PEOPLE OF MI V BENNIE IRVIN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 20, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 226740
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 99-007417
BENNIE IRVIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Talbot and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317,
and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. He was
sentenced to consecutive terms of eighteen to thirty years’ imprisonment for the murder
conviction, and two years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant appeals
as of right. We affirm.
Defendant was charged in the shooting death of Tyrus Chipp, which occurred outside
Chipp’s home. As Chipp turned to go into the home, defendant shot him five times, striking
Chipp in his back, the back of his neck, and the back of his head. Defendant claimed that he and
Chipp had an ongoing feud, and that he shot Chipp in self-defense because he believed Chipp
was reaching for a gun.
I. JURY EXPOSURE TO EXTRANEOUS INFORMATION
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to inquire into the possibility that the
jury was exposed to extraneous information which may have affected its verdict. Defendant
refers to a courtroom incident that led the judge to admonish spectators outside the jury’s
presence. At the conclusion of testimony by a prosecution witness, the court excused the jury
and the following exchange occurred:
The Court: If you could step up, just up to here with your client.
The situation in the court at this time is that this defendant is on trial for
second degree murder and the court has heard the opening statements and first
witness, and also seen the situation in this courtroom.
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First, I’m going to address the audience and state that this jury must decide
this case and must decide it without any in-put other than the testimony under
oath. For that reason, if anyone becomes emotional and feels that they must cry
out or make any noise that would be distracting to the jury, you must leave the
courtroom during that time.
Also, comments of any kind will absolutely not be allowed. You will be
taken out of the courtroom if you make audible comments that could be heard by
the jury.
Second, the court has accessed [sic] this situation and I believe that it is in
the best interests and safety of all involved, and the fair and efficient running of
this trial, that the defendant be remanded during the pendency of this case.
[Defense counsel]: Why, your honor?
The Court: Because this is a second degree murder case. There has been a lot of
emotion. It’s clear by the testimony that the court hears at this time, this is a
dangerous situation. The witnesses are close to the defendant, and family
members, and the court is concerned for the safety of all, and the running of this
trial with no communication between the defendant and any witnesses and that’s
what the court is going to do.
A defendant has a right to a fair and impartial jury. People v Budzyn, 456 Mich 77, 88;
566 NW2d 229 (1997). The jury is required to consider only the evidence received in open
court, and is not permitted to consider extraneous facts not introduced in evidence. Id. A
defendant must show that the jury was exposed to extraneous influences and that the extraneous
influences “created a real and substantial possibility that they could have affected the jury’s
verdict.” Id. at 88-89. Because defendant failed to preserve this issue, our review is for plain
error affecting his substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130
(1999).
We are not persuaded from this record that the jury was exposed to extraneous facts.
Audience interruptions do not necessarily rise to the level of extraneous facts or “evidence.” See
People v Duby, 120 Mich App 241, 250-251; 327 NW2d 455 (1982); People v Van Epps, 59
Mich App 277, 284-285; 229 NW2d 414 (1975). The record does not establish that a disruption
actually occurred. The trial court’s admonition to the spectators may have been a preventative
warning rendered with knowledge that audience interruptions may occur in emotionally-charged
trials. The court expressed concern generally, and made no reference to any particular outburst
or extraneous information. Even if the jury was exposed to a disruption, defendant has not
shown that the jury was affected by it. Defendant offers no basis for concluding that any “input”
overheard or overseen by the court – if indeed any occurred – was prejudicial to the defense. We
note that the trial court instructed the jury before and after the proofs to consider only the
evidence properly presented in court. Van Epps, supra. Defendant has not demonstrated plain
error.
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II. ALLEGED PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. The test of
prosecutorial misconduct is whether the defendant was denied a fair trial. People v Bahoda, 448
Mich 261, 267 n 7; 531 NW2d 659 (1995); People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 586; 629
NW2d 411 (2001). Defendant asserts fifteen alleged errors. Defendant preserved review of only
two of these allegations by objecting at trial. Defendant’s remaining claims of prosecutorial
misconduct are not preserved because defendant either failed to object at trial or objected on a
different basis than he asserts as error on appeal. People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 512; 597
NW2d 864 (1999). We review these instances of alleged misconduct for plain error. Carines,
supra at 763, 774; People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 720; 613 NW2d 370 (2000).
The prosecutor asked three questions in a short period of time in which defendant’s legal
counsel was mentioned. Contemporaneous with those references, the prosecutor inquired of a
police officer whether defendant had filed a complaint stating that the victim had threatened him.
No objection was raised. We do not view these questions as denigrating defendant’s right to
remain silent or his right to legal counsel.
Defendant argues the prosecutor improperly stated that the defense obstructed the
investigation. The prosecutor’s comment that the gun was never produced was a fair comment
on the evidence and defendant’s assertion that he had nothing to hide. We disagree with
defendant’s contention that the prosecutor told the jury that she knew the truth surrounding this
crime, or that she attempted to testify.
We also are not persuaded that the prosecutor’s closing arguments denigrated the concept
of self-defense or shifted the burden of proof. In fact, the prosecutor told the jury that he had the
burden of proof. As discussed in part IV of this opinion, the witness’ prior testimony under oath
was not limited to impeachment purposes, so the prosecutor did not err when she asked the jury
to consider the testimony as substantive evidence.
We agree that the prosecutor’s reference to Jeffrey Dahmer’s insanity defense in her
closing argument was improper. However, this was an isolated remark and the trial court
instructed the jury that the arguments of counsel are not evidence. We do not find plain error
affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Schutte, supra at 720.
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor “intruded” on defendant’s attorney-client
relationship and that the prosecutor testified when she picked up a defense file from the defense
table. The record does not indicate that the prosecutor touched a file from the defense table. The
prosecutor referred to a file marked “self-defense” and asked defendant if he had looked at the
file, which defense counsel stated contained his notes. The trial court sustained defense
counsel’s objection and defendant denied looking at the file. On the basis of this record, we find
no error requiring reversal.
III. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because (A) his
trial attorney did not object to the prosecutor’s remarks discussed in part II of this opinion; (B)
counsel failed to request that the jury be instructed to consider the lesser offense of
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manslaughter; (C) counsel did not request an instruction on “imperfect self-defense”; (D) counsel
did not request a modification of CJI2d 4.4 to instruct that defendant’s disposal of the gun was
equivalent to flight, which could be considered only as consciousness of guilt and not an
admission of guilt; and (E) counsel did not pursue the matter of the audience disruption
discussed in part I of this opinion.
Defendant is entitled to the protection of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the
effective assistance of counsel. Cuyler v Sullivan, 446 US 335; 100 S Ct 1708; 64 L Ed 2d 333
(1980); Evitts v Lucey, 469 US 387; 105 S Ct 830; 83 L Ed 2d 821 (1985). Because defendant
failed to moved for a new trial or a Ginther1 hearing, our review is limited to errors apparent
from the record. People v Sabin (On Second Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 658-659; 620 NW2d
19 (2000); People v Williams, 223 Mich App 409, 414; 566 NW2d 649 (1997).
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that the representation so
prejudiced him that he was denied the right to a fair trial. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 338;
521 NW2d 797 (1994). This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of counsel regarding
matters of trial strategy, nor will it assess counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight.
People v Garza, 246 Mich App 251, 255; 631 NW2d 764 (2001); People v Rice (On Remand),
235 Mich App 429, 445; 597 NW2d 843 (1999). To establish prejudice, defendant must show
that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. People v Johnson, 451 Mich 115, 124; 545 NW2d 637 (1996).
A. Failure to Object to Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct
For the reasons stated in part II of this opinion, counsel’s failure to object did not deprive
defendant of a fair trial.
B. Failure to Request Manslaughter Instruction
Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction
on manslaughter. Defendant has not overcome the presumption that counsel’s decision to pursue
an “all-or-nothing” approach to conviction or acquittal was a matter of sound trial strategy.
People v LaVearn, 448 Mich 207, 216; 528 NW2d 721 (1995); People v Rone (On Second
Remand), 109 Mich App 702, 718; 311 NW2d 835 (1981) (decision not to seek manslaughter
instruction in second-degree murder case did not deny defendant the effective assistance of
counsel).
C. Failure to Seek Imperfect Self-Defense Instruction
Defendant also claims that counsel failed to request a jury instruction on imperfect selfdefense. Imperfect self-defense is a qualified defense that can mitigate second-degree murder to
voluntary manslaughter. People v Kemp, 202 Mich App 318, 323; 508 NW2d 184 (1993), citing
People v Butler, 193 Mich App 63, 67; 483 NW2d 430 (1992). This defense is implicated where
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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a defendant would have been entitled to invoke the theory of self-defense had he not been the
initial aggressor. Kemp, supra, citing People v Heflin, 434 Mich 482, 502; 456 NW2d 10 (1990).
Defendant was not entitled to an instruction on imperfect self-defense. Defendant
pursued a theory of self-defense in which the victim was the aggressor. Defendant testified that
he sought to avoid conflict with the victim, and sought to avoid the conversation which led to
this shooting. Defendant testified that he thought Chipp was reaching for a gun. Fearing for his
life, he pulled his own gun out of his pocket and shot Chipp. Although there was no proof that
the victim was armed, defendant’s theory of self-defense was that Chipp was the aggressor. It is
not consistent with a theory of imperfect self-defense in which the defendant is the aggressor.
Butler, supra at 67. Thus, counsel was not ineffective for failing to request the instruction. To
the extent that defendant argues that his attorney was ineffective for pursuing a theory of pure
self defense instead of a theory of imperfect self-defense, we will not second-guess this matter of
trial strategy.
D. Failure to Seek Instruction Regarding Disposal of Evidence
Defendant also claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to seek an instruction that
defendant’s disposal of the gun should be given limited consideration. We disagree. Inviting
attention to the disposal of evidence could have compromised defendant’s position that he turned
himself in as quickly as could be arranged by his attorney. In addition, if the court were to craft
an additional instruction to address the disposal of evidence, it is possible that defendant’s
actions would be afforded greater culpability. Defendant has not shown that counsel was
ineffective.
E. Failure to Pursue Audience Interruption Issue
As discussed in part I of this opinion, the nature of the audience interruption (if one
indeed occurred) is subject only to speculation. Likewise, the argument that defendant was
denied the effective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to pursue this matter further is not
supported by the record.
IV. WEIGHT OF IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE
In a separate brief filed by defendant in propria persona, defendant argues the prosecutor
improperly argued to the jury that the impeachment evidence of Tykishe Chipp’s prior statement
to police as well as her preliminary examination testimony may be considered as substantive
evidence. Defendant also contends that the court erred by failing to instruct the jury that
impeachment evidence could not be considered as substantive evidence. This argument is
without merit.
A. Statement to Police
The record does not indicate that the prosecutor told the jury to consider the witness’
statement to police as substantive evidence. Rather, the prosecutor told the jury that it could
evaluate her testimony in light of the statement she gave to police. The prosecutor then told the
jury that it could consider as substantive evidence the witness’ preliminary examination
testimony. Further, the court properly instructed the jury that the witness’ prior inconsistent
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statement to police could not be used to decide whether the elements of the crime had been
proven, although it could be used to “help you decide whether you think the witness is truthful.”
Avant, supra at 511.
B. Preliminary Examination Testimony
The prosecutor’s argument to the jury that it could “take her testimony under oath as
substantive evidence just as if she is sitting here talking to you” was a correct statement of law.
MRE 801(d)(1)(A). By definition, the witness’ preliminary examination testimony given under
oath is not hearsay and may be considered as substantive evidence. MRE 801(d)(1)(A); People v
Malone, 445 Mich 369, 381-382; 518 NW2d 418 (1994). The court properly instructed the jury
that the witness’ prior inconsistent statement in the form of sworn testimony at the preliminary
examination could be used as substantive evidence. MRE 801(d)(1)(A); Malone, supra.
V. CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ERRORS
We find no cumulative effect of error requiring reversal. People v Sawyer, 215 Mich
App 183, 197; 545 NW2d 6 (1996).
VI. SENTENCING ISSUES
Defendant raises three allegations of sentencing error. Because the offense occurred in
July 1999, the legislative sentencing guidelines apply. MCL 769.34(2).
Defendant argues that the scoring of fifteen points for offense variable 5 was unsupported
by the record and that the trial court did not make sufficient findings in this regard. We find no
error in the court’s conclusion that the victim’s sister, who personally witnessed the victim being
shot five times in the back and who watched him die, would have suffered the type of injury
which required professional treatment. She testified that her family members held her
responsible for her brother’s death. Although there was no testimony that family members
received psychological treatment, that fact is not conclusive. MCL 777.35(2).
Defendant also argues that the trial court “failed to give a critical eye to all of the facts
underlying the offense” when it sentenced him within the guidelines range rather than sentencing
him below the guidelines range. Specifically, defendant argues that the court should have made
allowances for “[a]n inadequate claim of self-defense” and because the victim had a reputation
for violence. Defendant has not shown that the court was unaware of its sentencing discretion,
People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 389; 624 NW2d 227 (2001), so this claim is rejected.
Defendant argues that because he had no prior criminal history, his sentence violates the
principle of proportionality, in reliance on People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1
(1990). If the minimum sentence imposed is within the guidelines range, this Court must affirm
and may not remand for resentencing absent an error in the scoring of the sentencing guidelines
or a showing that inaccurate information was relied upon in determining the defendant’s
sentence. MCL 769.34(10), People v Leversee, 243 Mich App 337, 348; 622 NW2d 325 (2000).
Because defendant’s sentence is within the guidelines range, and defendant has failed to show
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that it was the product of either a scoring error or inaccurate information, we must affirm the
sentence. People v Hedgwood, 465 Mich 432, 437; 636 NW2d 127 (2001); Leversee, supra.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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