. Nor
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may a prosecutor appeal to the jury to sympathize with the victim, or argue facts not in evidence.
People v Modelski, 164 Mich App 337, 347; 416 NW2d 708 (1987).
Defendant first argues that the prosecutor improperly questioned witnesses and
improperly argued that the experts had formed opinions on the victim’s credibility. Considered
in context, the prosecutor’s questions to Janice Valentine did not elicit improper opinion
testimony about the victim’s credibility. Valentine’s responses were consistent with why she was
treating the victim. Her responses did not indicate that she personally felt that the victim was
being truthful about the abuse.
While the prosecutor’s remarks in closing argument urging the jurors to take into account
the expert witnesses’ opinions about the victim’s credibility, bordered on being improper, they do
not constitute plain error. Further, to the extent the questions could be characterized as improper,
a cautionary instruction could have cured any possible prejudice. Stanaway, supra. Thus, this
issue does not warrant reversal.
The prosecutor’s statements to the jury that the victim was telling the truth were based on
the evidence presented at trial, and, as such, did not constitute improper vouching.
We also reject defendant’s claim that the prosecutor improperly urged the jurors to decide
the case based upon sympathy for the victim. The prosecutor only asked the jurors to consider all
of the circumstances in the case and the consequences to the victim in determining if she would
have made the allegations against defendant if they were not true. This was not improper.
People v Hoffman, 205 Mich App 1, 21; 518 NW2d 817 (1994).
Defendant has not shown that the prosecutor committed plain error affecting his
substantial rights.
IX
Next, defendant argues that the cumulative effect of each of the errors in this case denied
him a fair trial. We disagree.
Although a single error may not necessarily provide a basis for granting a new trial, it is
possible that the cumulative effect of multiple minor errors may add up to error requiring
reversal. People v Anderson, 166 Mich App 455, 472-473; 421 NW2d 200 (1988). The test is
whether the cumulative effect of several errors deprived the defendant of a fair and impartial
trial. People v Taylor, 185 Mich App 1, 10; 460 NW2d 582 (1990). Because defendant has
failed to show any error in this case, he cannot show that a new trial is required because of
cumulative error.
As part of his argument for this issue, defendant also raises additional claims of
prosecutorial misconduct. In the two examples cited by defendant, the trial court sustained a
defense objection. While some of the prosecutor’s questions and comments were found to be
objectionable by the trial court and stricken, they were not so prejudicial to require reversal.
Furthermore, even if these questions and comments are considered with the other errors
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defendant alleges, reversal is not required because he has not demonstrated that the cumulative
effect of the claimed errors deprived him of a fair trial.
X
In his final issue, defendant challenges the proportionality of his twenty-five to seventyfive year sentences for first-degree CSC.
Because the offenses for which defendant was convicted occurred in 1998, the earlier
sentencing guidelines promulgated by our Supreme Court apply. The legislative guidelines apply
only to offenses committed on or after January 1, 1999. MCL 769.34(2); People v Reynolds, 240
Mich App 250, 253; 611 NW2d 316 (2000).
The sentencing guidelines recommended a minimum sentence range of 180 to 360
months, or life. On appeal, defendant refers to the effect of his fifty point score for offense
variable (OV) 12 on the ultimate recommended sentence range, but does not specifically assert
that OV 12 was erroneously scored. We agree that the record factually supports the court’s
scoring of OV 12 and, accordingly, will not disturb that scoring decision. People v Raby, 456
Mich 487, 497-498; 572 NW2d 644 (1998).
Because defendant’s sentences are within the guidelines range, they are presumptively
proportionate. People v Dukes, 189 Mich App 262, 266; 471 NW2d 651 (1991). Defendant
must demonstrate unusual circumstances to overcome the presumption of proportionality.
People v Sharp, 192 Mich App 501, 505-506; 481 NW2d 773 (1992).
Defendant refers to a prior plea bargain offer made by the prosecution as evidence that his
sentences are disproportionate. That offer was to the lesser charge of third-degree CSC. The
maximum sentence for third-degree CSC is fifteen years. The prosecutor informed defendant
that the sentencing guidelines range for third-degree CSC would be five to ten years. Under the
two-thirds rule, the trial court could not impose a sentence greater than ten years for third-degree
CSC. Moreover, the plea offer was made before trial. The trial court was entitled to consider the
evidence at trial in determining an appropriate sentence.
Furthermore, defendant had two prior felony convictions and two prior misdemeanor
convictions, including a prior conviction for child abuse involving the same victim. He also
failed to comply with the terms of his probation in connection with his prior convictions.
Defendant has failed to overcome the presumptive validity of his sentences. Defendant’s
sentences do not violate the principle of proportionality.
We affirm.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Jane E.Markey
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
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