IN RE DE'ANDRE RICO TURNER MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of D.R.T., Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
September 13, 2002
Petitioner-Appellee,
V
No. 235308
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 97-349930
PIN MBOYA WINSTON a/k/a ROBERT
WINSTON,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Gage, P.J., and Cavanagh and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right the March 26, 2001 order terminating his parental rights
pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm.
I. Facts and Proceedings
In January 1997, the minor child in this case was removed from his mother’s care
because of environmental neglect. At that time, respondent had not established paternity and
was not living with the minor child. Although he had visited his son, he said he was unaware of
the unsatisfactory condition of the home and did not know that his child was not attending
school.
Petitioner established paternity in May 1997, but the court refused to place the minor
child in his care because he had waited until the child was nearly eight years old to establish
paternity and had not been paying child support. The court ordered respondent to comply with a
parent-agency agreement that included attending parenting classes, participating in individual
therapy, maintaining stable housing and employment, and visiting the minor child.
Over the next year, the court held dispositional review hearings and learned that
respondent was complying with some aspects of the parent-agency plan, but not all of them. He
did not follow through with the therapy requirement and missed some of his regularly scheduled
supervised visits. Additionally, unsupervised visitation was suspended for a period of time
because respondent took the minor child to work with him on the midnight shift and failed to
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return the minor child to foster care on Sunday evening. In October 1998, petitioner filed a
petition to terminate the rights of the mother and respondent, alleging that respondent had failed
to comply with his parent-agency agreement because he did not complete parenting classes or
participate in therapy.
Testimony at the termination hearing, which took place over several months in 1999 and
2000, showed that respondent sometimes failed to interact appropriately with his son and that he
was “not very realistic” about his child’s special educational and medical needs. Additionally,
testimony showed that respondent did not benefit from parenting classes and still had not
participated in individual therapy. Testimony also showed, however, that sometimes respondent
played appropriately with his son during supervised visits.
Testimony taken in the later months of the proceedings showed that respondent had
started attending therapy, had appropriate housing, and was visiting his son regularly. The
testimony was mixed regarding whether respondent interacted appropriately during the visits.
Ultimately, in February 2000, the court decided not to terminate respondent’s parental rights, but
did terminate the mother’s rights.
At the review hearing just one month later, the court learned that respondent no longer
had suitable housing and had engaged in “some physical contact” with his son. Additionally, at
both the March and June 2000 hearings, the record showed that respondent failed to fully comply
with the parent-agency treatment plan. As of June, he still had not obtained suitable housing and
had missed several therapy sessions.
Also in June 2000, the minor child began exhibiting signs of mental illness, including
experiencing hallucinations and hearing voices. He was hospitalized for these problems, and at
the September 2000 review hearing, the court reminded respondent of the importance of
attending therapy and having the insight necessary to parent a child with significant
psychological problems. The record of the September 2000 hearing shows that respondent’s
pattern of non-compliance with the parent-agency treatment plan continued. For example,
respondent was incarcerated for a period of time between the June and September hearings, but
did not inform any of the concerned parties of his whereabouts during his incarceration.
Moreover, respondent still had not secured suitable housing and indicated that it was not
important where he lived. By this time, the minor child had been in foster care for nearly three
years.
Petitioner again filed a petition for termination of respondent’s rights. At the March 2001
trial, the court took judicial notice of the file and heard testimony from the caseworker, therapist,
and respondent. The caseworker’s testimony showed that respondent had engaged in an
unauthorized visit with the minor child approximately one month before the trial and did not
always interact appropriately during authorized visits, sometimes sleeping during visits or
criticizing the minor child. Additionally, although respondent had been offered financial help
with finding adequate housing, he failed to follow through with agency requirements. Not long
before the trial, respondent indicated to the caseworker that he had decided to move in with his
grandparents, who had a suitable home, but that he had not done so sooner because they had too
many rules.
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The therapist for respondent and the minor child testified that respondent did not
understand the importance of stable housing or why it was important to meet his son’s most basic
needs. Additionally, she stated that although it appeared that respondent and the minor child
genuinely loved each other, they seemed to behave more like brothers than father and son,
discussing video games, cartoons, and the minor child’s love life. Respondent also indicated to
her that he would not need to find childcare for the minor child when he was working at night
because the minor child and respondent’s two-year-old son would just be sleeping. He also did
not see a problem with sleeping during the day while leaving his two-year-old son unattended.
Additionally, respondent believed the minor child’s cognitive troubles were caused by a lack of
effort.
Respondent testified regarding his housing difficulties and his desire to do whatever he
needed to do to get his son back. However, he also characterized the minor child’s
hallucinations as an effort to get more attention since he had been in multiple schools and foster
homes. Counsel for the minor child informed the court that the minor child wanted to live with
his father. In its oral opinion issued a few days after the trial, the court found that petitioner had
met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that respondent’s rights should be
terminated pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j) and that termination was not clearly
not in the child’s best interest. Respondent appeals.
II. Standard of Review
In termination of parental rights cases, petitioner has the burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that one of the statutory grounds for termination exists. MCL 712A.19b(3);
In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 350; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). If petitioner satisfies its burden,
the family court must terminate the respondent’s parental rights unless it finds on the whole
record that clear evidence exists that termination is not in the child’s best interests. Id. at 354.
We review the court’s termination of parental rights for clear error. Id. at 356-357. Clear error
exists when this court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
McNamara v Horner, 249 Mich App 117, 182; 642 NW2d 385 (2002). “[A] decision must strike
us as more than just maybe or probably wrong.” In re Trejo, supra at 356, quoting In re Sours
Minors, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). We give due regard to the trial court’s
unique ability to assess the witnesses’ credibility. In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d
161 (1989).
III. Analysis
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that plaintiff had met its burden of proving
that grounds for termination existed. Although some evidence might be construed in
respondent’s favor, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made. McNamara, supra at 182.
Termination of respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) is not clearly
erroneous. MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) states that termination is warranted when “[t]he parent, without
regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable
expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable
time considering the child’s age.” The evidence showed that respondent minimized his child’s
psychological and educational problems, despite referral to three sets of parenting classes and
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ample opportunities to participate in therapy. Although he did show interest in his son’s welfare,
he generally failed to understand the precise care, encouragement, and supervision his son
required. Additionally, respondent failed to secure adequate housing over a lengthy time span,
even though significant assistance had been offered to him. He obtained suitable housing right
before the end of the 2000 termination trial, but didn’t reside in that home just one month later.
Then, just before the 2001 trial, respondent said he was moving into suitable housing with his
grandparents. However, testimony showed that he could have moved into their home sooner if he
had been willing to follow their household rules. This evidence, together with respondent’s
indication that a stable home was not important to raising a child, supports the court’s conclusion
that there was no reasonable expectation that respondent would be able to provide proper care for
his minor child in a reasonable time. Because we find that petitioner met its burden of proof
with regard to one of the statutory bases for termination, it is unnecessary for us to address the
other grounds for the court’s decision.
The trial court also did not clearly err by concluding that terminating respondent’s rights
was not clearly not in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5), Trejo, supra at 353. The
evidence showed that the child was eleven years old, had been in foster care for approximately
four years, and that he had serious psychological and educational problems. Additionally,
testimony showed that the stress of day-to-day life affected the child’s emotional health and that
a stable environment, which respondent had failed to secure, would be best for him. Based on
this evidence, the court properly found that termination was not clearly not in the child’s best
interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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