BARBARA BLAMER V HERNAN LEONES GUIANG MD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
BARBARA BLAMER,
UNPUBLISHED
September 20, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 231478
Muskegon Circuit Court
LC No. 00-040284-NH
V
DR. HERNAN LEONES GUIANG, M.D., and
MERCY HEALTH SERVICES,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Hood and Murray, JJ.
Per Curiam
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting summary disposition in favor of
defendants. We affirm.
On July 16, 1998, defendant doctor changed plaintiff’s medication from Procardia to
Diovan. On July 30, 1998, plaintiff telephoned defendant doctor’s office and reported flu-like
symptoms, a reaction to the Diovan. Defendant doctor instructed plaintiff to discontinue the
medication for one week, then resume taking the medication. On August 7, 1998, after resuming
the medication, plaintiff was hospitalized after suffering a severe reaction. Plaintiff filed a
complaint alleging medical malpractice on August 2, 2000. The trial court granted defendants’
motion for summary disposition based on the statute of limitations.
Plaintiff alleges that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary
disposition because there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the cause of action accrued
on August 7, 1998, the date she resumed the medication. We disagree. An appellate court
reviews the grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition de novo to determine if the
moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109,
118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). In the absence of disputed facts, whether a cause of action is barred
by the statute of limitations is a question of law for the trial judge. Solowy v Oakwood Hospital
Corp, 454 Mich 214, 230; 561 NW2d 843 (1997). Generally, a plaintiff in a medical malpractice
case must bring a claim within two years of the claim’s accrual or within six months of the
discovery of the claim. MCL 600.5805(4). Medical malpractice claims accrue “at the time of
the act or omission that is the basis for the claim of medical malpractice, regardless of the time
the plaintiff discovers or otherwise has knowledge of the claim.” MCL 600.5838(a)(1). Solowy,
supra at 220. Plaintiff’s claim accrued on July 30, 1998. See McKiney v Clayman, 237 Mich
App 198, 207; 602 NW2d 612 (1999). Plaintiff’s attempt to extend the statute of limitations
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period based on a “continuing wrong” theory is without merit. This Court declined to extend the
continuing violations doctrine or continuing wrongful acts doctrine to negligence claims. Traver
Lakes Community Maintenance Ass’n v Douglas Co, 224 Mich App 335, 341; 568 NW2d 847
(1997). Furthermore, the Traver Court noted that the continuing violations doctrine was
established by “continual tortuous acts, not by continual harmful effects from an original,
completed act.” Id. at 340-341. Even assuming that the continuing wrong acts doctrine applied
to medical malpractice claims, plaintiff merely alleged continued harmful effects from the
original act. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted defendants’ motion for summary
disposition.
Affirmed.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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