PEOPLE OF MI V KEVIN BURNETT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 13, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 233151
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-008042-01
KEVIN BURNETT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Bandstra and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right the circuit court’s order revoking his probation, which was
based on an underlying guilty plea to aggravated stalking. We affirm.
Defendant previously pleaded guilty to aggravated stalking and was sentenced to
probation with ninety days to be served in jail. As a condition of probation, defendant was
ordered to have no contact with the stalking victim. While in jail, defendant sent letters to
various third parties in which he threatened the stalking victim. Based on these letters, a petition
for probation violation and bench warrant was issued.
Defendant first asserts the prosecutor failed to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that defendant violated the condition of probation ordering him to have no contact with
the stalking victim. Additionally, defendant claims the trial court based its guilty finding on
conduct not alleged in the probation violation petition.
Probation violation proceedings involve two steps: (1) a factual determination whether a
defendant is guilty of violating probation, and (2) if a defendant is found guilty, a discretionary
determination whether the violation warrants revocation. People v Pillar, 233 Mich App 267,
269; 590 NW2d 622 (1998). We review the trial court’s factual findings for clear error, People v
Thenghkam, 240 Mich App 29, 43-47; 610 NW2d 571 (2000), and the court’s decision to revoke
probation for an abuse of discretion. People v Ritter, 186 Mich App 701, 706; 464 NW2d 919
(1991).
The prosecution bears the burden of proving a probation violation by a preponderance of
the evidence. MCR 6.445(E)(1). On review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecutor to determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the preponderance of
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the evidence indicates the defendant violated his probation. People v Reynolds, 195 Mich App
182, 184; 489 NW2d 128 (1992). Only evidence relating to the charged probation violation
activity may be considered, and only that evidence may provide the basis for a decision to revoke
probation. Pillar, supra at 270.
At defendant’s hearing, the prosecutor introduced letters defendant wrote to third parties.
In these letters, defendant made disparaging and threatening remarks directed toward the victim,
threatening that the victim better leave defendant alone before she is “hurt real bad.” He directed
that the victim be contacted, stating in several letters, “tell [victim]” and “tell that whore
[victim]. . . .” Further, he acknowledged that the victim had received at least one of his
messages, stating “[y]ou gave [victim] the letter I wrote you.” Viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecutor, the preponderance of the evidence establishes defendant contacted
his victim, albeit through the use of a third party. The trial court did not err in finding defendant
guilty of violating his probation conditions.
Moreover, the trial court did not improperly base its finding of guilt on conduct not
alleged in the probation violation petition. As the basis for the allegation that defendant violated
the no contact condition, the petition listed the letters defendant wrote from jail. The court relied
on comments and threats directed toward the victim in these letters, as outlined above, to find
defendant guilty of violating his probation.
Next, defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in admitting defendant’s
letters because they were irrelevant, lacked a proper foundation, and were more prejudicial than
probative. MRE 402, 403, 602, 901. The Michigan Rules of Evidence do not apply to probation
revocation proceedings. MCR 6.445(E)(1); MRE 1101(b)(3). Therefore, the trial court did not
err in admitting the letters in disharmony with those rules.
Finally, defendant contends the trial court violated his double jeopardy protection and
due process rights by admitting as evidence a letter that had previously been used to establish the
charge underlying his probation sentence. Specifically, defendant asserts that because the letter,
dated April 18, 2000, was previously used against him, the letter could not be used against him
concerning the probation violation. Defendant failed to preserve this issue below because he
challenged the letter’s admission on relevance grounds, not double jeopardy or due process;
however, we will nonetheless review the issue because it involves a “significant constitutional
question.” See People v Lugo, 214 Mich App 699, 705; 542 NW2d 921 (1995). A double
jeopardy claim presents a question of law that we review de novo. People v Herron, 464 Mich
593, 599; 628 NW2d 528 (2001).
The United States and the Michigan Constitutions prohibit placing a defendant twice in
jeopardy for a single offense. US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15. However, for double
jeopardy protections to apply, the defendant must have been put in jeopardy by a criminal
prosecution in a court of justice. People v Marrow, 210 Mich App 455, 465; 534 NW2d 153
(1995), aff’d 453 Mich 903 (1996), overruled in part on other grounds People v Pashu, 466 Mich
378; 645 275 (2002); People v Johnson, 191 Mich App 222, 226-227; 477 NW2d 426 (1991). A
probation violation hearing is not a criminal prosecution. Johnson, supra at 225-227. Moreover,
the trial court’s determination that defendant violated the terms of his probation order does not
burden defendant with a new conviction or expose defendant to punishment other than that to
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which he was already exposed as a result of his previous guilty plea on the underlying charge. Id.
The letter’s admission did not violate defendant’s double jeopardy protection.
Additionally, the letter’s admission did not violate defendant’s due process rights. The
probation revocation petition gave defendant notice that he would have to answer for attempts to
contact the victim. The trial court did not rely on the April 18 letter to determine defendant’s
guilt of violating probation, but admitted the letter for the limited purpose of demonstrating that
defendant had the means to contact the victim.
Affirmed.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
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