SANDY WESTBROOK V CARAVAN KNIGHT FACILITIES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SANDY WESTBROOK,
UNPUBLISHED
September 20, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 232983
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-002557-CZ
v
CARAVAN KNIGHT FACILITIES
MANAGEMENT and JOSEPH JOHNSON,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Cooper, P.J., and Hoekstra and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this sexual harassment case, plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s grant of
summary disposition in favor of defendants and its denial of plaintiff’s motion to amend her
complaint. We affirm.
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition in favor of
defendants. We review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant summary disposition. Spiek v
Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).
In evaluating a motion for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10), “a
trial court considers affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted
by the parties, MCR 2.116(G)(5), in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion” to
determine whether a genuine issue regarding any material fact exists. Maiden v Rozwood, 461
Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). If the nonmoving party fails to present evidentiary
proofs showing a genuine issue of material fact for trial, summary disposition is properly
granted. Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 455, n 2; 597 NW2d 28 (1999).
Here, plaintiff makes three separate claims concerning her position that the trial court
erred in granting summary disposition in favor of defendants. First, plaintiff claims that the trial
court erred in concluding that defendant employer Caravan Knight took appropriate remedial
action against defendant Johnson after plaintiff made a written complaint of sexual harassment to
her employer. An employer is liable for hostile environment sexual harassment only if it failed
to investigate and take prompt, appropriate remedial action after having been put on notice of the
harassment. Chambers v Trettco, Inc, 463 Mich 297, 313; 614 NW2d 910 (2000); Radtke v
Everett, 442 Mich 368, 396; 501 NW2d 155 (1993). In Chambers, supra at 319, our Supreme
Court emphasized that “the relevant inquiry concerning the adequacy of the employer’s remedial
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action is whether the action reasonably served to prevent future harassment of the plaintiff.” See
also Downer v Detroit Receiving Hosp, 191 Mich App 232, 234-235; 477 NW2d 146 (1991).
Here, reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we conclude that summary
disposition was proper because plaintiff has not shown that the remedy was inadequate.
Evidence demonstrated that defendant employer removed Johnson as plaintiff’s supervisor and
told him to have no contact with plaintiff. Plaintiff does not claim that any harassment occurred
after she notified the human resources department and when asked in her deposition if Johnson
“made any untoward comments to [her] or any comments which [she] would consider
offensive,” plaintiff replied “[n]ot that I can recall.” Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue
of material fact concerning the adequacy of the employer’s remedial action.
Next, plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in concluding that plaintiff did not meet her
burden of showing that her employer had constructive knowledge of sexual harassment before
she submitted her written complaint of sexual harassment. According to plaintiff, because
Johnson was both plaintiff’s supervisor and an owner, no notice was necessary for the employer
to be liable for hostile environment sexual harassment because the employer should have known
that Johnson was sexually harassing plaintiff.
An employer cannot be held liable for a hostile work environment unless it received
actual or constructive notice of the harassing conduct. Sheridan v Forest Hills Public Schools,
247 Mich App 611, 621; 637 NW2d 536 (2001). Notice is considered adequate if, under the
totality of the circumstances, a reasonable employer would have known there was a substantial
probability that an employee was being sexually harassed. Chambers, supra at 319; Sheridan,
supra at 622.
Here, plaintiff offered no evidence that she told anyone about the alleged harassment or
that any incident occurred in the presence of higher management. Instead, she suggests that
Johnson’s involvement sufficed as constructive notice to the employer. In support of her
argument plaintiff cites only one case, Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368; 501 NW2d 155 (1993),
which is clearly distinguishable from the present case. In Radtke, the alleged harasser, who
committed a physical sexual assault on the employee, owned the company in equal shares with
one other person and had the ability to control the employee’s working conditions and wages, to
discipline her, and to fire her. Radtke, supra at 374-375, 397. In the present case, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the alleged harasser owned, at most, a small
percentage of a separate company that held an interest in defendant employer and there is no
evidence he had the authority of an employer; rather, the evidence demonstrates, at most, that
Johnson was her supervisor. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact
concerning whether the employer had constructive knowledge of the alleged sexual harassment.
Plaintiff further claims that the trial court erred in concluding that the complained of
conduct was not severe and pervasive enough to rise to the level of hostile environment sexual
harassment. Again, we disagree.
“[W]hether a hostile work environment existed shall be determined by whether a
reasonable person, in the totality of circumstances, would have perceived the conduct at issue as
substantially interfering with the plaintiff’s employment or having the purpose or effect of
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment environment.” Radtke, supra at 394.
Stated another way, “to survive summary disposition, plaintiff had to present documentary
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evidence to the trial court that a genuine issue existed regarding whether a reasonable person
would find that, in the totality of circumstances, [the harasser’s] comments to plaintiff were
sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment.” Quinto v Cross & Peters
Co, 451 Mich 358, 369; 547 NW2d 314 (1996). Viewing the evidence presented in a light most
favorable to plaintiff, no reasonable person would conclude that the alleged conduct was severe
or pervasive nor that over an approximately seven month period the conduct substantially
interfered with plaintiff’s employment or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
environment. Summary disposition was appropriate.
Plaintiff also argues, in essence, that the trial court erred in denying her motion to amend
her complaint to add a quid pro quo sexual harassment count because amendment would be
futile. We disagree. We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s denial of a motion to
amend a complaint. Dowerk v Oxford Charter Twp, 233 Mich App 62, 75; 592 NW2d 724
(1998).
To establish a claim of quid pro quo harassment, an employee must demonstrate:
(1) that she was subject to any of the types of unwelcome sexual conduct or
communication described in the statute, and (2) that her employer or the
employer’s agent used her submission to or rejection of the proscribed conduct as
a factor in a decision affecting her employment. [Chambers, supra at 310,
quoting Champion v Nation Wide Security, Inc, 450 Mich 702, 708-709; 545
NW2d 596 (1996).]
“[Q]uid pro quo harassment occurs only where an individual is in a position to offer tangible job
benefits in exchange for sexual favors or, alternatively, threaten job injury for a failure to
submit.” Champion, supra at 713.
Here, the trial court concluded that the amendment was futile because plaintiff did not
reject the advances “in this employment context.” Even if this conclusion is erroneous,
plaintiff’s motion to amend was properly denied because plaintiff did not propose any new
factual scenario that would sustain a quid pro quo harassment claim. Schellenberg v Rochester
Elks, 228 Mich App 20, 47; 577 NW2d 163 (1998) (“This Court will not reverse a trial court's
decision if the right result is reached for the wrong reason.”); Champion, supra; see Plumb v
Abbott Laboratories, 60 F Supp 2d 642, 649 (ED Mich, 1999) (“Merely offensive sexual conduct
which is not directed at an employee with the explicit or implicit understanding that fulfillment
of a sexual proposition will lead to job benefits or that rejection of sexual advances will yield
serious employment consequences, does not give rise to a quid pro quo claim.”).
Affirmed.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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