PEOPLE OF MI V ROGER DALE WARD JR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 11, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 232657
Berrien Circuit Court
LC No. 2000-410980-FC
ROGER DALE WARD, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr. and Cavanagh, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his convictions of premeditated first-degree murder, MCL
750.316(1)(a), and felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b), for which he was sentenced as a fourth
habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to life in prison. We affirm but remand for entry of an amended
judgment of sentence indicating a single conviction and sentence for first-degree murder,
supported by the alternative theories of premeditation and felony murder.
Defendant was charged with the killing of Kenneth Marlin. The prosecution’s theory of
the case was that defendant, in the early morning of April 9, 2000, robbed the victim, ordered
him into the trunk of his own car, and drove off with him. Later, in an attempt to conceal what
he had done, defendant, with help from an accomplice, Melissa Gray,1 drove the car to Plym
Park, a nearby golf course, and set the car on fire, resulting in the victim’s death. Gray entered
into a plea agreement with the prosecution and testified against defendant.
Defendant’s first issue on appeal relates to the trial court’s statement that Gray’s plea
agreement was made in exchange for her truthful testimony. Defendant contends that the
statement served to bolster Gray’s testimony. We disagree. Because defendant did not object to
the statement at trial, this issue is forfeited unless plain error is established. See People v
Carines, 460 Mich 750, 762-763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
In People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 276; 531 NW2d 659 (1995), our Supreme Court held
that:
1
The record reflects that Gray pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, for her
involvement in the crime.
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reference to a plea agreement containing a promise of truthfulness is in itself [not]
grounds for reversal. A more accurate statement of the law appears to be that,
although such agreements should be admitted with great caution, admissibility of
such an agreement is not necessarily error unless it is used by the prosecution to
suggest that the government had some special knowledge, not known to the jury,
that the witness was testifying truthfully. [Citation omitted.]
Here, there was no mention by the prosecutor about Gray’s plea agreement during closing
arguments; nor was there any further mention by the trial court. As plaintiff argued, there was
no way for the jury to know whether the trial court believed or disbelieved Gray – it was just as
possible that the court did not believe her. The trial court’s statement represented that it would
sentence Gray after her testimony, and the sentence would reflect whether it believed she was
telling the truth. In this regard, the trial court was expressing that it had not yet formed any
opinion as to whether Gray’s testimony was truthful. Consequently, defendant has failed to
show any error, plain or otherwise, on the part of the trial court warranting reversal of his
conviction.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury
on the issue of accomplice testimony with regard to Dennis Davis.2 We disagree. In People v
McCoy, 392 Mich 231, 236; 220 NW2d 456 (1974), our Supreme Court reiterated that, because
accomplice testimony is inherently suspect, a “defendant has a right to have a special cautionary
instruction given to the jury concerning such testimony.” This instruction takes the form of
CJI2d 5.5.
Here, there was evidence to support a conclusion that Davis was an accomplice.
However, the trial court is not required to sua sponte provide a cautionary instruction and such
failure to instruct may be reversible error if the defendant’s guilt is closely drawn. People v
Reed, 453 Mich 685, 692-693; 556 NW2d 858 (1996); McCoy, supra. A defendant’s guilt may
be considered closely drawn if the trial is essentially a credibility contest between the defendant
and the accomplice. See People v Jensen, 162 Mich App 171, 188; 412 NW2d 681 (1987). A
“credibility contest” in this context is one in which, absent the accomplice’s testimony, a rational
trier of fact could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
offense. People v Perry, 218 Mich App 520, 530; 554 NW2d 362 (1996).
In this case, considering the evidence adduced at trial, the issue of defendant’s guilt was
not closely drawn. Even without the testimony of either Gray or Davis, the purported
accomplices, a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant
committed this crime. The evidence included, but was not limited to: (1) witness testimony that
someone resembling defendant was seen at the victim’s house at approximately the time the
victim was alleged to have been taken from his home; (2) defendant’s handprint was found on
the victim’s home telephone; (3) defendant’s friend, Loren McTheeney, testified that after
defendant left to get some drugs, he returned to the house and was driving a “loud car” which he
was not driving earlier and that before defendant left again, he asked McTheeney for a gas can;
2
We note that a cautionary instruction relating to accomplice testimony was read with regard to
Gray.
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(4) other witnesses identified defendant driving a car similar to the one the victim owned; (5)
defendant, as seen on surveillance videotape and by several witnesses, visited a gas station that
morning and purchased a gas can and some gasoline; (6) two witnesses observed defendant and
Gray walking in Plym Park around the time of the fire; (7) when the police seized the clothing
defendant was suspected of having worn on the night of the fire, one of the sleeves on
defendant’s jacket was singed; and (8) a police officer testified that defendant confessed to the
crime. Considering this evidence, the issue of defendant’s guilt was not closely drawn.
Therefore, defendant’s contention that the trial court’s failure to sua sponte instruct the jury on
the issue of accomplice testimony is without merit.
Defendant alternatively argues that, if the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on
its own, his counsel was ineffective for failing to request such an instruction. We again disagree.
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for defense
counsel’s errors, there was a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have
been different. People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 385; 624 NW2d 227 (2001). The defendant
must also overcome the presumption that the challenged action might be considered sound trial
strategy. Id. at 385-386. This Court will not second-guess counsel regarding matters of trial
strategy and, even if defense counsel was ultimately mistaken, this Court will not assess
counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight. People v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App
429, 444-445; 597 NW2d 843 (1999).
Here, defendant fails to rebut the presumption that his trial counsel’s actions amounted to
strategy. Defendant’s theory of the case was that he was not involved in the victim’s death and
that he had no knowledge of the crime. For defense counsel to illustrate that it was necessary to
have an instruction about the unreliability of Davis’ testimony, he would have had to show that
Davis was an accomplice to the crime. See McCoy, supra. However, to do so, the jury would
have had to believe, in part, defendant’s confession to Officer Merrimen. Defendant vehemently
denied making that confession. Therefore, we regard defense counsel’s failure to request such an
instruction a strategic decision. This Court will not review defendant’s trial strategy with the
benefit of hindsight.
Defendant, through his Standard 11 brief, challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion
to exclude crime scene photographs on the grounds that the photographs were not relevant and
were unduly gruesome. We disagree. This Court reviews a trial court’s evidentiary decisions for
an abuse of discretion. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).
In People v Coddington, 188 Mich App 584, 598; 470 NW2d 478 (1991), this Court
stated:
Photographic evidence is admissible if relevant, pertinent, competent, and
material to any issue in the case. The admission of this evidence is within the
sound discretion of the trial court. Photographs are not inadmissible merely
because they may be gruesome and shocking; however, the trial court should
preclude those which could lead the jury to abdicate its truth-finding function and
convict on passion. [Citations omitted, emphasis in original.]
Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of a fact which is of
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consequence to the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
MRE 401; People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 388-389; 582 NW2d 785 (1998). Here, the
photographs were relevant because they were helpful to illustrate the fire pattern. By looking at
the deposits of soot in the car, plaintiff’s fire investigator was able to testify as to where the
accelerant was placed in the car. This evidence was also helpful to corroborate Gray’s testimony
about how defendant poured gasoline on the car before lighting it on fire. Moreover, by looking
at the photographs and studying the damage done to the victim’s body, the expert was able to
gauge the intensity of the fire. The fact that the fire burned as hot as it did led to the examiner’s
conclusion that the fire was most likely set by an accelerant. Finally, the photographs were
helpful for maintaining the chain of custody. Accordingly, the evidence was relevant for those
issues, and was not merely admitted to play on the jurors’ emotions. Although defendant
suggests that he would have been willing to stipulate to the cause of the victim’s death, a
prosecutor is under no obligation to use the least prejudicial evidence available to establish a fact
at issue. People v Fisher, 449 Mich 441, 452; 537 NW2d 577 (1995). Further, we reject
defendant’s contention that the relevance of these photographs was outweighed by their unfair
prejudice.
Defendant also challenges his sentence, contending that he should not have been
sentenced as a fourth habitual offender because two of his convictions actually stemmed from
one transaction. Defendant is correct that multiple convictions that arise out of a single
transaction may count only as a single prior conviction for the purpose of the habitual offender
statute. People v Stoudemire, 429 Mich 262, 278; 414 NW2d 693 (1987), modified by People v
Preuss, 436 Mich 714, 717; 461 NW2d 703 (1990). However, if the convictions arise from
separate criminal incidents, each conviction may be counted as a prior conviction under the
statute. Id.
Here, defendant presents no evidence that his convictions stemmed from a single
transaction. In fact, both defendant and his counsel represented to the trial court at resentencing
that they accepted the fact that the convictions at issue could serve as the basis for defendant’s
habitual offender enhancement. Because defendant failed to show any evidence to the contrary,
we must reject his argument. Further, the sentence for first-degree murder is mandatory life
imprisonment whether or not defendant was sentenced as an habitual offender.
Finally, defendant argues that he was improperly convicted of two first-degree murders
when it was uncontroverted at trial that only one person was killed. We agree. Separate
convictions for both premeditated murder and felony murder in connection with a single instance
of criminal conduct violate the rule against double jeopardy. People v Bigelow, 229 Mich App
218, 220-221; 581 NW2d 744 (1998). Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court with
instructions to issue an amended judgment of sentence reflecting a single conviction for firstdegree murder, supported by the alternative theories of premeditation and felony murder. See
People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 392-393; 633 NW2d 376 (2001); Bigelow, supra.
Affirmed, but remanded for issuance of a corrected judgment of sentence consistent with
this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
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