PEOPLE OF MI V CHAD EDWARD JOHN MALESKI
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 13, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 234112
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 00-004017-FC
CHAD EDWARD-JOHN MALESKI,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Hood and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted after a joint jury trial with codefendant James Rivero of firstdegree felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b), unarmed robbery, MCL 750.530, carjacking, MCL
750.529a, and kidnapping, MCL 750.349. He was sentenced to life in prison for murder, as well
as concurrent prison sentences of ten to fifteen years, twenty-five to fifty years, and twenty-five
to fifty years, respectively, for unarmed robbery, carjacking, and kidnapping. The trial court
denied defendant’s motion for new trial, and he now appeals by right. We affirm.
The evidence at trial indicated that defendant participated with Joshua Rogers, Mark
Kopp and James Rivero in the beating, robbery, and carjacking perpetrated against the victim
outside a bowling alley in the city of Grand Rapids. The victim, after being severely beaten, was
stuffed into the trunk of his own car and driven to a remote location in Mecosta County, where he
was repeatedly stabbed with scissors and left to die. Trial testimony also indicated that while the
victim was likely beaten into a helpless condition in the bowling alley parking lot, he survived
even the stab wounds but died from blunt force injuries to his abdomen and head after several
hours without medical attention. Defendant, Kopp, and Rivero were apprehended the next
morning after the police stopped Kopp for a traffic violation while he was driving the victim’s
car.
Defendant gave two statements to the police, which he moved to suppress before trial. At
the suppression hearing and on appeal, defendant argues that he did not effectively waive his
rights as set forth by Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966),
because he was too intoxicated to understand them, because the police did not read a statement
waiver, and because he never positively stated he waived his rights. Defendant further argues
that because of a four- or five-hour gap between his initial statement and a second statement after
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taking police to the victim’s body, the second statement should be suppressed because the police
failed to reread the Miranda warnings. The trial court found that both of defendant’s statements
were voluntary, and that defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his
constitutional rights to silence and counsel. Further, the trial court concluded that fresh Miranda
warnings were not required before defendant’s second statement, and accordingly, it denied
defendant’s motion to suppress. We agree with the trial court.
When considering a motion to suppress a statement, the trial court must determine, based
on the totality of the circumstances, whether a defendant's statement was voluntary, and whether
defendant made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights to
silence and to counsel. People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 27 (Boyle, J.), 44 (Weaver, J.); 551
NW2d 355 (1996); People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 416; 608 NW2d 502 (2000). This Court
must review the entire record de novo, but factual determinations of the trial court will not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous. MCR 2.613(C); People v Daoud, 462 Mich 621, 629; 614 NW2d
152 (2000). A factual finding is clearly erroneous if the appellate court is left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made, giving due deference to the trial court’s superior
ability to determine credibility. People v Sexton (After Remand), 461 Mich 746, 752; 609 NW2d
822 (2000).
Constitutional due process, and the common law, require that for the statement of the
accused in a criminal trial to be admitted as evidence at trial it must have been freely and
voluntarily made. Daoud, supra at 630-631; People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331,
333; 132 NW2d 87 (1965). A statement is voluntary if, under the totality of the circumstances, it
is “the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker,” rather than one
where the defendant’s “will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically
impaired.” People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 334; 429 NW2d 781 (1988), quoting Culombe v
Connecticut, 367 US 568, 602; 81 S Ct 1860; 6 L Ed 2d 1037 (1961). A court must decide
whether a statement is voluntary by reviewing all of the circumstances surrounding its making,
with no single factor being determinative, including: the duration of the defendant's detention and
questioning; the age, education, intelligence, and experience of the defendant; whether there was
unnecessary delay of arraignment; the defendant's mental and physical state; whether the
defendant was threatened or abused; and any promises of leniency. Sexton, supra at 752-753.
Further, if the accused was in police custody, a statement of a defendant may not be used
by the prosecutor as evidence unless he demonstrates that, prior to any questioning, the accused
was warned that he had a right to remain silent, that his statements could be used against him,
and that he had the right to retained or appointed counsel. Daoud, supra at 633. The prosecutor
must prove by the preponderance of the evidence that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently waived his constitutional rights to silence and counsel before the defendant’s
statements made during custodial interrogation may be admitted in evidence. Id. at 634. A court
must apply an objective standard to determine by the “totality of circumstances” involved,
including the education, experience, and conduct of the defendant and the credibility of the
police, whether a defendant’s waiver of Fifth Amendment rights was voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent. Id. at 633-634. Furthermore, the analysis must be bifurcated: 1) whether the waiver
was “voluntary,” and 2) whether the waiver was “knowing” and “intelligent.” Id. at 639.
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Whether a waiver is “voluntary” depends on the absence of police coercion, and here
there was no evidence of police coercion. Id. at 635. Defendant’s waiver was “knowing” and
“intelligent” if defendant was aware of his available options, but he need not comprehend the
ramifications of exercising or waiving his rights. Id. at 636.
In the present case, whether defendant was able to understand his available options as set
forth in the Miranda warnings, or whether he was too intoxicated to comprehend his rights, was a
question of fact that the trial court was required to determine at the motion to suppress. The
credibility of witnesses is a key factor in finding facts that are contested. In Daoud, supra at 629,
our Supreme Court, quoting Cheatham, supra at 30, opined that “[c]redibility is crucial in
determining a defendant's level of comprehension, and the trial judge is in the best position to
make this assessment.” Here, the trial court expressly found that defendant was not intoxicated,
and that considering defendant’s prior experiences in juvenile court, the police “effectively”
communicated to him his rights under Miranda. The trial court’s factual finding was supported
by police testimony, and therefore it was not clearly erroneous. Further our independent review
of the record does not create a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake by
finding that defendant’s statements were voluntary.
Defendant’s argument that his statements should have been suppressed because the police
failed to read a statement of waiver to him and that he failed to make a positive statement
waiving his rights is without merit. The prosecutor correctly notes that Miranda does not require
that the police read a statement of waiver before custodial interrogation, but rather requires that
the suspect “be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of
an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires.” Miranda, supra at 479. Further, although waiver will not be
presumed from a silent record, id. at 475, and the prosecutor must prove defendant waived his
rights to silence and counsel by the preponderance of evidence, Daoud, supra at 634, the trial
court here properly found that defendant was aware that by signing the Miranda warning card he
was waiving his rights, and that defendant’s act of signing his name on the card constituted an
express waiver of his rights.
Moreover, this Court has held that Miranda does not necessarily require an explicit
statement by a defendant waiving his rights, but rather it is a question of fact whether the
defendant actually waived his rights. People v Matthews, 22 Mich App 619, 627, 630-631; 178
NW2d 94 (1970). In People v Brannon, 194 Mich App 121, 130-131; 486 NW2d 83 (1992), this
Court held an effective waiver of Miranda rights from a deaf defendant did not require an oral
recitation. The issue was also addressed by the United States Supreme Court in North Carolina v
Butler, 441 US 369; 99 S Ct 1755; 60 L Ed 2d 286 (1979), where the defendant indicated he
understood his rights and waived them, but refused to sign the FBI’s “advice of rights” form.
The Supreme Court held that an explicit statement of waiver is unnecessary if, based on all the
facts and circumstances, the defendant, in fact, voluntarily and knowingly waived his rights. Id.
at 374-375. The Court opined:
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An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent
or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but
is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver. The question is
not one of form, but rather whether the defendant, in fact, knowingly and
voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda case. . . . The courts must
presume that a defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution’s burden is
great; but in at least some cases, waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions
and words of the person interrogated. [Id. at 373.]
Here, as noted above, the trial court found that defendant, in fact, understood his rights
and waived them. This conclusion was supported by the uncontradicted testimony of the police
that they read defendant his Miranda rights, and that defendant both verbally and nonverbally
acknowledged that he understood his rights; by the internal content of defendant’s statements; by
defendant’s knowledge of his rights based on past experience in juvenile court; and by defendant
signing the police Miranda card, which contained language that defendant was willing to talk to
police. Thus, the trial court did not clearly err by finding, based on the totality of circumstances,
that defendant’s statements were voluntary and uncoerced, and that defendant sufficiently
understood his rights to knowingly and intelligently waive them.
Defendant’s argument concerning his “second” statement also lacks merit. The failure of
the police to repeat the Miranda warnings before a second statement does not preclude a finding,
based on the totality of circumstances, that defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
waived his Fifth Amendment rights to silence and counsel. People v Littlejohn, 197 Mich App
220, 223; 495 NW2d 171 (1992); People v Godboldo, 158 Mich App 603, 605; 405 NW2d 114
(1986). In Godboldo, the defendant waived his Miranda rights and gave the police a four-page
statement. Id. at 605. Two hours later, the defendant was interviewed again without fresh
Miranda warnings but after acknowledging he remembered his rights. Id. This Court opined:
[T]he failure to reread a defendant’s Miranda rights prior to each
interrogation does not render his subsequent statements inadmissible as evidence
against him. Rather, a factual question is raised as to whether the statements were
voluntary. As we have previously noted, we find that the defendant's statements
here were indeed voluntary, and thus no error occurred in denying the motion to
suppress. [Id. at 607.]
In People v Ray, 431 Mich 260, 276; 430 NW2d 626 (1988), the Michigan Supreme
Court held that fresh Miranda warnings were unnecessary before a post-polygraph interview.
Instead, our Supreme Court adopted the test set forth in Wyrick v Fields, 459 US 42, 47; 103 S Ct
394, 396; 74 L Ed 2d 214 (1982), which provided that “the admissibility of such statements is to
be resolved by a review as to whether in the ‘totality of circumstances’ the waiver of the Fifth
Amendment right could be considered knowing and voluntary.” Ray, supra at 276.
If a suspect at any point after waiving his rights thereafter invokes his right against selfincrimination or to have counsel present, questioning by the police must cease. Miranda, supra
at 473-474. The police must “scrupulously honor” a defendant’s invocation of his right to
remain silent. People v Kowalski, 230 Mich App 464, 476; 584 NW2d 613 (1998). Further, if
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after waiver, a defendant invokes his right to counsel during custodial interrogation, questioning
must stop until the defendant has counsel present or unless the defendant initiates further
communication with the police. People v Paintman, 412 Mich 518, 525; 315 NW2d 418 (1982).
On the other hand, if an accused validly waives his Fifth Amendment rights, the police may
continue to question him until and unless he clearly invokes his rights. An ambiguous or
equivocal reference regarding counsel does not require that the police cease questioning or clarify
whether the accused wants counsel. People v Adams, 245 Mich App 226, 237-238; 627 NW2d
623 (2001).
In the present case, as discussed above, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that
defendant’s initial statement was voluntary and preceded by a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent
waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights. No evidence was submitted to the trial court that
thereafter defendant sought to invoke his rights either fully or partially. Rather, the evidence
established that during the time between the end of defendant’s first statement and the start of his
second statement, defendant continued to cooperate and communicate with the police by
directing them to the victim’s body. Thus, the totality of circumstances supported the trial
court’s finding that defendant’s second statement was also voluntary, and made after a knowing
and intelligent waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights. The trial court did not clearly err by
denying defendant’s motion to suppress his second statement.
Defendant next argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for
felony murder and kidnapping, claiming he was merely present, and that no evidence showed that
he was aware the victim was still alive when he directed the others involved to the location in
Mecosta County to dispose of the victim’s body. The trial court rejected defendant’s sufficiency
argument, finding that the evidence supported the conclusion that defendant was an active
participant in one way or another of all phases of the criminal episode. The trial court noted that
Rivero told the police that defendant was a participant in the beating at the bowling alley, while
defendant admitted taking money from the victim while Kopp and Rogers beat him, and
defendant also was aware before the robbery that the plan included stealing the victim’s car.
Further, the trial court found that the very act of stuffing the victim into his car trunk constituted
secret confinement, which defendant subsequently affirmatively aided. Moreover, defendant’s
participation in abandoning the victim in a remote location away from medical attention after his
severe beating proved that defendant acted in willful and wanton disregard of serious injury or
death to the victim. Finally, the trial court found that the evidence showed that the victim was
alive when taken to Mecosta County, and that the jury could conclude this fact was apparent to
all participants. The trial court noted that even if the jury found that the victim died before he
was finally abandoned, the victim’s secret confinement at the bowling alley was sufficient to
leave the question for the jury. Again, we agree with the trial court for the reasons discussed
below.
In a jury trial, the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments combine to require that every
essential element of the charged offense be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Bearss,
463 Mich 623, 629; 625 NW2d 10 (2001). Thus, in a criminal case, due process requires that a
prosecutor introduce evidence sufficient to justify a rational factfinder in concluding that the
defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 723; 597
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NW2d 73 (1999). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecutor and determine whether a rational factfinder
could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 513-514; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), mod 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
This standard of review for the sufficiency of evidence is deferential, and this Court must make
all reasonable inferences and resolve evidence or credibility conflicts in favor of the jury verdict.
People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). Circumstantial evidence and
reasonable inferences therefrom may constitute sufficient evidence to find all the elements of an
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Further, a prosecutor need not negate every reasonable
theory of innocence, but must only prove his own theory beyond a reasonable doubt in the face of
whatever contradictory evidence the defendant provides. Id.
The elements of felony murder are: (1) the killing of a human being, (2) with malice − the
intent to kill, to do great bodily harm, or to create a very high risk of death or great bodily harm
with knowledge that death or great bodily harm was the probable result, (3) while committing,
attempting to commit, or assisting in the commission of any of the felonies specifically
enumerated in MCL 750.316(1)(b), including the underlying charged offenses here of unarmed
robbery, carjacking, and kidnapping. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 758-759; 597 NW2d 130
(1999). Defendant concedes that sufficient evidence established he was guilty of unarmed
robbery and carjacking and that a human being was killed. The only contested element is malice.
In the present case, defendant was tried on the theory that he was guilty as an aider and
abettor. To establish that a person has criminal liability as an aider and abettor it must be shown
(1) that the crime was committed by someone, (2) that the accused performed acts or gave
encouragement that assisted the commission of the crime, and (3) that the accused intended the
commission of the crime or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time
he gave aid and encouragement. MCL 767.39; Carines, supra at 757. While “mere presence” is
insufficient to establish criminal liability, People v Wilson, 196 Mich App 604, 614; 493 NW2d
471 (1992), assistance sufficient for criminal liability “includes the actual or constructive
presence of an accessory, in preconcert with the principal, for the purpose of rendering
assistance, if necessary,” People v Palmer, 392 Mich 370, 378; 220 NW2d 393 (1974).
The intent of an aider and abettor may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including
a close association between the defendant and the principal, the defendant’s participation in the
planning or execution of the crime, and evidence of flight after the crime. Carines, supra at 757758. Further, malice necessary for felony murder may be inferred where the participants are
acting intentionally or recklessly in pursuit of a common plan that includes killing or infliction of
great bodily harm. Id. at 759. Moreover, because of the difficulty of proving a person’s state of
mind, proof of intent may be satisfied by minimal circumstantial evidence. People v McRunels,
237 Mich App 168, 181; 603 NW2d 95 (1999).
Applying the foregoing analysis to the present case, it is readily apparent that more than
ample evidence was presented at trial for a rational jury to find all of the elements of felony
murder were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, including malice. The evidence established that
defendant was acting in concert with his codefendants before the offense, defendant was aware of
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a plan to “beat a black man’s butt for his car,” and defendant either participated in beating the
victim or took money from the victim while two others were beating him. After the carjacking,
robbery, and beating of the victim, defendant continued acting in concert with his codefendants
when they tried to conceal the crime by changing their bloodied clothes, and defendant directed
the codefendants to a remote out-of-county location to dispose of the victim. It is this latter
action, according to the testimony of the forensic pathologist, which resulted in the victim’s
death by depriving him of necessary medical attention. Therefore, the evidence, viewed in a light
favorable to the prosecution, supported an inference that defendant was acting intentionally in
pursuit of a common plan to commit robbery and carjacking, and that a savage beating likely to
result in death or great bodily harm was within the scope of the common plan. In summary, the
evidence supported an inference that defendant acted intentionally with callous indifference to
human life sufficient to prove him guilty of felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for
kidnapping also fails. Although MCL 750.349 establishes several different forms of kidnapping,
People v Wesley, 421 Mich 375, 383; 365 NW2d 692 (1984), defendant was prosecuted and
convicted under the alternative theories of (1) secret confinement or (2) forcible seizure or
confinement, with intent to secretly confine. People v Jaffray, 445 Mich 287, 299; 519 NW2d
108 (1994); People v Hoffman, 225 Mich App 103, 111-112; 570 NW2d 146 (1997). The
elements of secret confinement kidnapping are that defendant, either alone or by aiding and
abetting others, (1) willfully, maliciously, and without legal authority, (2) secretly confined or
imprisoned another person, (3) using force or without consent. Jaffray, supra at 305. The
elements of forcible kidnapping applied to the present case are: (1) a forcible seizure or
confinement of another, (2) done willfully, maliciously and without lawful authority, and (3) with
the specific intent to cause such person to be secretly confined or imprisoned. Wesley, supra at
389. Neither of these forms of kidnapping requires proof of asportation or movement incidental
to the kidnapping, id. at 390-391, and secret confinement kidnapping is a general intent crime,
Jaffray, supra at 298. Thus, “the critical factor peculiar to this form of the statutorily proscribed
behavior is the degree of the victim's isolation as a result of the accused’s conduct, not the
specific intent of the accused.” Id. at 305, n 30. The difference between the two alternatives is
that in secret confinement “a kidnapping conviction may be premised on a showing of
confinement that in fact is secret” and the other alternative depends “upon a showing of forcible
seizure or confinement with intent to secretly confine, whether or not the confinement remains a
secret.” Id. at 300-301.
Here, the evidence overwhelmingly established that the victim was in fact willfully,
maliciously, forcibly, and secretly confined against his will, first in the trunk of his own
automobile, and then in a remote field where he was left to die. Furthermore, defendant admitted
that he knowingly assisted the victim’s secret confinement by directing other defendants to a
remote location where the secret confinement could continue. To the extent the victim must have
been alive while secretly confined, the physical evidence, the pathologist’s testimony, and the
statement of Rivero were more than sufficient to support an inference that the victim was living
when confined to his car’s trunk and when left in the remote field. As a general intent crime that
defendant assisted in committing, it is not necessary to prove what defendant’s specific intent
may have been because the secret confinement in fact occurred.
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Moreover, a rational view of the evidence, in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
also supported a conclusion that defendant was aware that the victim was alive. What happened
to the victim before being put in the trunk was always referred to by defendant and the other
participants as a beating and not a killing. The pathologist’s testimony supported an inference
that the victim survived for several hours after the initial beating. Rivero’s statement that the
victim was moaning for help when the trunk was opened in the field further supports an inference
that the victim was alive and an inference that it also would have been readily apparent to
defendant. Also, Rivero’s statement that before opening the trunk in the field, Rogers got out of
the car with scissors, and that Kopp and defendant got out of the car with him, raised an
inference that all three believed the victim was still alive. The jury could also have inferred that
defendant intended to secretly confine the victim to avoid apprehension. Thus, the evidence was
sufficient to find defendant guilty of forcible seizure or confinement, with intent to secretly
confine.
Next, defendant argues he was denied a fair and impartial trial as a result of pretrial
publicity when the trial court failed to grant his motion for change of venue. We disagree.
Defendant failed to preserve this issue by not obtaining a ruling from the trial court on his motion
and not objecting to the composition of the jury after it was seated. People v Carter, 462 Mich
206, 214; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). Alleged error by the trial court in granting or denying a motion
for a change of venue is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion, People v Jendrzejewski,
455 Mich 495, 500; 566 NW2d 530 (1997), but defendant’s claim that he was denied a fair and
impartial trial because jurors were tainted by pretrial publicity raises a constitutional issue subject
to de novo review, People v Manser, 250 Mich App 21, 24; 645 NW2d 65 (2002). However,
because the alleged error was not preserved, appellate review is for plain error affecting
defendant’s substantial rights. People v Milstead, 250 Mich App 391, 402; 648 NW2d 648
(2002). Reversal is warranted only when plain error results in the conviction of an actually
innocent defendant or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings. Carines, supra at 763.
Before trial, defendant moved for a change of venue alleging that negative pretrial
publicity would make it impossible to seat an impartial jury. Attached to the motion were several
articles from The Grand Rapids Press printed from the date the four suspects were arrested,
March 17, 2000, through the preliminary examination in mid-April, as well as numerous letters
to the editor published on the paper’s public commentary page. The articles reported details of
the offense, the troubled backgrounds of the four suspects, and reported that the victim was a
well-liked, mild-mannered retiree. Of course, the fact that three of the suspects were white teens
and the victim was a black man who was savagely beaten made the case a compelling news story
in the community. One headline read, “Black leaders suspect killing was hate crime,” but the
accompanying story also reported that the police called the offense “a senseless, random act of
violence,” for which there was no indication of racial motivation (The Grand Rapids Press,
March 28, 2000).
Defendant, however, never insisted on a ruling from the trial court on his motion for
change of venue. Counsel did not raise the issue before or after the selection of jurors. The trial
court, however, noted that a front-page newspaper article published on the eve of trial was
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regrettable and had come “very close to making it impossible to select juries to try this particular
case.” The trial court addressed its concern by inquiring of prospective jurors if they had read the
most recent article and summarily excusing those who had. At the conclusion of juror voir dire,
defense counsel expressed no challenge to the jury that eventually was impaneled. Because the
trial court was not called upon to exercise its discretion concerning the motion for change of
venue, there can be no abuse of discretion. See, e.g., People v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App
429, 438-439; 597 NW2d 843 (1999).
Furthermore, this Court has found a waiver, as opposed to mere forfeiture, in similar
circumstances, where the defendant’s pretrial motion for change of venue based on pretrial
publicity was denied, but where after voir dire, counsel expressed satisfaction with the jury
impaneled and failed to renew the motion. People v Clark, 243 Mich App 424, 426; 622 NW2d
344 (2000). Regardless of whether defendant waived the argument, we find no error.
Without question, a defendant in a criminal case has an absolute right to have a fair and
impartial jury decide his guilt or innocence. Jendrzejewski, supra at 501. The general rule,
however, is that prospective jurors are presumed to be impartial and a juror’s answer under oath
that he or she can set aside preconceived opinions and decide the case based on the evidence at
trial is sufficient to protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial. Id. at 517. Furthermore, pretrial
publicity alone is insufficient to require a change of venue to guarantee a fair and impartial jury.
Id. at 502. Rather, a defendant must demonstrate either a pattern of strong community animus
against him and publicity so extensive and inflammatory that jurors would be unable to remain
impartial after being exposed to it, or that the jury was actually prejudiced, or that the atmosphere
surrounding the trial created a probability of bias. People v Hack, 219 Mich App 299, 311; 556
NW2d 187 (1997).
Defendant points to nothing in the record to indicate actual bias on the part of the jury,
nor does he argue that the atmosphere of the courtroom created a presumption of bias. Instead,
defendant argues that because some prospective jurors acknowledged having read a recent
newspaper article, and were excused without further inquiry by the trial court, jurors that were
seated harbored undisclosed information sufficient to overcome the presumption of impartiality.
Defendant’s argument must be rejected because the pretrial publicity in this case was far less
extensive or prejudicial than cases where similar arguments have been rejected. Jendrzejewski,
supra at 502-504. Moreover, the value protected by the Constitution is lack of impartiality, not
an empty mind. Id. at 519.
In summary, defendant has failed to meet his burden of proving that clear error affected
his substantial rights. Defendant was not denied a fair and impartial trial as a result of pretrial
publicity.
Last, defendant argues that his constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clause were
denied when the statements of his non-testifying codefendant were admitted at their joint trial.
We need not reach the merits of defendant’s claim because he waived any error by stipulating to
the admission of his codefendant’s statements as substantive evidence at their joint trial. People
v Riley, 465 Mich 442, 448-449; 636 NW2d 514 (2001). Defendant’s attorney noted on the
record that he specifically advised defendant that he believed parts of Rivero’s statements would
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help defendant’s case but some parts would hurt defendant’s case. Defendant acknowledged
such advice and affirmed that it was his decision to proceed with a joint trial and agreed that
codefendant Rivero’s statements would be received as substantive evidence. Defendant’s actions
constituted an “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right,” thus waiving and
extinguishing any alleged error. Id. at 449.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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