PEOPLE OF MI V SALATHEIEL REZA BROWN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 8, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 228762
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 99-002839-FH
SALATHEIEL REZA BROWN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Meter. P.J., and Saad and R.B. Burns*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant of unarmed robbery, MCL 750.530, and sentenced him to a
term of three to fifteen years' imprisonment. He appeals as of right, and we affirm.
Defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to properly prepare
this case for trial and because he failed to object to certain evidence and prosecutorial arguments
at trial. Because defendant did not raise this issue in a motion for a new trial or evidentiary
hearing in the trial court, our review is limited to the existing record. People v Snider 239 Mich
App 393, 423; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that the representation so
prejudiced defendant that he was denied a fair trial. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 338; 521
NW2d 797 (1994). Defendant must overcome the presumption that the challenged action might
be considered sound trial strategy. People v Tommolino, 187 Mich App 14, 17; 466 NW2d 315
(1991). To establish prejudice, defendant must show that there was a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. People v Johnnie
Johnson, Jr, 451 Mich 115, 124; 545 NW2d 637 (1996). The burden is on defendant to produce
factual support for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6;
594 NW2d 57 (1999).
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Defendant argues that his attorney was unprepared for trial. We find nothing in the
record that supports this assertion. It is apparent that defendant received sufficient notice of his
trial dates to be able to timely advise his attorney of any witnesses he wanted to call at trial.
Although defendant complains that certain witnesses were not called, he has failed to show that,
had those witnesses testified, there is a reasonable probability that the result in this case would
have been different. Accordingly, he has not met his burden of proving that counsel was
ineffective. Pickens, supra; Johnson, supra.
Defendant also claims that his attorney should have done more to use defendant’s closedhead injury as a defense at trial. A defendant is entitled to have his counsel prepare, investigate
and present all substantial defenses. Where there is a claim that counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise a defense, the defendant must show that he made a good-faith effort to avail
himself of the right to present a particular defense and that the defense of which he was deprived
was substantial. A substantial defense is one that might have made a difference in the trial's
outcome. People v Kelly, 186 Mich App 524, 526; 465 NW2d 569 (1990). This Court is
reluctant to substitute its judgment for that of trial counsel in matters of trial strategy and
ineffective assistance of counsel will not be found merely because a strategy backfires. People v
Duff, 165 Mich App 530, 545-546; 419 NW2d 600 (1987).
There is nothing in the record to support defendant's claim that his head injury or mental
state would have supported an insanity or related defense. Furthermore, though counsel knew of
defendant's closed-head injury before trial, there is simply no evidence regarding defense
counsel’s investigation or consideration of defendant's injury or mental condition as a possible
defense. In the absence of such testimony, we cannot conclude that counsel erred. People v
Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 77; 601 NW2d 887 (1999).
Defendant also says that defense counsel was ineffective for not objecting at trial to
various evidentiary matters. At trial, the prosecutor presented evidence of both a subsequent and
prior attack upon the victim by defendant. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the record shows
that defense counsel objected when the prosecutor began to present evidence of the subsequent
attack. Moreover, this evidence was admissible as part of the res gestae of the charged crime.
The common law continues to recognize that the entire res gestae of a crime may be admitted
without regard to MRE 404(b). As our Supreme Court observed in People v Sholl, 453 Mich
730, 742; 556 NW2d 851 (1996):
"Evidence of other criminal acts is admissible when so blended or
connected with the crime of which defendant is accused that proof of one
incidentally involves the other or explains the circumstances of the crime."
[Quoting State v Villavicencio, 95 Ariz 199, 201; 388 P2d 245 (1964).]
Because the evidence was admissible under the res gestae exception, it was not necessary to
evaluate whether it was also admissible under MRE 404(b). People v Coleman, 210 Mich App
1, 5; 532 NW2d 885 (1995); People v Crowell, 186 Mich App 505, 508; 465 NW2d 10 (1990).
Further, both defendant and his mother were properly subject to cross-examination regarding this
evidence. Thus, counsel was not ineffective for failing to object on the basis of MRE 404(b).
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Defendant also contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the testimony
of Detective David Dismuke, wherein Dismuke referred to the subsequent assault of the victim to
explain why he was unable to speak to her until about a week after the offense was committed.
As discussed above, the evidence of the subsequent attack was admissible as part of the res
gestae of this offense. Also, we disagree with defendant’s claim that Dismuke’s testimony
explaining how he learned of the victim's location and condition was inadmissible hearsay.
Because the testimony was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, it was not hearsay.
MRE 801(c). Therefore, counsel was not ineffective for failing to object on this basis. See
People v Armstrong, 175 Mich App 181, 186; 437 NW2d 343 (1989).
Defendant further argues, erroneously, that counsel should have objected to testimony
about the victim being hit with a baseball bat, that she required brain surgery, and that she was
placed on a ventilator. Defendant contends that this testimony was unduly prejudicial under
MRE 403. The probative value of this evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice. MRE 403. "Prejudice inures when marginally probative evidence would be
given undue or preemptive weight by the jury." People v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App 429,
441; 597 NW2d 843 (1999). Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to this
evidence. Armstrong, supra.
We likewise conclude that evidence regarding a prior attack on the victim by defendant
was also admissible as part of the res gestae of this offense. Sholl, supra. The prior incident
explained the circumstances leading up to the charged offense. The time lapse between the
events would not foreclose the prosecution from presenting this evidence. See Crowell, supra at
508. Thus, counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to this evidence or the prosecutor's
mention of it in opening statement.
We agree that defense counsel should have objected to the prosecutor’s questions, on
cross-examination of defendant, about whether defendant assaulted a Radio Shack manager.
This other incident was not related to the charged offense and there is no indication that the
evidence was admissible for a proper purpose under MRE 404(b). However, because defendant
denied any involvement in that incident, and no other evidence on that matter was presented, we
conclude that defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object. Pickens, supra;
Johnson, supra.
Similarly, we reject defendant's claim that the prosecutor committed misconduct by
presenting the above evidence. Prosecutorial misconduct cannot be based on a good faith effort
to admit evidence. People v Noble, 238 Mich App 647, 660; 608 NW2d 123 (1999); People v
Missouri, 100 Mich App 310, 328; 299 NW2d 346 (1980). The prosecutor, as an advocate for
the state, is entitled to attempt to introduce evidence which he legitimately believes will be
accepted by the court so long as that attempt does not actually prejudice the defendant. Id. at
328-329. Because the evidence of the prior and subsequent assaults upon the victim was
admissible, the prosecutor did not commit misconduct by presenting such evidence. Further,
even if the prosecutor acted improperly by questioning defendant about an assault upon a Radio
Shack employee, as discussed above, the questioning did not prejudice defendant.
To the extent defendant requests that we remand this matter for an evidentiary hearing on
his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we decline to do so. This Court previously denied
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defendant's motion to remand and defendant has not offered any additional support for his
request. See People v Simmons, 140 Mich App 681, 685-686; 364 NW2d 783 (1985).
Finally, we reject defendant’s claim that his sentence should be reversed. Defendant was
sentenced within the recommended range of the statutory sentencing guidelines. People v
Babcock, 244 Mich App 64, 70-73; 624 NW2d 479 (2000); People v Leversee, 243 Mich App
337, 348; 622 NW2d 325 (2000).
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Robert B. Burns
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