PEOPLE OF MI V DEON D JACKSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 20, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 229097
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-001759
DEON D. JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Griffin and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of assault with intent to murder, MCL
750.83, three counts of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL
750.84, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. He was
sentenced as a second-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to concurrent prison terms of
seventeen to fifty years for the assault with intent to murder conviction, and three to ten years for
each assault with intent to do great bodily harm conviction, plus a consecutive two-year term for
the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
I
Defendant first argues that his waiver of his right to a jury trial was not voluntarily,
intelligently, and understandingly made. Defendant claims that his waiver was based on defense
counsel’s unfulfilled promise of leniency and counsel’s indication that he had a prior
professional relationship with the judge.1 Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court
denied defendant’s motion for a new trial on this basis, concluding that the waiver was
voluntarily, intelligently, and understandingly made. We agree with the trial court.
This Court reviews a trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of
discretion. People v Brown, 239 Mich App 735, 744-745; 610 NW2d 234 (2000). A trial court’s
determination that a defendant validly waived his right to a jury trial is reviewed for clear error.
People v Leonard, 224 Mich App 569, 595; 569 NW2d 663 (1997). A finding is clearly
1
At the evidentiary hearing, defense counsel testified that he told defendant that he knew the
judge, and that defendant may have a better chance with the judge rather than a jury, but
indicated that no promises were made by anyone.
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erroneous where, after reviewing the entire record, we are “left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.” People v Parker, 230 Mich App 337, 339; 584 NW2d
336 (1998).
A defendant’s waiver of his constitutional right to trial by jury must be made voluntarily,
intelligently, and knowingly. People v Godbold, 230 Mich App 508, 512; 585 NW2d 13 (1998);
People v Reddick, 187 Mich App 547, 549; 468 NW2d 278 (1991). MCR 6.402(B) sets forth the
procedure for securing a proper jury trial waiver:
Before accepting a waiver, the court must advise the defendant in open
court of the constitutional right to trial by jury. The court must also ascertain, by
addressing the defendant personally, that the defendant understands the right and
that the defendant voluntarily chooses to give up that right and to be tried by the
court. A verbatim record must be made of the waiver proceeding.
In the present case, on the first day of trial, defense counsel advised the court that
defendant wished to waive his right to a jury. Defense counsel stated on the record that
defendant understood his constitutional rights, and defendant had been advised that he should not
expect any particular verdict because of his waiver. Thereafter, the trial court made inquiries of
defendant.
The record demonstrates the trial court complied with the requirements of MCR
6.402(B), and defendant unequivocally testified on the record that there had been no promises of
leniency, threats, or coercion. Defendant’s claim that his waiver was based on illusory promises
of leniency is contrary to the record made in open court and, therefore, must be rejected. See
People v Gist, 188 Mich App 610, 611-612; 470 NW2d 475 (1991). In addition, defendant
completed a waiver form, as prescribed by MCL 763.3. Despite his explicit denial that any
promises were made, defendant makes much of his interrupted attempt to tell the court about “his
understanding” during the waiver proceeding. However, a trial court is not required to engage in
a colloquy with a defendant to determine whether a waiver of jury trial is predicated on any
promise of leniency or other misleading statements. People v Shields, 200 Mich App 554, 560561; 504 NW2d 711 (1993); People v Margoes, 141 Mich App 220, 223-224; 366 NW2d 254
(1985). Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err by accepting defendant’s waiver of jury
trial, or abuse its discretion by denying his motion for a new trial on this basis.
II
Defendant next argues there was insufficient evidence to convict him of assault with
intent to murder or disprove that he acted in self-defense. He further argues that the verdict is
against the great weight of the evidence. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for new trial
on this basis. Again, we agree with the trial court.
We review the trial court’s findings of fact for clear error, MCR 2.613(C), and give
special deference to the trial court’s resolution of factual issues involving the credibility of the
witnesses. People v Cartwright, 454 Mich 550, 555; 563 NW2d 208 (1997).
When ascertaining whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support a
conviction, this Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and
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determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992),
amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). This Court will not interfere with the trier of fact’s role of
determining the weight of evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Id. at 514.
In evaluating whether a verdict is against the great weight of the evidence, the question is
whether the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict so that it would be a miscarriage
of justice to allow the verdict to stand. People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 627; 576 NW2d 129
(1998); People v Gadomski, 232 Mich App 24, 28; 592 NW2d 75 (1998). Conflicting testimony
and questions regarding the credibility of witnesses are not sufficient grounds for granting a new
trial. Lemmon, supra at 643. A verdict may be vacated only when it “does not find reasonable
support in the evidence, but is more likely to be attributed to causes outside the record such as
passion, prejudice, sympathy, or some extraneous influence.” People v DeLisle, 202 Mich App
658, 661; 509 NW2d 885 (1994).
To sustain a conviction for assault with intent to murder, the prosecution must establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed: “(1) an assault, (2) with an actual intent
to kill, (3) which, if successful, would make the killing murder.” People v Hoffman, 225 Mich
App 103, 111; 570 NW2d 146 (1997); see also MCL 750.83. Circumstantial evidence and
reasonable inferences arising from the evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements
of the crime. People v Truong (After Remand), 218 Mich App 325, 337; 553 NW2d 692 (1996).
An intent to kill may be inferred from the facts in evidence, and because the state of an actor’s
mind is difficult to prove, only minimal circumstantial evidence is required. People v McRunels,
237 Mich App 168, 181; 603 NW2d 95 (1999).
Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to sustain
defendant’s conviction for assault with intent to murder. There was evidence at trial that
complainant Aaron Williams moved in with his sister, Tiffany Williams, and her boyfriend,
defendant, in a house owned by defendant’s mother. After a few months, defendant and the
complainant began having conflicts, and the complainant was told to leave. The complainant
moved in with a different sister, Dawntra Young. Shortly thereafter, the complainant and
Tiffany had an argument and physical altercation, wherein the complainant struck Tiffany,
resulting in noticeable injuries. Three days later, the complainant called Tiffany and made
arrangements to come to defendant and Tiffany’s home to retrieve his belongings. At Young’s
request, defendant’s mother called the house and asked Tiffany to place the complainant’s
belongings on the curb. Young drove the complainant to defendant’s house; an eight-year old
child was seated in the front passenger seat, and the complainant and Young’s two-week-old
child were seated in the back. Defendant’s mother and stepfather followed the complainant and
Young to defendant’s house in a separate car to eliminate the possibility of any trouble.
After the cars arrived at defendant’s home, Young parked on the street with all of her
passengers, including the complainant, remaining in the car, while defendant’s mother knocked
on the side door. At that point, defendant charged toward Young’s car, with a club raised in the
air and a gun hidden in his waistband underneath his shirt. Defendant’s mother testified that
defendant yelled, “come on out man and do what you said you was going to do to me.” At this
time, the complainant was still seated in the back of the car. Once defendant was within a few
feet of the car, he dropped the club, pulled the gun from his waistband, fired one shot into the
back tire, and then fired numerous shots into the front and back of the car, until the weapon was
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unloaded. Defendant, himself, testified that he shot two or three times into the back car door,
“[b]ecause that’s where [the complainant] was sitting.” The complainant was shot in the arm and
the spine and, as a result, was left without the use of his lower extremities. Viewed most
favorably to the prosecution, this evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction for
assault with intent to commit murder.
The evidence was also sufficient to disprove defendant’s claim of self-defense. Selfdefense requires that the defendant honestly and reasonably believe that he or another2 was in
imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm, that the action taken appeared at the time to be
immediately necessary, that the defendant was not the initial aggressor, and that the defendant
did not use any more force than is necessary to defend himself. People v Kemp, 202 Mich App
318, 322; 508 NW2d 184 (1993). Proof that a defendant’s belief of imminent danger was not
honest or reasonable is sufficient to defeat a claim of self-defense or defense of others. People v
Fortson, 202 Mich App 13, 20; 507 NW2d 763 (1993).
Here, defendant’s self-defense theory was based on the complainant’s prior assault of
Tiffany, prior threats against defendant, and the complainant’s history of assaultive and violent
behavior, coupled with defendant’s allegation that he observed Aaron reaching under the car
seat. Initially, we note that the trial court found that defendant’s claim that he observed the
complainant reaching under his seat was not credible, and that any belief defendant may have
had that the complainant posed a threat was unreasonable under the circumstances. As
previously indicated, special deference is given to a trial court's resolution of factual issues
involving the credibility of the witnesses. Cartwright, supra.
Further, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence plainly enabled
the trier of fact to find that defendant, not the complainant, was the aggressor and that defendant
was not in imminent danger. Again, the complainant never exited the car and was unarmed, yet
defendant left the safety of his home, rushed toward the car with a club, pulled out a gun, shot
out the back tire thereby disabling the vehicle, and proceeded to fire numerous shots into the car.
In addition, there is no evidence that defendant’s actions were in defense of Tiffany, who was
standing on the front porch, which was more than thirty-five feet from the car. Even if defendant
had reason to fear the complainant because of prior threats or assaults, that does not excuse the
requirement that he be in imminent danger at the time of the use of deadly force. Truong (After
Remand), supra (even in the face of previous threats, a “preemptive strike” is not any form of
self-defense). Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to disprove defendant’s claim of selfdefense.
We further conclude that the verdict is not against the great weight of the evidence. The
evidence does not clearly preponderate so heavily against the verdict that a miscarriage of justice
would result if the verdict was allowed to stand. Lemmon, supra. Accordingly, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial on this basis.
2
The right to act in self-defense generally includes the right to defend another. People v Curtis,
52 Mich 616, 622; 18 NW 385 (1884); People v Wright, 25 Mich App 499, 503; 181 NW2d 649
(1970).
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We note that, within this issue, defendant fleetingly challenges the trial court’s findings
as insufficient and inconsistent with the evidence. MCR 2.517 requires a trial court sitting
without a jury to find the facts specially, state separately its conclusions of law, and direct entry
of the appropriate judgment. The requirements of the court rule are satisfied as long as it appears
from the court's findings that the court was aware of the factual issues and correctly applied the
law. People v Wardlaw, 190 Mich App 318; 475 NW2d 387 (1991). Here, the trial court fully
summarized the facts of the case and correctly focused on the elements of the charged crimes.
Contrary to defendant’s claim, the trial court’s findings are not inconsistent with the evidence,
and the mere fact that defendant disagrees with the outcome is insufficient to warrant reversal.
III
Defendant also argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of three counts
of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, and that the verdicts for those
counts are against the great weight of the evidence. The trial court denied defendant’s motion
for new trial on this basis. We agree with the trial court.
To sustain a conviction for assault with intent to do great bodily harm, the prosecution
must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed: (1) an attempt or threat
with force or violence to do corporal harm to another (an assault), and (2) an intent to do great
bodily harm less than murder. People v Parcha, 227 Mich App 236, 239; 575 NW2d 316
(1997). The requisite specific intent may be inferred from the defendant’s conduct. Id.
Here, defendant claims there was no evidence that he intended to harm Young or the two
children. However, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, defendant’s act of firing
a handgun from close range numerous times into the car in which the three victims were seated
was sufficient to infer that defendant intended to commit great bodily harm. Id. There was also
evidence that, after defendant emptied the gun, Young exited the car in an attempt to take the
children to a place of safety. At that point, defendant hit Young in the back of the head with the
gun, knocked her to the ground, and proceeded to punch and kick her. The evidence was
sufficient to sustain defendant’s convictions for three counts of assault with intent to do great
bodily harm. Further, given the evidence presented, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying defendant’s motion for a new trial on this basis. Lemmon, supra.
IV
Next, defendant argues that the trial court’s questioning of witnesses deprived him of a
fair trial. We disagree.
Because defendant failed to raise this claim below, this Court reviews this unpreserved
claim for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights, i.e., that it affected the outcome of
the proceedings. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999); People v
Collier, 168 Mich App 687, 697; 425 NW2d 118 (1988).
A trial court has wide, but not unlimited, discretion and power in the matter of trial
conduct. People v Cole, 349 Mich 175, 199-200; 84 NW2d 711 (1957). A trial court may
question witnesses in order to clarify testimony or elicit additional relevant information, but the
court must exercise caution and restraint to ensure that its questions are not intimidating,
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argumentative, prejudicial, unfair, or partial. MRE 614(b); People v Conyers, 194 Mich App
395, 404; 487 NW2d 787 (1992). A court’s questioning of a witness does not deprive the
defendant of a fair trial if the questions are limited in scope, material to the issues in the case,
posed in a neutral manner, and neither add to nor distort the evidence. People v Davis, 216 Mich
App 47, 50; 549 NW2d 1 (1996). The fact that testimony elicited by a trial court’s questions
damaged a defendant’s case does not demonstrate that the trial court improperly assumed the role
of surrogate prosecutor. Id. at 51. “As long as the questions would be appropriate if asked by
either party and, further, do not give the appearance of partiality, . . . a trial court is free to ask
questions of witnesses that assist in the search for truth.” Id. at 52.
Applying the above criteria, our review of the record indicates that the challenged
questions by the trial court to Tiffany were not improper. During defense counsel’s direct
examination of Tiffany, she testified that she saw the complainant reach for something on the
floor of the car and that she turned her back and then heard shots. This testimony suggested that
the complainant acted in conformance with someone reaching for a weapon and, thus, that
defendant acted in self-defense. As brought out by the trial court’s questioning, the
inconsistency in Tiffany’s testimony was that, after allegedly observing the complainant reach
underneath his seat, she did not alert defendant, but rather walked back into the house to watch
television. In response to the court’s questions, Tiffany testified that she did not believe that the
complainant was reaching for a gun, did not see the complainant with a gun, and did not believe
that he had a gun. We conclude that, under these circumstances, the court’s questions were
proper because Tiffany’s observations were relevant to the claims in this case, particularly
defendant’s claim of self-defense, and the court’s questions helped clarify ambiguities in her
testimony. Moreover, the court’s questions were not intimidating, argumentative, prejudicial,
unfair, or partial. Cf. Conyers, supra.
We note that defendant provides transcript citations to other instances where the trial
court allegedly improperly questioned witnesses. Apart from providing the transcript cites,
defendant provides no explanation or argument concerning the propriety of the questions. “An
appellant may not merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and
rationalize the basis for his claims.” People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 587; 629 NW2d 411
(2001). In any event, we have reviewed the court’s questions and find no judicial impropriety
where the questions clarified testimony or elicited additional relevant information and were not
prejudicial. Accordingly, defendant has failed to demonstrate plain error, and thus, reversal is
not warranted on this basis.
V
Defendant argues that he was denied a fair and impartial trial because of several instances
of prosecutorial misconduct. We disagree.
Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are generally reviewed on a case by case basis to
determine whether the defendant was denied a fair trial. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 266267; 531 NW2d 659 (1995); People v Noble, 238 Mich App 647, 660; 608 NW2d 123 (1999).
The challenged remarks must be viewed in context. Id. In this case, however, because defendant
failed to timely object to the alleged prosecutorial misconduct, this Court reviews this issue for
outcome-determinative plain error. Carines, supra; People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 720;
613 NW2d 370 (2000).
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Viewed as a whole and in context, none of the challenged conduct rises to the level of
error requiring reversal. Defendant first argues that the prosecutor impermissibly asked him to
comment on the credibility of other witnesses. It is improper for the prosecutor to ask a witness
to comment on the credibility of another witness because credibility is a determination for the
trier of fact. People v Buckey, 424 Mich 1, 17; 378 NW2d 432 (1985). However, we agree with
the trial court’s finding that, although the questions may have been improper, they did not deny
defendant a fair trial. We are not persuaded that any error in defendant’s testimony affected this
bench trial verdict. “A judge, unlike a juror, possesses an understanding of the law which allows
him to ignore such errors and to decide a case based solely on the evidence properly admitted at
trial.” See People v Jones, 168 Mich App 191, 194; 423 NW2d 614 (1988). Moreover, our
review of the record shows that the trial court found defendant guilty on the basis of properly
admitted evidence. Because the trial court’s decision was not affected by the disputed testimony,
defendant has failed to demonstrate outcome-determinative plain error.
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor improperly elicited other acts testimony from
the complainant that defendant had offered him a job selling narcotics. Here, the complainant’s
reference to selling drugs was inadvertent and unsolicited. The prosecutor merely asked the
witness how he came to live with defendant and Tiffany, which merely required the portion of
his answer explaining that, after he got out of jail, he did not have a place to live. In general, a
nonresponsive volunteered answer to a proper question is not cause for granting a mistrial.
People v Kelsey, 303 Mich 715, 717; 7 NW2d 120 (1942); People v Yarbrough (On Remand), 86
Mich App 105, 108; 272 NW2d 345 (1978). Further, there were not any repeated references to
defendant’s alleged offer. Accordingly, defendant has failed to demonstrate plain error, and
thus, this claim does not warrant reversal.
Defendant further argues that the prosecutor improperly accused him of “beating up” his
girlfriend. During direct examination, defendant testified that, after the complainant moved into
the house, problems arose because the complainant tried to “break up” defendant’s relationship
with Tiffany. On cross-examination, the prosecutor challenged defendant by asking whether the
complainant’s interference with the relationship was due to his concerns about defendant
“beating up Tiffany.” We conclude that once defense counsel elicited testimony concerning the
complainant’s interference in the relationship, the circumstances and explanation regarding his
intrusive behavior became relevant. See MRE 401. A defendant cannot complain of the
admission of testimony that he invited or instigated in an effort to support his defense. In other
words, defendant opened the door to the challenged evidence. See, generally, People v Paquette,
214 Mich App 336, 342; 543 NW2d 342 (1995); People v Lipps, 167 Mich App 99, 108; 421
NW2d 586 (1988). Accordingly, because defendant has failed to demonstrate plain error, this
issue does not warrant reversal.
VI
Defendant next argues that he is entitled to a new trial because defense counsel was
ineffective. We disagree.
Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden of
proving otherwise. Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674
(1984); People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994); People v Effinger,
212 Mich App 67, 69; 536 NW2d 809 (1995). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a
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defendant must show that counsel’s performance was below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing norms and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Id.
Defendant first claims that defense counsel was ineffective by failing to present two
additional witnesses who observed the complainant’s assault of Tiffany three days before the
shooting and the corresponding police report and pictures of Tiffany’s injuries, and by failing to
present evidence concerning the complainant’s criminal history and reputation for violence.
Defendant claims that this evidence would have bolstered his testimony and his claim of selfdefense.3 Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that, but for these alleged
omissions, the outcome of the trial would not have been different and, thus, defendant is not
entitled to a new trial.
Ineffective assistance of counsel can take the form of a failure to call witnesses or present
other evidence only if the failure deprives the defendant of a substantial defense. People v Hoyt,
185 Mich App 531, 537-538; 462 NW2d 793 (1990); People v Julian, 171 Mich App 153, 158159; 429 NW2d 615 (1988); People v Wilson, 159 Mich App 345, 354; 406 NW2d 294 (1987).
A defense is substantial if it might have made a difference in the outcome of the trial. People v
Kelly, 186 Mich App 524, 526; 465 NW2d 569 (1990).
Here, defendant has not established that counsel’s failure to present the additional
evidence prejudiced his defense, i.e., that he was deprived of a substantial defense. First, it is
clear from the record that the proposed testimony of the two witnesses would have been
cumulative to the testimony offered by Tiffany and that of an additional witness who was present
during the assault. Further, there was substantial testimony, including the complainant’s own
testimony, that Tiffany was indeed assaulted and injured by the complainant. Accordingly, as
the trial court concluded, the additional witnesses and photographs would have been cumulative.
More compelling, however, is that in light of the evidence presented at trial, the proposed
evidence would have been insignificant to defendant’s self-defense claim. As discussed in
part II, defendant’s reason to fear the complainant because of prior threats and assaults did not
excuse the requirement that he be in imminent danger at the time he used deadly force. Truong
(After Remand), supra. Therefore, defendant has failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s alleged failure to present the additional evidence, the result of
the proceedings would have been different. Effinger, supra. Accordingly, defendant is not
entitled to a new trial on this basis.
Defendant also argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to make certain
objections. We disagree.
Defendant claims that defense counsel was ineffective by failing to object to a police
witness’ testimony regarding witnesses’ identifying defendant as the shooter because it was
hearsay. However, “[t]hird-party identification testimony by a police officer, including
3
At the hearing, defendant testified that he and Tiffany advised defense counsel of the additional
evidence.
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repetition of the statements of identification, is not hearsay, and the admission of such testimony
is within the discretion of the trial court.” MRE 801(d)(1); People v Legrone, 205 Mich App 77,
83; 517 NW2d 270 (1994). Further, it was undisputed that defendant was the shooter.
With regard to the remaining claims, as discussed in part V, defendant failed to show that
the prosecutor’s conduct denied him a fair trial and, therefore, defense counsel’s failure to object
did not prejudice defendant. Further, as discussed in part IV, the trial court’s questioning of
certain witnesses was not improper and, therefore, defense counsel was not required to make
futile objections. People v Darden, 230 Mich App 597, 604-605; 585 NW2d 27 (1998).
Accordingly, because defendant has failed to establish that defense counsel was ineffective
during trial, he is not entitled to a new trial on this basis. Pickens, supra; Effinger, supra.
VII
Defendant’s final claim is that he was denied due process when the trial court sentenced
him as a second-offense habitual offender because the prosecutor had not proved he was guilty
of the offense, and the court made no such finding. We disagree.4
MCL 769.13(5) provides that the trial court must determine the existence of the
defendant’s prior convictions at sentencing or at a separate hearing for that purpose before
sentencing. People v Zinn, 217 Mich App 340, 345; 551 NW2d 704 (1996). The existence of a
defendant’s prior convictions may be established, as it was in this case, by information contained
in the presentence report. MCL 769.13(5); People v Green, 228 Mich App 684, 700; 580 NW2d
444 (1998). Further, due process is satisfied if the sentence is based on accurate information and
the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to challenge the information at sentencing. Zinn,
supra at 347-348; see also People v Williams, 215 Mich App 234, 236; 544 NW2d 480 (1996).
Here, defendant was arraigned on an information that included a notice of enhancement
for habitual offender, second offense. The presentence report listed defendant as an habitual
offender, and included details of defendant’s prior felony conviction. Moreover, at defendant’s
sentencing hearing, the prosecutor and the trial court explicitly recognized defendant as an
habitual offender. In discussing the guidelines, defense counsel likewise acknowledged that
defendant was an habitual offender. Defendant has never challenged the accuracy of the
information concerning his prior conviction, and he had ample opportunity to do so at
sentencing. Accordingly, the trial court properly relied on the uncontested information to
sentence defendant as an habitual offender, and defendant is not entitled to resentencing.
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
4
Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial on
this basis, relying on Zinn, supra.
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