PEOPLE OF MI V MICHAEL L STEELE
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 15, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 234049
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-007540
MICHAEL STEELE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Gage and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right from his conviction following a bench trial of fourth-degree
criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520e(1)(b). The trial court sentenced him to two years’
probation. We affirm.
At trial, the complainant, SF, testified as follows: On April 4, 2000, she was at her home
in Detroit around 7:00 p.m. At that time, defendant, a friend of her husband’s, came over to
change some fuses for her because her husband was at work and could not do it himself.
Defendant asked SF to bring some hand lotion downstairs, where the fuse box was located,
because he would need to use it later. SF, who was wearing a snap-up jacket, fastened to her
neck, and no bra, complied with this request. After defendant completed his work on the fuse
box in the basement, he asked SF to come downstairs with him so that he could show her which
fuse he had changed. SF came downstairs, at which point defendant asked her to sit down and
asked her where the lotion was located. Defendant then came toward SF, grabbed her wrist,
pulled open her jacket, and grabbed her breasts. He stated, “it’s no secret what your breasts do to
me” and began rubbing his penis through his pants. SF objected to his actions, and defendant
apologized but then mentioned her breasts again, stating that he requested the lotion because he
wanted to make himself ejaculate on SF’s chest. Defendant stated that he had wanted to have
sex with SF for two years but had not said anything about it because he was a friend of her
husband’s. Eventually, defendant left the house, claiming that he could not believe what he had
just done.
SF testified that after she reported defendant’s actions to the police two days later,
defendant called her and threatened her and her children. SF denied flirting with defendant on
the day in question.
-1-
On cross-examination, SF admitted that her first thought after the assault was that her
husband might have set up the encounter with defendant. She also admitted that in her statement
to the police, she did not mention that defendant had threatened her and her children over the
telephone.
SF’s husband, KF, testified that he asked defendant to change a fuse for his wife on the
day in question and that he was very angry with defendant after his wife told him what happened.
He further testified that a few days after the incident, defendant appeared at his (KF’s) place of
employment, a car wash, and tried to hit him, after which KF hit defendant with a metal pipe.
KF admitted on cross-examination that the police report regarding his confrontation with
defendant at the car wash differed from his trial testimony and that he had been “evasive” in his
statement to the police regarding the confrontation. KF also testified on cross-examination that
he did not argue with his wife over the sexual contact incident; this contradicted SF’s earlier
testimony.
Detroit Police Sergeant Martin Gaynor testified that he interviewed defendant a few days
after the sexual contact incident. Gaynor testified that defendant told him the following: When
he arrived at SF’s house to change some fuses, SF was wearing “a nursing top with only the top
button buttoned” and her breasts were exposed because she wore no bra. While defendant was
reaching toward the fuse box in the basement, SF came up behind him so that her breasts were
on his back. She then came around to his side, and her breasts were on his arm. He told her that
she was going to make him excited because she had “[her] breasts out on me.” He told her to
“get the lotion” so he could masturbate. She then laughed, went upstairs to answer the
telephone, came back downstairs, and said that she did not want to cheat on her husband.
Defendant then fixed the fuses and left. He did not touch SF’s breasts. He did not tell SF that he
wanted to have sex with her, but SF told him that she wanted to have sex with him.
The prosecutor presented no further witnesses, and defense counsel stated, “At this time,
having discussed with [defendant] his absolute right to testify in this matter, [defendant] and I
have decided that he’s going to waive his right to testify, and we’re going to rest at this time . . .
.” The court asked no questions of defendant.
The court then convicted defendant of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, finding that
he did seize SF’s breasts. The court stated, “The question of force I think is patently
demonstrated by the opening of the three snaps described by [SF].”
On appeal, defendant contends that his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel in several respects. Because defendant did not raise this issue below, our review is
limited to mistakes apparent from the record. People v Barclay, 208 Mich App 670, 672; 528
NW2d 842 (1995). Under the two-pronged test for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel,
defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient according to an objective standard
of reasonableness and that the deficiency was so prejudicial that it deprived defendant of a fair
trial. People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302; 613 NW2d 694 (2000). On this latter point, defendant
must demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional error or errors,
the trial outcome would have been different. Id. at 302-303. This Court presumes effective
assistance of counsel, and a defendant bears a heavy burden to overcome this presumption.
People v Garza, 246 Mich App 251, 255; 631 NW2d 764 (2001).
-2-
Defendant contends that his attorney erred by failing to obtain the jacket worn by SF on
the day in question because “[a]n examination of the jacket was crucial to the issue of whether
the alleged groping occurred.” We fail to discern how the introduction of the jacket would have
aided defendant’s case. Indeed, SF did not claim at trial or in her statements to police that
defendant ripped her jacket during the assault. The jacket closed with snaps, meaning that it
easily could have been pulled open without causing any damage. Defendant has failed to
demonstrate that counsel’s failure to examine the jacket or to introduce it at trial was
unreasonable under prevailing professional norms or that it affected the outcome of the trial.
Toma, supra at 302-303.
Defendant further contends that defense counsel erred by failing to call defendant to
testify at trial. This allegation is patently without merit, because the only record evidence on this
issue indicates that defendant himself freely decided to refrain from testifying. Nothing indicates
that defense counsel cajoled defendant into making this decision or otherwise violated prevailing
professional norms.
Finally, defendant points to his statement at sentencing that he agreed to submit to a
polygraph examination when asked to do so by the police. Apparently, the police did not
administer the test. Defendant claims on appeal that “[i]f the police were not willing to provide
the test, it was incumbent upon trial counsel to secure one.” In light of the existing record,
defendant has once again utterly failed to demonstrate that a polygraph examination would likely
have affected the outcome of the case, and appellate relief is unwarranted. Id.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
