JEAN HERTEG V SOMERSET COLLECTION GP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JEAN HERTEG,
UNPUBLISHED
September 20, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 227936
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 98-011207-NO
v
SOMERSET COLLECTION GP, INC., and
FORBES/COHEN PROPERTIES,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
PERINI BUILDING COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and Griffin, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this premises liability negligence action, defendants appeal as of right from a judgment
entered following a jury trial awarding plaintiff $100,781.34. We affirm.
Defendants Somerset Collection GP, Inc., and Forbes/Cohen Properties, are the owners
and operators of the Somerset Collection Mall. In the early morning of January 7, 1998,
plaintiff, then 72 years old and a mall walker, slipped and fell in a puddle of water that had
accumulated in an access area located before the entrance to a skywalk that connects old and new
sections of the mall. The skywalk was built by defendant Perini Building Company and opened
in October 1996. The puddle was created when rainwater leaked through the roof of the mall
just above the skywalk access. It had been raining for three or four days prior to the accident.
Intermittent leaks in the same area had caused the operators of the mall to effectuate repairs to
the roof in June and July of 1997, and again in October and November of 1997. Plaintiff broke
her left wrist and forearm in the fall.
Appellants first argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion for a directed
verdict because the evidence did not establish that appellants had actual or constructive notice of
the puddle, nor did it show that appellants had created the dangerous condition. We review de
novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for a directed verdict. Meagher v Wayne State Univ, 222
Mich App 700, 708; 565 NW2d 401 (1997).
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In reviewing the trial court’s ruling, this Court views the evidence presented up to
the time of the motion in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, grants
that party every reasonable inference, and resolves any conflict in the evidence in
that party’s favor to decide whether a question of fact existed. A directed verdict
is appropriate only when no factual questions exist on which reasonable minds
could differ. [Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare System, 242 Mich App 385, 388389; 619 NW2d 7 (2000), vacated in part on other grounds 465 Mich 53 (2001).]
“In premises liability cases, the duty owed by the landowner is determined by the
plaintiff's status at the time of injury.” Burnett v Bruner, 247 Mich App 365, 368; 636 NW2d
773 (2001). Accord Stanley v Town Square Coop, 203 Mich App 143; 512 NW2d 51 (1993).
(“The duty a possessor of land owes to those who come upon the land turns on the status of the
visitor.”). It is a long established principle of the common law that a storekeeper has a duty to
provide a reasonably safe environment for its invitees. See Clark v K Mart Corp, 465 Mich 416,
419; 634 NW2d 347 (2001); Carpenter v Herpolsheimer's Co, 278 Mich 697, 698; 271 NW 575
(1937). This includes the responsibility of providing reasonably safe aisles for the customers to
traverse while shopping. Carpenter, supra at 698. This duty also applies to the owners of
shopping malls, who as possessors of the land have the affirmative duty to see that the hallways
and passageways of the retail complex are safe for use by patrons of the retail stores located in
the mall. See 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 344.
The question we are presented with is whether in these circumstances, plaintiff, who was
at the mall on the day of the accident as a mall walker, was an invitee or a licensee of the mall.
Answering this question is essential to the resolution of this appeal because of the differing
duties owed by a landowner to invitees and licensees. To both invitees and licensees, the
landowner owes a duty to warn of any hidden dangers the landowner either knows of or has
reason to know of. Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591, 596-597; 614
NW2d 88 (2000). However, a landowner also owes its invitees a duty to “make the premises
safe, which requires the landowner to inspect the premises and, depending upon the
circumstances, make any necessary repairs or warn of any discovered hazards. Thus, an invitee
is entitled to the highest level of protection under premises liability law” Id. at 597 (citation
omitted).
In Stitt, our Supreme Court held that “[i]n order to establish invitee status, a plaintiff must
show that the premises were held open for a commercial purpose.” Id. at 604 (emphasis
omitted). In reaching this conclusion, the Stitt Court reasoned, in part, “that the imposition of
additional expense and effort by the landowner, requiring the landowner to inspect the premises
and make them safe for visitors, must be directly tied to the owner’s commercial business
interests.” Id. at 604.
The issue before the Stitt Court was “whether invitee status should be extended to an
individual who enters upon church property for a noncommercial purpose.” Id. at 595.1
1
See also Stitt, supra at 597 (“In this case, we are called upon to determine whether invitee
status should extend to individuals entering upon church property for noncommercial purposes.”
[emphasis in original]), and at 607 (“[W]e hold that persons on church premises for other than
commercial purposes are licensees and not invitees.”).
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Examining three cases in which invitee status had been found with respect to persons injured on
church property,2 the Court concluded that the three cases showed that “invitee status has
traditionally been conferred in our cases only on persons injured on church premises who were
there for a commercial purpose.” Id. at 602. However, the Court noted that Michigan appellate
courts had never directly addressed the issue of whether a churchgoer who fell into the category
“public invitee” was also due a heightened standard of care. Id. at 600-601.
The Court concluded that the “invitee” designation should not be attached to “persons on
church premises for other than commercial purposes.” Id. at 607. In reaching this conclusion,
the Court examined the common-law meaning of the term “invitation.” Id. at 597-598. The
Court observed that its “prior decisions have proven to be less than clear in defining the precise
circumstances under which a sufficient invitation has been extended to confer ‘invitee’ status.”
Id. at 598. Indeed, in conclusion that “Michigan has historically . . . recognized a commercial
business purpose as a precondition for establishing invitee status,” the Court also acknowledged
that the handling of the issue had not been uniform throughout Michigan appellate court
decisions. Id. at 600.
“Given the divergence” of the prior Supreme Court cases, the Stitt Court further
recognized the need to “provide some form of reconciliation in this case.” Id. at 603. In
“harmonizing” the case law, the Stitt Court decided that the basis for the imposition of a
heightened standard of care was the potential of commercial benefits accruing to the landowner.
Id. at 604. In the words of the Court, “the prospect of pecuniary gain is a sort of quid pro quo for
the higher duty of care owed to invitees.” Id. at 604.3
Section 332 of the Second Restatement Torts defines an invitee as being “either a public
invitee or a business visitor.” 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 332. In Stitt v Holland Abundant Life
Fellowship, 229 Mich App 504, 507-508; 582 NW2d 849 (1998), rev’d 462 Mich 591 (2000),
this Court had concluded, based on its reading of Preston v Sleziak, 383 Mich 442; 175 NW2d
759 (1970), that § 332 of the Restatement applied in Michigan. The Supreme Court concluded,
however, that the issue of whether to adopt the “public invitee” definition of § 332 was not
before the Preston Court, and thus it was doubtful that Preston was binding on this point. Stitt,
supra, 462 Mich at 603. Nevertheless, the Stitt Court overruled Preston to the extent that it
could be considered as binding precedent on the issue. Id.
The Stitt Court then specifically declined to adopt § 332 of the Restatement. Id. The
Court concluded that limiting invitee status to those situations where “the premises were held
open for a commercial purpose,” id. at 604 (emphasis in original), “best serve[s] the interests of
2
Manning v Bishop of Marquette, 345 Mich 130; 76 NW2d 75 (1956); Kendzorek v Guardian
Angel Catholic Parish, 178 Mich App 562; 444 NW2d 213 (1989), overruled on other grounds
in Orel v Uni-Rak Sales Co, 454 Mich 564; 563 NW2d 241 (1997); Bruce v Central Methodist
Episcopal Church, 147 Mich 230; 110 NW 951 (1907).
3
According to William L. Prosser, Reporter of the Second Restatement of Torts, this commercial
benefit test “seems to have originated in the mind of the writer of a forgotten treatise on the law
of negligence, Robert Campbell, whose first edition appeared in 1871.” 26 Minn L Rev 573, 583
(1942) (footnote omitted).
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Michigan citizens.” Id. at 607. In support of this formulation of the common-law rule, the Court
looked to the reasoning of a Florida case, McNulty v Hurley, 97 So 2d 185 (Fla, 1957), overruled
in part by Post v Lunney, 261 So 2d 146 (Fla, 1972). McNulty involved a churchgoer injured on
church property. See Stitt, supra at 604. “With regard to church visitors,” the Stitt Court
declared, “we agree with the court in McNulty . . . that such persons are licensees.” Id.
As framed by the Stitt Court, the question before it was narrow: “[W]hether invitee status
should be extended to an individual who enters upon church property for a noncommercial
purpose.” However, in answering this question, the Court examined a broad area of law
involving invitee status in general. While arguably judicial dicta, we do not believe we can
ignore the Stitt Court’s broad statements simply because they do not technically qualify as the
holding of the Court. Unlike obiter dicta,4 judicial dicta is integral to the Court’s reasoning.5
Luhman v Beechler, 424 NW2d 753, 755 ( Wis App, 1988). Given the relatively few number of
cases granted certiorari, our Supreme Court frequently uses judicial dicta to guide the judiciary
on particular areas of law, and to signal future development of the law. See Schauer, Opinions
as rules, 53 U Chi L Rev 682, 683 (1986). Such judicial dicta is arguably as binding as the
precise holding of the case. Am Jur 2d, § 603, p 299. Cf Johnson v White, 430 Mich 47, 55, n 2;
420 NW2d 87 (1988) (observing that “unlike obiter dicta, judicial dicta are not excluded from
applicability of the doctrine of the law of the case”).
Accordingly, given the Stitt Court’s refusal to adopt § 332 of the Restatement, as well as
its conclusions regarding the connection of invitee status to potential pecuniary gain, we
conclude that under Stitt, a mall walker is not entitled to invitee status unless the invitation to
enter upon the land is tied to the landowner’s business interests. Stitt, supra.
Thomas Bird, general manager of the Somerset Collection Mall, testified that a primary
reason the mall had instituted an organized mall walkers program was to “increase sales for [the
mall’s] stores.” While we agree with Bird’s contention that the mall walker phenomenon would
likely exist even in the absence of such facility supervised programs, it is also clear from his
testimony that this mall took particular steps to attract walkers to the Somerset Mall.6 In other
words, the invitation extended to plaintiff was not for the mere benefit of plaintiff, but for the
mutual advantage of both plaintiff and the mall. Stitt, supra at 600.
Bird testified that as part of the program, the walkers sign up to get a free tee shirt, and
each is given a card that can be used to track “how many times they walk.” The mall even
produced a newsletter for the mall walkers. In addition to these organizational steps, the mall
4
Cf Sebring v City of Berkley, 247 Mich App 666, 681-682; 637 NW2d 552 (2001) (declining to
follow obiter dicta set forth in Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd Comm, 463 Mich 143, 171, n 27; 615
NW2d 702 (2000).
5
We note that often the distinction between judicial and obiter dicta is easier to define than it is
to implement. Compare Stitt, supra at 602-603 (majority opinion) with Stitt, supra at 616 (Kelly,
J., dissenting). In any event, we believe the general discussion by the Stitt majority on invitee
status is integral to its holding.
6
The success of this program is evidenced by Bird’s testimony that at the time of the accident
the mall had approximately 3,000 members “signed up” for the mall walker program.
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also instituted a routine for passing out complimentary gifts to the mall walkers. For example,
after every ten visits, each mall walker would receive a small gift that the mall “purchase[d]
specifically” for the program. Once a month, the mall would have a free breakfast for the mall
walkers. Bird indicated that the mall also tried to institute an educational program for the mall
walkers. Further, the evidence established that the mall was open for use by mall walkers hours
before the individual retailers opened for business. This evidences not simply a willingness to
have mall walkers enter the mall, but the desire that they do so. We believe it is reasonable to
infer from this evidence that the mall’s primary consideration for inviting mall walkers to use the
facility was commercial. The program held out the “prospect of pecuniary gain” to the
landowner, and thus was “tied to the owner’s business interests.” Id. at 604.
Further, plaintiff testified that mall walking was not always the only reason she would
visit the mall. She indicated that while walking, she would sometimes see an item in a store that
she would purchase later. In other words, the mall’s goal of promoting sales by instituting what
is essentially an organized ability to window shop within the facility itself was, at least in this
instance, successful. A visitor of the mall need not have entered the facility with the immediate
intention of making a purchase in order to be considered an invitee.
Given the above testimony, we believe it is reasonable to conclude that in the
circumstances of this case, plaintiff’s presence on the day of the accident was directly tied to the
mall’s commercial business interests. Therefore, plaintiff was an invitee and thus was owed a
heightened standard of care.
A landowner, including the owner of a shopping mall,
is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the
land if the owner: (a) knows of, or by the exercise of reasonable care would
discover, the condition and should realize that the condition involves an
unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees; (b) should expect that invitees will not
discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it; and (c)
fails to exercise reasonable care to protect invitees against the danger. [id. at
597.]
We believe that when viewed in the appropriate light, reasonable jurors could have concluded
from the evidence adduced at the time the motion for a directed verdict was brought, that
defendants were liable. Kubczak v Chemical Bank & Trust Co, 456 Mich 653, 663; 575 NW2d
745 (1998).
The evidence showed that the roof in this area had leaked in October and November of
2001, just months prior to the accident. The later 2001 leaks were a reoccurrence of an earlier
leaking problem that occurred during the summer of 2001. Despite this recent history, there was
no evidence that the mall regularly inspected this area for leaks, or that they would inspect the
area during periods of heavy rain, as occurred just prior to plaintiff’s accident. We believe that it
is reasonable to infer from this evidence that given the advance warning of leaking problems, the
mall’s failure to inspect and maintain this area constituted active negligence that caused the
dangerous condition, i.e., the puddle of water. Williams v Borman’s Foods, Inc, 191 Mich App
320, 321; 474 NW2d 425 (1991).
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Additionally, we believe that this evidence supports the conclusion that appellants had
constructive knowledge of the condition. “‘If one by exercise of reasonable care would have
known a fact, he is deemed to have had constructive knowledge of such fact.’” Black's Law
Dictionary (6th ed), p 314. We believe that given the history of leaking in the area, a jury could
reasonably find that the mall, by exercising reasonable care, could have discovered the puddle in
time to prevent this accident. There is no direct evidence establishing how long the puddle was
there. However, the puddle obviously had to have been accumulating sometime before the
accident, which occurred at approximately 7:30 a.m. There was testimony estimating the size of
the puddle to be somewhere between twelve and fifteen inches. There is no evidence that the
flow of water leaking from the skywalk was heavy. A reasonable jury could infer from this
evidence that the puddle had taken a sufficient length of time to accumulate, that the mall could
have discovered the puddle in enough time to either remedy it or to warn its invitees of the
hidden danger had it used ordinary care to inspect an area where previous leaks had been
discovered during periods of heavy rain. Accordingly, appellants are deemed to have
constructive knowledge of the danger.
Further, a reasonable jury could conclude that the mall’s failure to inspect this area
constituted a failure to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. We want to make clear
that precise time limits cannot be established for when liability attaches in such a situation. See
Louie v Hagstrom’s Food Stores, Inc, 81 Cal App 2d 601, 608 (1947) (“The exact time the
condition must exist before it should, in the exercise of reasonable care, have been discovered
and remedied, cannot be fixed, because, obviously, it varies according to the circumstances.”).
Each accident must be viewed in light of its own unique circumstances, and the question of
whether a dangerous condition existed for a long enough time to be discovered by a reasonably
prudent landowner is a question of fact that should be left to the jury. Id. See also Ortega v KMart Corp, 26 Cal 4th1200, 1209; 114 Cal Rptr 2d 470 (2001). Under these circumstances, a
reasonable jury could have found appellants negligent.
We also believe a reasonable jury could conclude that the mall should have expected that
its mall walkers would not discover the puddle or would fail to protect themselves against it.
Testimony at trial established that the puddle was so transparent as to be virtually undetectable
by casual inspection. Joyce v Rubin, 249 Mich App 231, 238-239; 642 NW2d 360 (2002).
Plaintiff testified that she did not see the puddle before she fell. Another mall walker who
witnessed the fall testified that the floor in the area was made of a shinny marble that would have
made it difficult to see the puddle unless you were looking for it. Additionally, the estimated
diameter of the puddle was not so large as to make it an openly visible hazard. Cf Munoz v
Applebaum's Food Market, Inc, 293 Minn 433, 196 NW2d 921 (1972) (concluding that a puddle
measuring twenty square feet and one-quarter of an inch deep was open and obvious). We do
not believe that this evidence establishes that the puddle was readily detectable by a reasonable
person in plaintiff’s position. Riddle v McLouth Steel Products Co, 440 Mich 85, 96; 485 NW2d
676 (1992).
Next, appellants argue that the trial court erred in refusing to reduce the judgment by the
$22,000 mediation settlement plaintiff received from Perini. We disagree. In support of their
assertion, appellants rely on the common-law rule that a defendant is entitled to a pro tanto
reduction of a judgment for amounts received by plaintiff in a prior settlement. See Thick v
Lapeer Metal Products, 419 Mich 342, 348-349; 353 NW2d 464 (1984); Larabell v Schuknecht,
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308 Mich 419; 14 NW2d 50 (1940). This common-law principle was codified at MCL
600.2925d(b), which, until 1995, provided that a release or covenant not to sue “reduces the
claim against the other tort-feasors to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the
covenant or to the extent of the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever amount is the
greater.”
However, when the Legislature amended § 2925d in 1995, they deleted the above
language from the statute. 1995 PA 161. Defendants argue that repeal of subsection 2925d(b)
effectively revived the common-law rule as it existed before it was codified. People v Reeves,
448 Mich 1, 8; 528 NW2d 160 (1995); 2B Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction (6th ed.,
2000), § 50:01, pp 140-141. We disagree.
“The overriding goal guiding judicial interpretation of statutes is to discover and give
effect to legislative intent.” Bio-Magnetic Resonance, Inc v Dep't of Public Health, 234 Mich
App 225, 229; 593 NW2d 641 (1999). While courts often turn to the rules of statutory
construction to assist in this endeavor, it must be remembered that these rules are merely aids to
statutory interpretation, “not inflexible mandates for construction contrary to evident intent.”
New Jersey v Daquino, 56 N J Super 230, 241; 152 A 2d 377 (1959). See also Arlandson v
Humphrey, 224 Minn 49, 55; 27 NW2d 819 (1947) (“‘Statutes must be construed as to give
effect to the obvious legislative intent, though construction is contrary to such rules.’” [quoting 6
Dunnell, Dig & Supp § 8937]).
Our analysis of this issue is also guided by the understanding that where tort law was
once solely a creature of common law, extensive legislative action in the area of tort reform has
transformed the nature of the law. See Weiss, Reforming tort reform, 38 Cath U L Rev 737, 753
(1989). In Michigan, tort law is now a synthesis of statutory and common law.
The elimination of the language at issue from the statute was a part of a legislative tort
reform package that “replaced the common-law doctrine of joint and several liability among
multiple tortfeasors with the doctrine of several liability.” Smiley v Corrigan 248 Mich App 51,
53; 638 NW2d 151 (2002). Under the new system, “defendants now are only accountable for
damages in proportion to their percentage of fault.”7 Trial courts are now required to instruct
juries to answer special interrogatories and apportion the percentage of fault of all persons that
contributed to the injury, including any individual released from liability. MCL 600.6304(1).8
7
MCL 600.2957(1) provides:
In an action based on tort or another legal theory seeking damages for personal injury,
property damage, or wrongful death, the liability of each person shall be allocated under this
section by the trier of fact and, subject to [MCL 600.6304] in direct proportion to the person's
percentage of fault. In assessing percentages of fault under this subsection, the trier of fact shall
consider the fault of each person, regardless of whether the person is, or could have been, named
as a party to the action.
8
MCL 600.6304(1) provides:
In an action based on tort or another legal theory seeking damages for
personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death involving fault of more than
(continued…)
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We believe that this statutory scheme reflects a clear Legislative intent to abolish the rule
requiring offset and replace it with a several liability system to apportion damages. Therefore,
the common-law rule is abrogated. Bak v Citizens Ins Co of America, 199 Mich App 730, 738;
503 NW2d 94 (1993). We will not apply the reversion rule of statutory construction to revive
what has, by clear implication, been abolished.
Finally, defendants argue that they should be granted a new trial because of an apparent
inconsistency regarding plaintiff’s potential contributory negligence. Specifically, defendants
point to the verdict form, in which the jury in one section affirmatively indicated that plaintiff
was not negligent, and then in another section indicated that the percentage of negligence
attributable to plaintiff was five percent. Defendants argue this inconsistency requires a new
trial. We disagree for several reasons.
Initially, we note that defendants did not bring a motion for new trial based on the alleged
inconsistency before the trial court. The matter was first raised at a hearing on defendants’
motion for set off. Defendants’ failure to tie their argument to the grounds set forth in MCR
2.611(A)(1), which “provide[] the only bases upon which a jury verdict may be set aside” on a
motion for new trial, Kelly v Builders Square, Inc, 465 Mich 29, 38; 632 NW2d 912 (2001),
would preclude the trial court from granting such relief. Id. at 39.9
Further, when the matter was brought before the court, defendants indicated that they did
not believe that the circumstance constituted reversible error. Instead, defendants suggested that
it was simply “a flip of the coin” on which party would get the benefit of any ambiguity, i.e., if
(…continued)
1 person, including third-party defendants and nonparties, the court, unless
otherwise agreed by all parties to the action, shall instruct the jury to answer
special interrogatories or, if there is no jury, shall make findings indicating both
of the following:
(a) The total amount of each plaintiff's damages.
(b) The percentage of the total fault of all persons that contributed to the
death or injury, including each plaintiff and each person released from liability
under [MCL 600.2925d] regardless of whether the person was or could have been
named as a party to the action.
9
In Kelly, our Supreme Court stated, “MCR 2.611(A)(1) does not identify inconsistency or
incongruity as a ground for granting a new trial.” Kelly, supra at 39. We do not read Kelly as
stating that inconsistency and incongruity could never be argued in support of a motion for new
trial. Rather, we believe Kelly stands for the proposition that such an argument must be made in
context of the grounds set forth in the court rule. Id. at 41 (declining to construe the ground set
forth in MCR 2.611(A)(1)(e) not because the sub rule does not use the words “inconsistent” or
“incongruous,” but because the trial court did not rely on the sub rule when granting a new trial).
Indeed, we believe the Kelly majority specifically left open the door to an argument that
inconsistency may serve as the basis for a new trial when it wrote, “But even if a jury verdict may
be set aside on the basis of inconsistency under our current court rule, the trial court did not
apply the standard . . . for reviewing inconsistent verdicts.” Id. (emphasis added).
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the full damage award would stand or be reduced by five percent. We believe that this position
impliedly recognizes, and indeed invokes, the court’s authority to somehow reconcile the two
positions taken by the jury. Defendants may not now be heard to complain simply because the
trial court did not decide the ambiguity in their favor. Their waiver of their right to argue that
any irregularity required a new trial effectively extinguished any error. People v Carter, 462
Mich 206, 215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). Moreover, “a party may not take a position in the trial
court and subsequently seek redress in an appellate court on the basis of a position contrary to
that taken in the trial court.” Phinney v Perlmutter, 222 Mich App 513, 543; 564 NW2d 532
(1997).
In any event, we do not believe that the verdict rendered is logically inconsistent or
irreconcilable. “[T]he obligation to remedy an inconsistent verdict . . . lies with the court, with
or without objection of counsel.” Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co v Sears, Roebuck & Co, 99 Mich
App 763, 766; 298 NW2d 634 (1980). An allegedly inconsistent verdict should be upheld if
“there is an interpretation of the evidence that provides a logical explanation for the findings of
the jury.” Granger v Fruehauf Corp, 429 Mich 1, 7; 412 NW2d 199 (1987). Accord Kelly,
supra at 41. “A court must look beyond the legal principles underlying the plaintiff's causes of
action and carefully examine how those principles were argued and applied in the context of the
case.” Bouverette v Westinghouse Electric Corp, 245 Mich App 391, 399; 628 NW2d 86 (2001).
After reviewing the record, we believe the court’s jury instructions provide a logical
explanation for this apparent inconsistency. Id. In instructing the jury, the court began with a
series of proper instructions on the elements of negligence. It then instructed the jury that if
plaintiff proved each element of the tort, then the jury “must determine the percentage of fault
for each party or non-party whose negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.” The
court continued, “In determining the percentage of fault, you should consider the nature of the
conduct and the extent to which each person’s conduct caused or contributed to the plaintiff’s
injuries.” The court then turned to the duties owed by a landowner to an invitee. After that, the
court returned to the issue of apportioning fault:
If you find that more than one of the parties [sic] are at fault, then you
must allocate the total fault among those parties.
In determining the percentage of fault of each party, you must consider the
nature of the conduct of each party and the extent to which each party’s conduct
caused or contributed to the plaintiff’s injury. The total must add up to one
hundred percent.
We believe it is plausible that the apparent inconsistency was the result of a
misconception by the jury on its charge. Again, we emphasize that we find no fault with the
instructions given. However, we are mindful of our Supreme Court’s admonition in McCormick
v Hawkins, 169 Mich 641, 649; 135 NW 1066 (1912): “Jurors are not learned in the law, and
very frequently misapprehend the scope of their powers and duties.”
When first giving the instruction on “considering the nature of the conduct of each
party,” the court specifically linked it to the legal concepts of negligence and proximate cause.
The jury was told it needed to determine the percentage of fault for all those “whose negligence
was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.” The court then left the subject. When it returned,
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the concepts of negligence and proximate causation were missing from the preface. The jury
was then told that if they found “that more than one of the parties are at fault, then you must
allocate the total fault among those parties.” Further, only at this point were the jurors instructed
that the total “fault” must add up to one hundred percent. We believe it is possible that the jury
simply disconnected the legal concept of negligence from the calculation of fault percentages,
relying more on an everyday understanding of personal responsibility. In other words, the jury
could have marked the verdict form as it did based on the conclusion that even though defendant
had not established that plaintiff was negligent, she nonetheless bore some level of fault for the
accident. We believe that in these circumstances, the trial court’s determination that the specific
finding of no negligence on plaintiff’s part should govern was a reasonable remedy.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
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