ADVANTAGE TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORP V MPSC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ADVANTAGE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
CORP.,
UNPUBLISHED
October 11, 2002
Appellant,
v
MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
and HARRY E. WILSON, d/b/a THE HAMAR
HOUSE BED & BREAKFAST,
No. 230840
Public Service Commission
LC No. 00-012137
Appellees.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Cavanagh and R.P. Griffin*
PER CURIAM.
Advantage Telecommunications Corporation appeals by right from the Public Service
Commission’s opinion and order finding that Advantage violated the Michigan
Telecommunications Act [MTA], MCL 484.2101 et seq., in connection with appellee Harry E.
Wilson’s complaint for unauthorized switching of long distance service, a practice commonly
referred to as “slamming.” Advantage was fined $35,000, ordered to pay restitution in the
amount of $1,583.20, and ordered to cease and desist from all further violations of the MTA.
We affirm.
On September 17, 1999, Wilson, on behalf of himself and his business Hamar House Bed
& Breakfast, filed a formal complaint with the MPSC after Advantage changed his long distance
service without his authorization. On September 28, 1999, the MPSC served a copy of the
complaint on appellant. A notice of hearing followed on September 29, 1999. The notice of
hearing informed Advantage that a public hearing would be held October 8, 1999, and that its
answer was due no later than October 6, 1999. Advantage did not appear at the hearing or file an
answer.
At the hearing, Wilson testified that his April 1999 telephone bill had charges for calls
handled by Advantage, although Wilson had a different long distance provider, had not
authorized a switch, and had never been contacted by Advantage. Advantage was very difficult
to contact, placing Wilson on hold for four hours at one point. Wilson explained that when he
* Former Supreme Court justice, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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was finally able to contact someone, he was sent an audiotape of a stranger’s voice saying that he
had selected “Advantage Telecom” as his long distance provider.
The hearing referee issued a proposal for decision in which he found that Advantage had
violated MCL 484.2505.1 Accordingly, the referee imposed what he believed to be the
maximum fine under MCL 484.2506, $20,000, and ordered Advantage to reimburse Wilson for
his expenses in the amount of $683.20. Advantage filed exceptions to the referee’s proposed
decision, stating generally that it was denied due process but not identifying any specific
procedural irregularity. The MPSC rejected appellant’s exceptions because the exceptions were
merely conclusory statements that were unaccompanied by any reasoned discussion of the
evidence and law.
The commission found that the record clearly supported the referee’s finding that
Advantage violated the MTA by switching Wilson’s long distance service without authorization.
The MPSC determined, however, that in addition to a violation of MCL 484.2505, the record
supported the conclusion that Advantage also violated MCL 484.2502 of the MTA. Penalties for
a violation of that section include a fine of not less than $200 or more than $500 per day. MCL
484.2601. The commission imposed the maximum fines set forth in MCL 484.2601 for a total of
$15,500, which it imposed in addition to the $20,000 fine for the violation of MCL 484.2505.
Finally, the commission ordered Advantage to cease and desist from all further violations of the
telecommunications act.
Advantage moved for rehearing, arguing that it was given inadequate time to respond to
the complaint and that the hearing was held in violation of MPSC rules. The commission denied
the motion, finding that the hearing had been conducted in accordance with the time periods set
forth in MCL 484.2203(6). Appellant filed a timely claim of appeal in Ingham County Circuit
Court. On October 23, 2000, Judge Carolyn Stell ordered the case transferred to this Court.
A party challenging an order of the MPSC bears the burden of demonstrating by clear
and satisfactory evidence that the order is unlawful or unreasonable. MCL 462.26(8). To prove
that the order was unlawful, the appellant must demonstrate “‘that the commission failed to
follow some mandatory provision of the statute or was guilty of an abuse of discretion in the
exercise of its judgment.’” In re MCI Telecommunications Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 427; 596
NW2d 164 (1999) (citation omitted). Similarly, “[t]he hurdle of unreasonableness is equally
high. Within the confines of its jurisdiction, there is a broad range or ‘zone’ of reasonableness
within which the PSC may operate.” Id. Although issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed
de novo, “merely establishing that another interpretation of a statue is plausible does not satisfy a
party’s burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the PSC’s interpretation is
unlawful or unreasonable.” In re Michigan Cable Telecommunications Ass’n Complaint, 239
Mich App 686, 690; 609 NW2d 854 (2000).
1
We note that the provisions of the telecommunications act relevant to this case were repealed
effective January 1, 2001. However, the Legislature reenacted the statute in 2000 with
amendments. The current version of the MTA is repealed effective December 31, 2005. The
subsections at issue in this case have remained unchanged.
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At the time of the complaint, the provision at issue, MCL 484.2203, provided in relevant
part:
(1) Upon receipt of an application or complaint filed under this act, or on
its own motion, the commission may conduct an investigation, hold hearings, and
issue its findings and order under the contested hearings provisions of the
administrative procedures act of 1969, Act No. 306 of the Public Acts of 1969,
being sections 24.201 to 24.328 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.
***
(6) If a hearing is required, the applicant or complainant shall publish a
notice of hearing as required by the commission within 7 days of the date the
application or complaint was filed or as required by the commission. The first
hearing shall be held within 10 days after the date of the notice. If a hearing is
held, the commission shall have 180 days from the date the application or
complaint was filed to issue its final order. If the principal parties of record agree
that the complexity of issues involved requires additional time, the commission
may have up to 210 days from the date the application or complaint was filed to
issue its final order.
Advantage contends that the phrase “[t]he first hearing shall be held within 10 days after the date
of the notice” is ambiguous, and that Wilson failed to comply with the statutory requirement that
he “publish” the notice of hearing. Advantage also claims for the first time on appeal that it did
not receive the complaint or notice of hearing until after the hearing had been conducted. We
decline to address this argument because it has not been preserved for appellate review. Attorney
General v Public Service Comm, 243 Mich App 487, 494; 625 NW2d 16 (2000).
Addressing the second argument first, it is clear from the language of subsection (6) that
publication of the notice of hearing is only necessary if the commission requires it. The statute
plainly states that the “complainant shall publish a notice of hearing as required by the
commission” (emphasis added). In this case, the commission apparently concluded that
publication was not necessary and that service by first class mail was sufficient. Consequently,
this argument does not provide grounds for a finding of error.
Advantage’s first argument is similarly flawed. There is no ambiguity in terms of the fact
that the statute requires that the first hearing be held within ten days after the date of the notice of
hearing. Advantage insists that the fact that the statute makes reference to a “first” hearing
means that there must be a second hearing, warranting the conclusion that the “first” hearing
must be a prehearing conference. However, Advantage’s interpretation of the statute
contravenes the rules of statutory interpretation by requiring that language be read into the statute
that the Legislature did not see fit to include, specifically, a requirement for a second hearing.
See J & L Investment Co, LLC v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 233 Mich App 544, 550; 593
NW2d 196 (1999); In re Marin, 198 Mich App 560, 564; 499 NW2d 400 (1993).
Rule 311, 1992 AACS R 460.17311, states that an initial hearing may be either an
evidentiary hearing or a prehearing conference, as directed in the notice of hearing. In this case,
the notice of hearing stated that the hearing scheduled for October 8, 1999, would be a public
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[evidentiary] hearing. Advantage could have asked that the hearing be adjourned or redesignated
as a prehearing conference, but failed to do so despite the fact that the notice of hearing included
a toll-free number at which the commission could be reached.
Advantage also asserts that the commission’s own rules provide for a minimum fourteen
day notice before a hearing. However, the rules state that they apply “except as otherwise
provided by statute.” See, e.g., 1992 AACS R 460.17103(1); 1992 AACS 460.17305(1).
Similarly, although a party normally has twenty-one days after receiving the notice of hearing to
file an answer to a complaint under 1992 AACS 460.17509, the rule also states that the
commission may require a shorter time for answering. In this case, the time limits set forth in
MCL 484.2203(6) supersede the administrative procedural rules.
In conclusion, we find that the commission’s orders in this case were consistent with the
requirements of the MTA and that Advantage has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that
the orders were either unlawful or unreasonable.
We affirm.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Robert P. Griffin
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