ALMA DAWKINS-DAWSON V IMAGE OF BEAUTY HAIR SALON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ALMA DAWKINS-DAWSON, Personal Representative of the Estate of REGINALD DAWKINS,
Deceased,
UNPUBLISHED
September 10, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 233181
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-007907-CZ
IMAGE OF BEAUTY HAIR SALON,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: White, P.J., and Neff and Jansen, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from a circuit court order granting defendant’s motion for
summary disposition in this premises liability action. We affirm. This appeal is being decided
without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
This Court’s review of a decision regarding a motion for summary disposition is de novo.
Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). A motion under
MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support of a claim. In deciding a motion brought under this
subrule, the trial court considers the documentary evidence submitted by the parties in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597
NW2d 817 (1999). If the evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact,
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
The general rule is that a business invitor does not have a duty to protect its invitees from
the criminal acts of third persons. Williams v Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc, 429 Mich 495; 418
NW2d 381 (1988). In Mason v Royal Dequindre, Inc, 455 Mich 391; 566 NW2d 199 (1997), the
Court retreated a bit from Williams, holding “that merchants can be liable in tort for failing to
take reasonable measures to protect their invitees from harm caused by the criminal acts of third
parties. The harm must be foreseeable to an identifiable invitee and preventable by the exercise
of reasonable care.” Id. at 393. Recently, in MacDonald v PKT, Inc, 464 Mich 322; 628 NW2d
33 (2001), the Court limited the holding in Mason:
To summarize, under Mason, generally merchants “have a duty to use
reasonable care to protect their invitees from the foreseeable criminal acts of third
parties.” The duty is triggered by specific acts occurring on the premises that
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pose a risk of imminent and foreseeable harm to an identifiable invitee. Whether
an invitee is readily identifiable as being foreseeably endangered is a question for
the factfinder if reasonable minds could differ on this point. While a merchant is
required to take reasonable measures in response to an ongoing situation that is
taking place on the premises, there is no obligation to otherwise anticipate the
criminal acts of third parties. Consistent with Williams, a merchant is not
obligated to do anything more than reasonably expedite the involvement of the
police. [Id. at 338 (citation omitted).]
Whether the invitee is foreseeably endangered is to be gauged not from past incidents of
criminal activity on the merchant’s premises, i.e., whether a criminal act in general was
foreseeable. The proper inquiry is “once a disturbance occurs on the premises, whether a
reasonable person would recognize a risk of imminent harm to an identifiable invitee.” Id. at
339. An identifiable invitee is a specific individual who is personally endangered by the criminal
episode. Mason, supra at 402-405.
The criminal episode began with an attempted theft of a salon customer’s truck or
something in it. Kenneth Answorth, the salon owner, heard a noise and went to investigate. He
knew that plaintiff’s decedent followed him outside, but the thief did not pose an immediate
danger to anyone. He was not known to be armed, did not attack or otherwise try to harm
anyone, plaintiff’s decedent did not engage in an altercation with him, and they had not
previously been involved in a dispute. A disturbance arose after Answorth tried to capture the
thief, but it was not foreseeable that plaintiff’s decedent would be injured because the last
Answorth knew, plaintiff’s decedent had run back into the salon.
Moreover, until the thief’s partner actually started shooting, Answorth had no reason to
know that the partner/shooter was involved in the theft. Therefore, defendant did not owe a duty
to plaintiff’s decedent in this case. Although the trial court mistakenly concluded that there was
no special relationship between the parties giving rise to a duty, this Court will not reverse where
the trial court reached the right result for the wrong reason. Taylor v Laban, 241 Mich App 449,
458; 616 NW2d 229 (2000).
Plaintiff poses an alternative argument that once Answorth voluntarily assumed the duty
to effectuate a citizen’s arrest of the thief, he had an obligation to use reasonable care not to
endanger plaintiff’s decedent. “This argument was not raised by plaintiff below and,
consequently, was not addressed by the trial court. Therefore, it is not preserved for appellate
review.” Camden v Kaufman, 240 Mich App 389, 400 n 2; 613 NW2d 335 (2000). Further, this
alternative argument would not alter the analysis set forth above.
Affirmed.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
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