PEOPLE OF MI V CARLOS LOTT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 17, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 224944
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 99-005268
CARLOS LOTT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Hood and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of one count of carjacking, MCL 750.529a, and three
counts of armed robbery, MCL 750.529(1). He was sentenced to four concurrent prison terms of
fifteen to thirty years each. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that he was denied a fair trial because of prosecutorial misconduct.
Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are generally reviewed on a case-by-case basis by reviewing
the challenged remarks in context to determine whether the defendant was deprived of a fair trial.
People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 266-267; 531 NW2d 659 (1995); People v Noble, 238 Mich
App 647, 660; 608 NW2d 123 (1999). However, because defendant did not object to any of the
alleged instances of misconduct, we review this issue for plain error affecting defendant’s
substantial rights, which generally requires a showing of prejudice. People v Carines, 460 Mich
750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
We agree that the prosecutor made some improper civic duty arguments during her
closing argument. Bahoda, supra at 282; see also People v Cooper, 236 Mich App 643, 651; 601
NW2d 409 (1999). However, the challenged remarks were brief and isolated and any prejudice
was alleviated by the court’s instruction to the jurors that they must not be influenced by
sympathy or prejudice, and that the arguments and statements of the attorneys are not evidence.
See People v Stimage, 202 Mich App 28, 30; 507 NW2d 778 (1993). Furthermore, even if it was
plainly improper for the prosecutor to ask a witness whether he would tell the jury if he had any
doubts about his identification of defendant as one of the perpetrators, see People v Malone, 180
Mich App 347, 361; 447 NW2d 157 (1989), defendant was not prejudiced, considering that the
witness had already unequivocally identified defendant and that other evidence overwhelmingly
pointed to defendant’s identity as a perpetrator. Carines, supra. Accordingly, reversal is not
warranted on the basis of these unpreserved errors.
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With regard to defendant’s remaining claims of misconduct, we conclude that defendant
has not established plain error. Defendant has not plainly shown that it was improper for the
prosecutor to inquire about his use of aliases, or that the prosecutor inquired about prior arrests
for an improper purpose. See People v Layher, 464 Mich 756, 758; 631 NW2d 281 (2001);
People v Messenger, 221 Mich App 171, 180; 561 NW2d 463 (1997). Regardless, reversal is not
required as a timely instruction would have cured any error. People v Schutte, 240 Mich App
713, 721; 613 NW2d 370 (2000). Further, the prosecutor’s comments concerning the cellular
telephone found in the stolen vehicle were permissible in light of the evidence. People v Schultz,
246 Mich App 695, 710; 635 NW2d 491 (2001). Contrary to what defendant asserts, it is not
improper to base an inference upon an inference. See People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 428;
646 NW2d 158 (2002). Also, it was not improper for the prosecutor to comment on defendant’s
failure to produce corroborating alibi witnesses, nor did such commentary improperly shift the
burden of proof to defendant. People v Fields, 450 Mich 94, 112; 538 NW2d 356 (1995). We
also find that, given defendant’s testimony denying his participation in the charged offense, it
was not improper for the prosecutor to recall one of the victims to testify on rebuttal regarding
defendant’s identity as one of the perpetrators. The testimony was properly responsive to
defendant’s testimony. See People v Figgures, 451 Mich 390, 398-401; 547 NW2d 673 (1996).
Additionally, the prosecutor did not improperly vouch for the rebuttal witness’ credibility, nor
did she improperly “sandbag” defendant by an unfair ordering of the proofs. See People v
Vasher, 449 Mich 494, 504-505; 537 NW2d 168 (1995); see also People v Howard, 226 Mich
App 528, 548; 575 NW2d 16 (1997). Accordingly, reversal is not warranted on the basis of
prosecutorial misconduct.
Next, defendant argues that he is entitled to be resentenced because the trial court failed
to justify its substantial departure from the term of imprisonment previously suggested as part of
a Cobbs1 evaluation made during plea negotiations, thereby giving rise to a presumption of
vindictiveness. We disagree. In People v Cobbs, 443 Mich 276, 283; 505 NW2d 208 (1993)
(emphasis added), our Supreme Court approved a procedure whereby a judge may participate in
sentence discussions attendant to a plea offer by stating “on the record the length of sentence
that, on the basis of the information then available to the judge, appears to be appropriate for the
charged offense.” However, the Court in Cobbs never suggested that a preliminary evaluation
made pursuant to that procedure would serve to later restrict the court’s sentencing discretion
should a defendant decline the plea offer. On the contrary, the Court stated:
The judge’s preliminary evaluation of the case does not bind the judge’s
sentencing discretion, since additional facts may emerge during later proceedings,
in the presentence report, through the allocution afforded to the prosecutor and the
victim, or from other sources.
***
[T]he judge’s final sentencing decision must await receipt of all the
necessary information. [Id. at 283, 285 (emphasis added).]
1
People v Cobbs, 443 Mich 276; 505 NW2d 208 (1993).
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Accordingly, we find no merit to defendant’s claim that the trial court’s sentencing discretion
was restricted by the previous Cobbs evaluation, such that the court was required to justify the
later deviation on the record, or that the deviation gave rise to a presumption of vindictiveness.
Third, defendant argues that his convictions must be reversed because he was never
properly arraigned. However, defendant failed to argue below that he did not have proper notice
of the charges against him. Therefore, this issue is unpreserved and defendant must establish a
plain error affecting his substantial rights. Carines, supra. The lower court file does not contain
a signed copy of the information. Nonetheless, the record reveals that the charges of which
defendant was convicted, as amended at defendant’s preliminary examination, were read to
defendant on the record at his circuit court arraignment. Given this record, along with the fact
that defendant proceeded to trial without ever complaining that he did not have notice of the
charges of which he was convicted, we conclude that this unpreserved issue does not warrant
appellate relief.
Defendant next claims that reversal is required because the trial court failed to administer
the proper oath to the jury. We disagree. At trial, the court administered an oath that
substantially comported with the oath required by MCL 768.14, rather than MCR 2.511(G).
Because defendant did not object to the oath that was given, this issue is not preserved. Even if
the court rule trumps the statute, see Staff v Johnson, 242 Mich App 521, 530-531; 619 NW2d 57
(2000); People v Strong, 213 Mich App 107, 112; 539 NW2d 736 (1995), we disagree with
defendant that giving an oath based on MCL 768.14, rather than MCR 2.511(G), is the kind of
error where prejudice is presumed or reversal is automatic. The oath that was given sufficiently
served to obtain a promise that jurors would abide by the law, pay attention to the evidence and
the credibility of witnesses, and conduct themselves appropriately. See People v Pribble, 72
Mich App 219, 225; 249 NW2d 363 (1976). Thus, an error affecting defendant’s substantial
rights has not been shown. Carines, supra.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the
inherent unreliability of witness identification testimony in accordance with the principles set
forth in People v Anderson, 389 Mich 155, 173; 205 NW2d 461 (1973). Because defendant did
not object to the instructions given at trial, or request further instruction by the trial court, this
issue is not preserved. See People v Haywood, 209 Mich App 217, 230; 530 NW2d 497 (1995).
Accordingly, in order to avoid forfeiture of this issue, defendant must establish plain error
affecting his substantial rights. Carines, supra. The record reveals that the trial court gave CJI2d
7.8. That instruction adequately appraised the jury of the proper considerations for evaluating
eyewitness identifications. People v Carson, 217 Mich App 801, 807; 553 NW2d 1 (1996), as
adopted in relevant part by the special panel in People v Carson, 220 Mich App 662, 678; 560
NW2d 657 (1996). Thus, we find no error.
Similarly, defendant has also not demonstrated plain error with the trial court’s
instruction on reasonable doubt. The court instructed the jury in accordance with CJI2d 3.2,
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which sufficiently conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury. People v Hubbard
(After Remand), 217 Mich App 459, 487; 552 NW2d 493 (1996); see also Cooper, supra at 656.2
Next, defendant argues that entire jury venire was tainted because some of the prospective
jurors disclosed their experiences as crime victims. Defendant argues that the trial court should
have sua sponte granted a mistrial because of the revelations. We disagree. The questioning of
the prospective jurors regarding their experiences as crime victims was necessary to determine
whether they could serve fairly and impartially. People v Bell, 209 Mich App 273, 278; 530
NW2d 167 (1995). Indeed, defendant himself used the information elicited to reach conclusions
regarding juror impartiality, resulting in the dismissal of two jurors for cause and another by
peremptory challenge. Because defendant has failed to demonstrate either plain error or that his
substantial rights were affected, appellate relief is not available on the basis of this unpreserved
issue. Carines, supra.
We reject defendant’s claim that reversal is required because of the cumulative effect of
several minor errors, even if a single error does not warrant reversal. The few errors that did
occur did not deprive defendant of a fair trial. People v Daoust, 228 Mich App 1, 16; 577 NW2d
179 (1998).
Defendant argues, in pro per, that the trial court erred at sentencing by considering two
out-of-state convictions that were obtained without the benefit of counsel or a valid waiver of
counsel. Because defendant did not challenge the validity of the convictions at or before
sentencing, this issue is unpreserved. See MCR 6.429(C). Accordingly, we review this issue for
plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Carines, supra.
A court may not consider a prior conviction obtained in violation of defendant’s right to
counsel. People v Carpentier, 446 Mich 19, 28-30; 521 NW2d 195 (1994); People v Alexander,
234 Mich App 665, 670-671; 599 NW2d 749 (1999). In this case, it is not apparent from the
record at sentencing that defendant’s two out-of-state convictions were invalid. There is no
indication that the convictions were obtained without the benefit of counsel or a proper waiver of
counsel. Thus, the record does not establish plain error.
On appeal, defendant has presented copies of responses he received from courts in
Minnesota and Mississippi regarding his requests for documents. The response from Minnesota
consists of the docket listings for defendant’s Minnesota case. It does not expressly indicate that
defendant was not represented by counsel when he pleaded guilty to a felony drug offense in that
state and the name of a defense attorney is listed at the top of the document. We conclude that
this document does not amount to prima facie proof that defendant’s Minnesota conviction was
invalid. Carpentier, supra at 31-32, relying on People v Moore, 391 Mich 426, 440-441; 216
NW2d 770 (1974). The response from Mississippi indicates that the requested records were not
being provided because defendant failed to demonstrate a specific need for the records or
2
In any event, defendant affirmatively expressed satisfaction with the jury instructions as given,
which thereby extinguished any instructional errors on appeal. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206,
214-215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000).
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demonstrate good cause why the records should be provided without the applicable fee. Because
the Mississippi court did not refuse to respond to defendant’s request and because defendant has
not otherwise shown that the Mississippi conviction was obtained without counsel, defendant has
not satisfied his burden of establishing that the conviction was invalid or that remand for a
Tucker3 hearing is required. Carpentier, supra at 28, 31-32; Alexander, supra.
Defendant also argues that defense counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the court’s
consideration of the Minnesota and Mississippi convictions. Because defendant did not raise this
issue in a motion for a new trial or a Ginther4 hearing, our review of this issue is limited to
mistakes apparent on the existing record. People v Hurst, 205 Mich App 634, 641; 517 NW2d
858 (1994). It is not apparent from the record what efforts, if any, counsel may have made to
investigate the out-of-state convictions, or whether he may have inquired of defendant whether
he was represented by counsel in those matters. Thus, the record does not permit a conclusion
that counsel’s performance was deficient. See People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 156; 560 NW2d
600 (1997).
Defendant further argues, in pro per, that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to the prosecutor’s questions concerning the use of aliases, defendant’s prior arrests, and
defendant’s failure to present corroborating witnesses. We disagree. As discussed above,
defendant has failed to show that the prosecutor’s questions on these subjects were improper.
Defense counsel is not ineffective in failing to make meritless objections. See People v
Kulpinski, 243 Mich App 8, 27; 620 NW2d 537 (2000).
Finally, defendant argues, in pro per, that the prosecutor committed misconduct by
commenting on the amount of money that defendant was carrying at the time of his arrest. This
issue was not preserved with an appropriate objection at trial, thereby limiting our review to plain
error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Carines, supra. The prosecutor’s comments were
permissible in light of the evidence as a whole. Schultz, supra. There was no plain error.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
3
United States v Tucker, 404 US 443; 92 S Ct 589; 30 L Ed 2d 592 (1972).
4
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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