PEOPLE OF MI V RODRICK D DAVIS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 20, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 228528
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 99-003770
RODRICK D. DAVIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Gage and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of felony murder, MCL
750.316(1)(b). The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent life sentences with no
possibility of parole. We reverse.
I. Facts and Proceedings
In the early morning hours of March 24, 1999, a house located at 12753 Stoepel in
Detroit caught fire. Inside the house were three people, eighteen-year-old April Fleming, her
mother, Yvonne Fleming Seay, and her father, John Seay. Because the doors were barred by
security gates, they retreated to an upstairs bedroom. John Seay ordered his wife and daughter to
jump out a second story window, and then he jumped out another window. John Seay survived
the fire, but April and her mother did not escape and died from carbon monoxide poisoning.
The Detroit Fire Department investigated and concluded that the cause of the fire was
arson. Albert Hood, an expert in the cause and origin of fires from the Detroit Fire Department
Arson Squad, testified that in his opinion the fire was intentionally set, using gasoline poured
next to the house. The fire was very fast-burning, progressing to an extremely dangerous level in
a matter of minutes. Samples, found partially through the use of an arson dog, confirmed the
presence of gasoline in various areas behind the house.
The morning of the fire, April’s sister called one of April’s friends, LaReesa Linder, to
tell her April was dead and to ask her to find defendant, April’s former boyfriend. Linder and
another friend, Sherita Lyons, drove to defendant’s home and told him what had happened.
Linder and Lyons testified that defendant did not seem upset, that defendant told them to “quit
playing,” and asked “how could this happen?” Defendant confirmed the conversation and stated
he did not believe Linder and Lyons because they were “snickering” when they told him the
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news. The three drove to April’s house together in Linder’s car. When they arrived at April’s
house, April’s sister accused defendant of stalking April. Defendant did not respond to the
accusation, and his uncle pulled him away.
The Detroit Police Department began their homicide investigation at the scene, including
the gathering of statements. Officer Terrell Shaw spoke to Rochell Carr, one of April’s friends,
who told him that defendant had been stalking April and that April’s sister had accused
defendant of stalking April. Officer Shaw asked Seay if he could identify defendant, and after he
did so Officer Shaw directed officers to place defendant in a police car and take him around the
corner. Defendant was placed in the back of a police car and taken around the corner from the
scene. Defendant asserts he was handcuffed, but this was denied by the police at trial.
Approximately fifteen minutes later, Officer Shaw moved defendant to his car and took
defendant to the precinct. Defendant claimed he was again handcuffed. Officer Shaw, however,
denied at the suppression hearing that defendant was handcuffed or even under arrest. At trial,
though, Officer Shaw admitted that he arrested defendant himself before he took defendant to the
precinct.
After defendant’s arrest, Carr apparently also told the police that April had told her that
defendant had followed April the day before the fire and when confronted, told April he didn’t
have anything better to do. Carr also told the police that she had spoken to April on the
telephone from 11:45 p.m. until 1:30 a.m. the morning of the fire, that she heard call waiting
clicking in a number of times during the conversation, and that April told her on one occasion
that her sister was calling, but another time told her that defendant was calling. Carr told the
police that the conversation ended when April told Carr she had to get off the phone because
“Roderick keeps calling me.” Also in the evening after defendant had been arrested, Linder told
the police about the encounter with defendant after she learned of April’s death, and that April
had said that defendant told April that he could not live without her. Lyons told Arson
Investigator Hood on the morning of March 24, 1999, that she thought defendant’s reaction to
April’s death was strange and that he did not cry. Lyons did not tell the police about the stalking
accusation made by April’s sister, however, until her statement was taken the evening after
defendant was arrested. There was no evidence that Officer Shaw was aware of any of this
additional information when he arrested defendant.
Defendant was questioned at the precinct, either in an interrogation room or the general
area with the desks and other office equipment. Before questioning, Officer Shaw read
defendant his Miranda1 rights. Defendant read aloud a form explaining his rights and initialed
and signed it. According to Officer Shaw, defendant said he was in the twelfth grade, did not
graduate, and could read and write. At 10:10 a.m. on March 24, 1999, defendant signed a
statement that he did not have a car, that he did not call April on the night of the fire, that they
broke up in January and she was dating other people, and that he knew nothing about the fire.2
Officer Shaw testified that defendant did not appear intoxicated, ill, or under the influence of
drugs or alcohol, and that he was given food and drink. Defendant denied he was given any
food, alleging that he was left in the interrogation room all day until approximately 9:00 p.m.
1
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
2
This statement was read, in its entirety, into the trial record by Officer Shaw.
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when another officer came in, told him he was lying, and threatened to arrest his mother if he
found out defendant was lying. Some time later defendant was taken to the cellblock and placed
in a cell.
Defendant was not removed from his cell until March 26, 1999, when he was taken to the
Michigan State Police offices for a polygraph test. Apparently, the polygraph was requested by
the Detroit Police Department, although the circumstances of the request were not clear in the
lower court record. Lieutenant Ernest Myatt was the Michigan State Police polygraph examiner.
Before beginning the test, Lieutenant Myatt spoke with defendant. Lieutenant Myatt claimed
that he advised defendant of his Miranda rights and his rights related to the polygraph. In
response to Lieutenant Myatt’s questions, defendant stated that he had eaten and slept and that he
was not under a doctor’s care. Defendant read each of the rights, initialed each, and signed the
form. Lieutenant Myatt stated that he spoke to defendant for approximately forty-five minutes
before the test and reviewed the questions with defendant.
After administering the test, Lieutenant Myatt reached the conclusion that defendant was
being evasive, and he shared that opinion with defendant and gave defendant reasons why he
should tell the truth. They then talked again, and defendant wrote out a different statement, this
time confessing that he set the fire by mistake with a lighter after getting gasoline from a gas can
in the trunk of his car. According to Lieutenant Myatt, defendant was not under duress and was
permitted to make corrections to the statement. Defendant’s second statement was in his own
handwriting and he signed the statement.
Defendant claimed that although he wrote and signed the statement, it was false. He
stated that he was pressured to make a statement and that Lieutenant Myatt told him that if he did
not make the statement, he would get life in prison. Defendant testified that Lieutenant Myatt
told him what to write and he wrote it. He also claimed that he wrote the statement because he
had not eaten in three days, he was afraid, and he wanted to go home. Defendant stated that the
police gave him food only after he signed the statement and took a photograph of him eating.3
He said that his confession was not voluntary, although he admitted he went to the state police
offices voluntarily.
After defendant signed the statement with Lieutenant Myatt, he was returned to the
Detroit Police Department precinct by Officer James Fisher of the Detroit Police Department.
Officer Fisher again read defendant his constitutional rights and had him initial and sign a form,
then interviewed defendant again based on information from Lieutenant Myatt’s interview.
Defendant then made a third statement that was comprised of questions and answers, and in this
statement defendant again confessed to setting the fire, this time admitting that the act was
intentional and adding more detail. Each page was signed by defendant. The statement referred
to a gas can thrown in a garbage can and the clothes he was wearing when he set the fire. Based
on that information, Officer Fisher asked defendant to show them where the gas can was located.
According to Officer Fisher, defendant led them to the dumpster and the gas can was removed
3
Oddly enough, the police did take a photograph of defendant eating and introduced it into
evidence.
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and placed in evidence. In addition, the police got a search warrant and consent from defendant
to search his home for the clothes.
Defendant denied making the third statement, claiming that he just heard it being typed.
He further claimed that he did not make any corrections to the statement, as Officer Fisher
alleged, and that he was promised that he could eat and go home if he signed. Defendant stated
that Lieutenant Myatt told him an address for the gas can location, he never took the officers to
the dumpster, and Lieutenant Myatt suggested the clothes defendant was wearing that night
based on information he had told other officers earlier. Defendant claimed that he thought they
would send him home if he confessed.
A felony warrant was issued for defendant on March 27, 1999. Defendant was not
arraigned until March 28, 1999.
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the confessions and sought a Walker4 hearing.
Defendant alleged that he was arrested without probable cause and that his confessions were not
voluntary. After the hearing, the court denied defendant’s motion, finding probable cause for his
arrest. The court made no specific determination regarding the voluntariness of defendant’s
confessions.
Defendant’s case was tried before a jury. Defendant was convicted of two counts of
felony murder and acquitted of attempted murder of John Seay. The court sentenced defendant
to concurrent life sentences without possibility of parole.
II. Standard of Review
A trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress is reviewed de novo. People v Custer,
465 Mich 319, 326; 630 NW2d 870 (2001); People v Beuschlein, 245 Mich App 744, 748; 630
NW2d 921 (2001). The court’s underlying findings of fact supporting that decision are reviewed
for clear error. Custer, supra at 325.
III. Analysis
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the
police did not have probable cause for his arrest, and that accordingly, his statements made while
being held pursuant to the illegal arrest were inadmissible. We are compelled to agree.
As a preliminary matter, we find that defendant was arrested the morning of March 24,
1999, at the crime scene. A person is “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if,
in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have
believed that he was not free to leave. People v Daniels, 186 Mich App 77, 80; 463 NW2d 131
(1990), citing Michigan v Chesternut, 486 US 567, 573; 108 S Ct 1975; 100 L Ed 2d 565 (1988).
The testimony of Officer Shaw makes it clear that defendant was not, in fact, free to leave at the
time he was taken from the crime scene to the police station.
4
People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331, 338; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).
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A police officer may arrest a person without a warrant if a felony has been committed and
the police officer has reasonable (probable) cause to believe the person committed the felony.
MCL 764.15(1)(c); People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 115; 549 NW2d 849 (1996). Probable
cause to arrest exists if the facts available to the officer at the moment of arrest would justify a
fair-minded person of average intelligence to believe that the suspected person has committed a
felony. People v Thomas, 191 Mich App 576, 579; 478 NW2d 712 (1991), citing People v
Oliver, 417 Mich 366, 374; 338 NW2d 167 (1983).
The record establishes that at the time Officer Shaw arrested defendant, Officer Shaw
was aware only that Carr and April’s sister had accused defendant of stalking April. While this
information might constitute reasonable grounds to consider defendant a suspect in the felony
murder, it is insufficient to establish probable cause to arrest for the charge of felony murder.
See People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 632-633; 588 NW2d 480 (1998); Thomas, supra at 579.
We conclude, therefore, that defendant’s arrest was illegal. We also conclude that on the record
before us, defendant’s statements were the product of the illegal arrest and that the statements
must be suppressed.
As noted above, during the three days that defendant was held without a warrant,
defendant made inculpatory statements that he had set the fire that resulted in the decedents’
deaths. “[W]hen an ‘unlawful detention has been employed as a tool to directly procure any type
of evidence from a detainee[,]’ . . . the evidence is suppressed under the exclusionary rule.”
Kelly, supra at 634, quoting People v Mallory, 421 Mich 229, 240-241, 243, n 8; 365 NW2d 673
(1984) (emphasis in original). The mere fact of an illegal arrest, however, does not per se require
the suppression of a subsequent voluntary confession, People v Manning, 243 Mich App 615,
636-637; 624 NW2d 746 (2000); Kelly, supra at 634, as the giving of Miranda warnings, the
temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the purpose and flagrancy of the official
misconduct, and the presence of intervening circumstances are important factors in determining
whether the confession was obtained by exploitation of the illegal arrest. Brown v Illinois, 422
US 590, 602-603; 95 S Ct 2254; 45 L Ed 2d 416 (1975). “Intervening circumstances can break
the causal chain between the unlawful arrest and inculpatory statements, rendering the
confession ‘sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint’ of the unlawful arrest.”
Kelly, supra at 634, quoting Brown, supra at 602. For example, where the police subsequently
acquire evidence sufficient to establish probable cause before the contested statements are made,
suppression of the statements is not required. Kelly, supra at 635-636. The burden of
establishing the admissibility of the statements rests with the prosecution. Brown, supra at 604.
We conclude that the primary taint of the illegal arrest was not sufficiently attenuated by
the evidence subsequently obtained in this case to render defendant’s statements properly
admissible. While the police obtained additional information that defendant was stalking April
prior to the fire, none of the information connected defendant with the fire. Thus, the police had
insufficient information apart from defendant’s statements to establish post-arrest probable cause
justifying admissibility of the statements. In addition, although defendant received Miranda
warnings at least twice before he gave his first inculpatory statement more than two days after
his arrest, Miranda warnings alone are insufficient to attenuate an illegal arrest. People v
Emanuel, 98 Mich App 163, 177; 295 NW2d 875 (1980). Similarly, a lengthy time span
between arrest and confession is not, in and of itself, always sufficient to dissipate the initial
illegality. People v Casey, 102 Mich App 595, 604; 302 NW2d 248 (1980). Nor were
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defendant’s apparently evasive responses to the polygraph test a sufficient intervening factor to
attenuate the taint. Casey, supra at 603-604. Finally and significantly, there is no evidence in
the record establishing any legitimate or good faith purpose for arresting defendant without
probable cause, suggesting that the purpose of defendant’s arrest was to obtain defendant’s
confession. The suggestion is particularly strong in light of the fact that defendant was detained
without the issuance of a warrant for three days and was not arraigned until four days after his
arrest. This Court has consistently condemned the practice of arrest for investigation or for
questioning, and we do so here. Kelly, supra at 634. For all the reasons stated above, we find
that the prosecution has failed to meet its burden of proving that defendant’s unlawful detention
was not used to secure evidence against defendant and that defendant’s statements should be
admissible in spite of his illegal arrest.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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