OMEGA ENVIRONMENTAL INC V SACO & SONS INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
OMEGA ENVIRONMENTAL, INC.,
UNPUBLISHED
September 20, 2002
Plaintiff/CounterdefendantAppellee/Cross-Appellant,
v
No. 223195
Kalkaska Circuit Court
LC No. 97-005888-CK
SACO & SONS, INC.,
Defendant/Counterplaintiff/ThirdParty Plaintiff-Appellant/CrossAppellee,
and
MARK SACO, FRANK SACO, ELMOND K.
NOLFF, BERNADEAN NOLFF, and E.K.
NOLFF, INC.,
Defendants,
and
C.F. FICK & SONS, INC.,
Third-Party Defendant/Third-Party
Plainitff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
and
SCHLUMBERGER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
Third-Party Defendant.1
1
Mark Saco, Frank Saco, Elmond K. Nolff, Bernadean Nolff, E.K. Nolff, Inc., and
Schlumberger Technologies, Inc. are non-parties on appeal.
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Before: Murphy, P.J., and Hood and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Saco & Sons, Inc. (hereinafter Saco) appeals as of right from a judgment
effectuating a jury verdict that awarded it damages on its countercomplaint against plaintiff
Omega Environmental, Inc. (hereinafter Omega) in the amount of $4,100 and declared no cause
of action on its third-party complaint against C.F. Fick & Sons (hereinafter Fick). Omega and
Fick cross-appeal, challenging the trial court’s order denying their motions for case-evaluation
sanctions. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Saco first argues that the trial court erred in failing to find as a matter of law that the
gasoline dispensers in this case constituted a “facility” under part 201 of the Michigan Natural
Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA), MCL 324.02101 et seq. We hold that
the trial court erred in submitting the question to the jury, but find such error harmless as the jury
arrived at the correct result in finding that Fick was not the owner of a “facility” for purposes of
MCL 324.20101(1)(o).
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for directed verdict de novo. Meagher v
Wayne State University, 222 Mich App 700, 708; 565 NW2d 401 (1997). Similarly, issues of
statutory construction are questions of law, which this Court reviews de novo on appeal.
Oakland Co Bd of Road Comm’rs v Michigan Property & Casualty Guaranty Ass’n, 456 Mich
590, 610; 575 NW2d 751 (1998).
Initially, we note that the trial court erred in submitting the question of whether gasoline
dispensers in this case constituted a “facility” under the statute, as it is the trial court’s exclusive
job to expound and interpret the applicable law. People v Sheets, 223 Mich App 651, 659; 567
NW2d 478 (1997). Nevertheless, we find such error harmless in light of the result reached by
the jury.
A review of the relevant statute in this case leads us to the firm conclusion that a gasoline
dispenser was not intended to be included within the definition of “facility” for purposes of MCL
324.20101(1)(o). “The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give
effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Kokx v Bylenga, 241 Mich App 655, 661; 617 NW2d 368
(2000). “This Court will not read into a statute anything that is not within the manifest intention
of the Legislature as gathered from the act itself.” Id. The first step in determining intent is to
review the specific language of the statute itself. In re MCI Telecommunications Complaint, 460
Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). If the plain and ordinary meaning of the language is
clear and the statute is unambiguous on its face, the Legislature is presumed to have intended the
meaning expressed, and judicial construction is neither required nor permitted. Id.
The definition of “facility” as defined in MCL 324.20101(1)(o) refers to any “area, place,
or property where a hazardous substance . . . has been released, deposited, disposed of, or
otherwise comes to be located.” When read as a whole, it is clear from the plain language of the
statute that the definition of “facility” does not encompass pieces of personal property such as
gasoline dispensers. The use of the term “where,” instead of “in which”, suggests that the focus
is on locations of real property, not instruments, such as gasoline-dispensing equipment. This
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conclusion is also supported by the use of the phrase “comes to be located,” instead of “is stored”
or “contained.” The other uses of “facility” within the companion provisions of the NREPA
further support our conclusion regarding the legislative intent at issue. “To the extent possible,
each provision of a statute should be given effect, and each should be read to harmonize with all
others.” Michigan Basic Property Ins Ass’n v Ware, 230 Mich App 44, 49; 583 NW2d 240
(1998). Thus, in light of the clear and unambiguous language of the statute and in the absence of
more specific language inviting the inclusion of separately owned gasoline dispensing
equipment, the gasoline station dispenser in this case does not fall within the definition of
“facility” for purposes of the NREPA, MCL 324.20101(1)(o). As such, Fick cannot be held
statutorily liable under MCL 324.20126.
Saco next argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for JNOV or a new trial
because the great weight of the evidence established that Fick was incontestably guilty of
negligence under the inherently dangerous activity doctrine. We disagree. This Court reviews
de novo a trial court’s decision with regard to a motion for JNOV. Morinelli v Provident Life &
Accident Ins Co, 242 Mich App 255, 260; 617 NW2d 777 (2000). On the other hand, “[a] trial
court’s decision regarding a motion for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”
Meyer v City of Centerline, 242 Mich App 560, 564; 619 NW2d 182 (2000).
We find that the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that Fick had a duty to
supervise and inspect the installation of the dispensing equipment under a theory of strict
liability. We hold that not every act involving an inflammable or explosive substance, such as
gasoline, implicates all parties to the action in strict liability. Rather, review of the case law
addressing the inherently dangerous activity doctrine indicates that it is the special risk of
physical injury that brings the inherently dangerous doctrine to bear. Indeed, an independent
contractor is subject to liability for physical harm caused to others by the contractor’s failure to
take reasonable precautions against such special dangers. Bosak v Hutchinson, 422 Mich 712,
726; 375 NW2d 333 (1985). The dispute in this case does not involve any physical harm that
occurred as a result of an inherently dangerous activity, but rather environmental contamination
caused by a gasoline leak. Thus, the inherently dangerous activity doctrine is inapplicable to the
facts of this case. As a result, the trial court erred in instructing the jury in such a manner.
However, we hold that such error was again harmless due to the jury’s finding that Fick was not
liable. Accordingly, reversal is not required.
Saco also argues that the jury verdict awarding damages against Omega was internally
inconsistent, and therefore, must be set aside and a new trial must be ordered. We disagree.
Again, “[a] trial court’s decision regarding a motion for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.” Meyer, supra. “A jury’s verdict is to be upheld, even if it is arguably inconsistent,
‘if there is an interpretation of the evidence that provides a logical explanation for the findings of
the jury.’” Bean v Directions, Unlimited, Inc, 462 Mich 24, 31; 609 NW2d 567 (2000) (citations
omitted). A court must make every effort to reconcile the seemingly inconsistent verdicts and
only verdicts that are so logically and legally inconsistent that they cannot be reconciled will be
set aside. Id.; Legalo v Allied Corp, 457 Mich 278, 282; 577 NW2d 462 (1998).
In this case, the trial court attempted to harmonize the jury verdict when it recalled the
jury and elicited from the foreperson that the jury determined Omega’s total liability to be $4,100
and that was its intent in apportioning one-half percent fault to Omega. Thereafter, with the
consent of counsel, the trial court entered the verdict as orally presented and not as written. This
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verdict, even if arguably inconsistent, must be upheld because the evidence and arguments as
applied in the context of this specific case provide a logical explanation for the findings of the
jury. See Bean, supra at 31-32. During closing argument, Omega’s counsel summarized the
evidence of the costs of remedying the soil contamination and suggested that if Omega were
liable at all, it should be for “[r]oughly forty-one hundred dollars for the cleanup of the soil.”
Because that is precisely the figure that the jury arrived at, it seems a logical explanation that the
jury accepted this figure in arriving at its verdict and calculated that the figure was roughly onehalf percent of the total damages involved in this case. Accordingly, the jury’s verdict is to be
upheld.2
Finally, Saco argues that such a grossly inadequate verdict was influenced by passion or
prejudice resulting from the evidence that the Sacos are immigrants from Iraq. A new trial may
be granted based on inadequate damages if the verdict was secured by improper means, passion,
prejudice, or sympathy. MCR 2.611(A)(1); see also Kelly v Builders Square, Inc, 465 Mich 29,
36; 632 NW2d 912 (2001). However, Saco’s assertion of prejudice is based on mere speculation
and unsupported by the record in this case. Further, the trial court instructed the jury that its
decision must not be influenced by prejudice regarding race, religion, or national origin. Jurors
are presumed to follow their instructions. Bordeaux v The Celotex Corp, 203 Mich App 158,
164; 511 NW2d 899 (1993).
Fick and Omega cross-appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to award
actual costs and reasonable attorney fees against Saco as mediation sanctions required by MCR
2.403(O)(1) and (6). We agree. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to award attorney
fees and costs for an abuse of discretion. Egan v City of Detroit, 150 Mich App 14, 28; 387
NW2d 861 (1986). However, we review the court’s decision whether to grant mediation
sanctions de novo because it is not a discretionary matter. Great Lakes Gas Transmission Ltd
Partnership v Markel, 226 Mich App 127, 129; 573 NW2d 61 (1997).
MCR 2.403(O), which governs a rejecting party’s liability for costs states in pertinent
part:
(1) If a party has rejected an evaluation and the action proceeds to verdict, that
party must pay the opposing party’s actual costs unless the verdict is more
favorable to the rejecting party than the case evaluation. However, if the
opposing party has also rejected the evaluation, a party is entitled to costs only if
the verdict is more favorable to that party than the case evaluation.
“Our Supreme Court’s use of the word ‘must’ indicates that the award of costs is mandatory, not
discretionary.” Id. at 130. Thus, by rejecting the mediation evaluation, Saco became liable to
pay as a sanction Fick and Omega’s “actual costs” when this suit concluded with a jury verdict
more favorable to Fick and Omega than the case evaluation. MCR 2.403(O)(1). MCR
2
Saco asserts in error that “inconsistent verdicts always require a new trial.” Contrary to Saco’s
argument, “MCR 2.611(A)(1) does not identify inconsistency or incongruity as a ground for
granting a new trial.” Kelly v Builders Square, Inc, 465 Mich 29, 39; 632 NW2d 912 (2001).
Rather, Saco must establish one of the grounds articulated in the court rule as a bases for
granting a new trial. See id. at 38-39. See also MCR 2.611(A)(1).
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2.403(O)(6) provides that “actual costs are those costs taxable in any civil action, and a
reasonable attorney fee based on a reasonable hourly or daily rate as determined by the trial
judge for services necessitated by the rejection of the case evaluation.” MCR 2.403(O)(6)(a) and
(b). Accordingly, the trial court erred in refusing to award Fick and Omega actual costs. This
case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to award costs as required by MCR 2.403(O).
Due to the resolution of the foregoing issues, Fick and Omega’s remaining issues on
cross-appeal need not be addressed.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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