LOGICAL NETWORKS INC V CHARLIE MURDOCK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LOGICAL NETWORKS, INC., d/b/a LOGICAL,
UNPUBLISHED
October 1, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
CHARLIE MURDOCK and DONNA DASILVA,
No. 239779
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 02-037956-CZ
Defendants-Appellees,
Before: Cooper, P.J., and Hoekstra and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff, Logical Networks, Inc. (“Logical”), appeals as of right an order dismissing
plaintiff’s case in favor of defendants, Charlie Murdock and Donna DaSilva. We reverse and
remand.
Bloomfield Computer Systems, Inc. (“BCS”), a small company that sold Hewlett Packard
(“HP”) computer products, hired Murdock as a sales representative in November 1993. After
Murdock was hired, BCS expanded its operations and began selling HP computer products on
consignment. As additional sales representatives were hired, Murdock moved into a managerial
role and executed an employment agreement with BCS on April 15, 1997. DaSilva began
working for BCS as a sales representative in March 1997. DaSilva was also required to sign an
employment agreement as a condition of her employment. She signed the agreement on
February 11, 1997. Both of the employment agreements included a non-competition clause. The
clause essentially provided that for one year following their employment with BCS, defendants
would not engage, either directly or indirectly, with any business that competed with BCS.
Logical, an international professional services and information technology integration
company, purchased the assets of BCS in 1999. At that time, BCS assigned all of its
employment contracts over to Logical. Apparently, neither BCS nor Logical explicitly informed
Murdock or DaSilva that their employment contracts were being assigned to Logical. Moreover,
they did not receive defendants’ express permission for the assignment. Murdock and DaSilva
became Logical employees and continued to work for the company until their voluntarily
resignations in January 2002. After Murdock and DaSilva left Logical, they joined Pepperweed
Consulting, LLC.
As BCS’s successor, Logical commenced this action alleging that defendants breached
their employment and non-competition agreements with Logical. Logical asked the trial court
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for an ex parte temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction prohibiting defendants
from: (1) continuing their employment with Pepperweed; (2) soliciting and contacting customers
and suppliers of Logical; (3) using Logical’s confidential information; (4) soliciting Logical’s
employees; and (5) further breaching the employment agreements. On January 30, 2002, the
trial court granted the temporary restraining order. The order restrained Murdock and DaSilva
from: (1) disclosing or misappropriating Logical’s confidential information; (2) soliciting and
contacting Logical suppliers and customers; and (3) contacting Logical employees for
employment elsewhere. In response, defendant filed a motion to dissolve the temporary
restraining order on the grounds that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
After a hearing on the issue, the trial court dissolved the temporary restraining order
ruling that the employment agreements were personal service contracts and non-assignable
absent consent. As such, the trial court held that Logical lacked standing to enforce the contracts
and dismissed the case. Relying on Detroit Postage Stamp Serv Co v Schermack, 179 Mich 266;
146 NW 144 (1914) and Hy King Assocs, Inc v Versatech Mfg Indus, Inc, 826 F Supp 231 (ED
Mich, 1993), the trial court stated that:
under the specific terms of [d]efendants’ employment agreements with BCS,
[d]efendants were employed as sales representatives to promote and sell BCS
products and services. Thus the contracts are “personal in nature.” Under
Michigan law, the agreements cannot be assigned without [d]efendants’ express
consent, which is lacking here. Accordingly, because [p]laintiff is not a party to
the employment agreements, [p]laintiff lacks standing to enforce the same.
Logical first argues on appeal that the trial court erred when it sua sponte dismissed its
complaint based on the finding that defendants’ employment agreements were non-assignable
personal service contracts. We review a trial court’s decision to dismiss an action for an abuse of
discretion. Vicencio v Ramirez, 211 Mich App 501, 506; 536 NW2d 280 (1995). The proper
construction and interpretation of a contract is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Bandit
Industries, Inc v Hobbs Int’l, Inc, 463 Mich 504, 511; 620 NW2d 531 (2001). Likewise, whether
a party has standing to bring an action is a question of law subject to review de novo on appeal.
Lee v Macomb County Bd of Comm’rs, 464 Mich 726, 734; 629 NW2d 900 (2001). To the
extent Logical argues that the employment contracts in this case were not personal service
contracts, we disagree. However, based on the record presented, we find that defendants’ actions
in this case and the surrounding circumstances indicate an acquiescence to the assignment of
their employment contracts.
The general rule in Michigan is that contracts are freely assignable. Board of Trustees of
Michigan State Univ v Research Corp, 898 F Supp 519, 521-522 (WD Mich, 1995), citing
Detroit T & IR Co v Western U Tel Co, 200 Mich 2, 7; 166 NW 494 (1918). However, it has
long been established that contracts of a personal nature, which contemplate personal association
and services, are an exception to this rule and are not assignable without consent. Northwestern
Cooperage & Lumber Co v Byers, 133 Mich 534, 537; 95 NW 529 (1903); see also Board of
Trustees, supra at 521-522. “Personal contracts are those involving a personal trust in a party or
the special skills and knowledge of a particular individual or group of individuals.” Board of
Trustees, supra at 522; see also Detroit Postage, supra at 275-276.
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In the cases relied upon by the trial court, Detroit Postage, supra and Hy King, supra, the
respective factual scenarios involved a sales agent and a sales representative attempting to assign
their personal service contracts. Both courts clearly held that an agent may not assign a personal
service contract without the other party’s consent. Hy King, supra at 239-240; Detroit Postage,
supra at 274-276. We note that neither of these cases dealt specifically with an employer’s
assignment of rights to an employee’s contract. However, the law is clear that an employee
cannot be compelled to work for another employer. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins Co v Jones, 129
Mich 664, 667-668; 89 NW 580 (1902), see also Northwestern, supra at 539. In Globe, supra at
667-668, our Supreme Court rejected the argument that a personal service contract to work for a
specific company could simply pass to a new corporation formed by a merger. Rather, the Court
held that, “the master cannot shift his liability by turning the servant over to another master . . .
nor can the servant compel the master to accept the services of another person in lieu of his
own.” Id. at 668, quoting Wood, Mast & S § 91. In both situations, the Court found that the
mutual consent of the parties was required to effect a valid assignment. Id.
In the case at bar, Murdock and DaSilva entered into employment agreements with a
small company that dealt primarily with selling HP computer products. Both Murdock and
DaSilva had previously been employed with HP for several years and had extensive experience
working with their product line. Moreover, Murdock and DaSilva were familiar with
consignment sales, an area in which BCS began participating after their employment. This prior
experience, in addition to the nature of their employment and direct interaction with BCS’s
customers, indicates that Murdock’s and DaSilva’s employment contracts were based on
personal trust and the special skills that each brought to BCS. See Board of Trustees, supra at
522; Edison v Babka, 111 Mich 235, 238; 69 NW 499 (1896). Accordingly, we find that the trial
court properly concluded that the employment contracts at issue were personal service contracts
requiring consent for a valid assignment.
Nevertheless, the fact that the contracts in question are personal service contracts does
not reach the issue of whether the non-compete covenants are assignable. We note that the
Michigan case law relied upon by the trial court and defendants also failed to address this issue.
In point of fact, Michigan case law does not specifically address the assignability of noncompete covenants included within employment contracts. A review of the case law throughout
the nation indicates a split of authority regarding the assignability of these covenants.
The majority of jurisdictions addressing this issue have concluded that covenants not to
compete, made in connection with the sale of a business, are assignable on the buyer’s resale of
the business. Farnsworth on Contracts (2d ed), § 11.4, p 79; see also Managed Health Care
Assocs v Kethan, 209 F3d 923 (CA 6, 2000) (applying Kentucky law); Equifax Services, Inc v
Hitz, 905 F2d 1355 (CA 10, 1990) (applying Kansas law); JH Renarde, Inc v Sims, 312 NJ Super
195; 711 A2d 410 (1998). However, some jurisdictions have declined to allow the assignment of
non-compete covenants. These jurisdictions have basically concluded that non-competition
covenants are personal in nature and therefore unenforceable by a new employer. See
Reynolds& Reynolds Co v Hardee, 932 F Supp 149 (ED Va, 1996); UARCO Inc v Lam, 18 F
Supp 2d 1116 (D Haw, 1998); Smith, Bell & Hauck, Inc v Cullins, 123 Vt 96; 183 A2d 528
(1962). While this presents an interesting question for future resolution, we need not address this
issue in the instant case in order to resolve the parties’ appeal.
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After a careful review of the record, it appears to this Court that Murdock and DaSilva
acquiesced to the assignment of the contracts. It is important to note that express consent is
unnecessary to effect a valid acceptance of an assignment. Detroit Postage, supra at 274. In Hy
King, supra at 233, Mr. King contracted with the defendant to become its exclusive sales
representative and thereafter proceeded to incorporate his business. However, defendant, despite
its awareness of the incorporation, continued to do business with Mr. King. Id. at 240. In that
case, the employment contract contained a clause explicitly prohibiting assignment without the
employer’s written consent. Id. at 239. The court noted that “[w]ithout this express restriction,
defendant might have risked unintentionally acquiescing to assignment of the agreement to
someone other than Mr. King.” Id. Accordingly, we find that an assignment of a contract for
personal services can be ratified by the conduct of the parties. See Board of Trustees, supra at
522.
Here, there was no provision in either employment contract regarding assignment.
Nevertheless, Murdock and DaSilva went to work for Logical after it acquired BCS in 1999.
Indeed, for nearly two years Murdock and DaSilva had access to Logical’s customers, vendors,
and other information concerning its business activities. Moreover, it appears from the record
that before Murdock and DaSilva resigned, Logical had continued to implement the
compensation plan in compliance with the employment contracts. Absent further evidence at
trial that Murdock and DaSilva actually refused to consent to the assignments, or that Logical
failed to abide by the terms of the contracts, we conclude that Murdock’s and DaSilva’s actions
and the surrounding circumstances indicate an acquiescence to the assignments.
In light of our decision, defendant’s remaining issue on appeal need not be addressed.
Reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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