PATRICK P YONO V J D CHATHAM INC
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK P. YONO as Next Friend for NINA
YONO, Minor,
UNPUBLISHED
September 6, 2002
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
J. D. CHATHAM, INC., 7-ELEVEN
FRANCHISE, JAMES DAVID, A. CHATHAM,
and SOUTHLAND, INC.,
No. 229033
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 99-015534-NO
Defendants-Appellees,
and
KHALIL GARMO,
Defendant.1
Before: Gage, P.J., and Cavanagh and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from an order granting defendants’ motion for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) in this premises liability action. We affirm.
Patrick Yono, as next friend for Nina Yono,2 commenced this action against defendants
after Khalil Garmo assaulted plaintiff in a 7-Eleven store. According to plaintiff, Garmo
inappropriately touched her while she and her sister were shopping in the store. Plaintiff left the
store without complaining about the incident. Plaintiffs allegedly later learned that defendants
knew that Garmo had attempted to assault other young girls on previous occasions. Plaintiffs
argue that summary disposition was improper because the submitted evidence showed that
1
This defendant is a non-party to this appeal, and, therefore will be referred to as Garmo in the
remainder of this opinion. As such, the term “defendants” refers only to defendants-appellees.
2
Because this action was brought on behalf of Nina Yono, she will be referred to as “plaintiff”
throughout the remainder of this opinion.
-1-
defendants had prior notice of Garmo’s assaultive character and, therefore, may be liable for
Garmo’s criminal assault on plaintiff.
In MacDonald v PKT, Inc, 464 Mich 322; 628 NW2d 33 (2001), our Supreme Court
addressed the scope of a merchant's duty to protect invitees from the criminal acts of third
parties. The Court held that a merchant generally has no obligation to anticipate and prevent
criminal acts against its invitees; rather, a duty arises only on behalf of those invitees who are
readily identifiable as being foreseeably endangered. Id. at 332. The Court further explained,
“[i]t is only a present situation on the premises, not any past incidents, that creates a duty to
respond.” Id. at 335. Here, the submitted evidence does not show that defendants had
knowledge of a specific situation on the premises in which plaintiff was readily identifiable as
being foreseeably endangered. Plaintiffs’ reliance on evidence showing that defendants were
aware of prior incidents involving Garmo is insufficient to establish a duty with respect to
plaintiff.
Plaintiffs argue that liability may also be predicated on rules established by the Liquor
Control Commission, which prohibit licensees from (1) allowing on the licensed premises the
annoying or molesting of customers by other customers, and (2) allowing the licensed premises
to be used for purposes of accosting or soliciting another person to commit prostitution.
Absent a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, an ordinance violation committed
by the defendant may not be actionable as negligence. Stevens v Drekich, 178 Mich App 273,
278; 443 NW2d 401 (1989). Although violation of an ordinance may be considered as evidence
of negligence, it is not itself sufficient to impose a legal duty cognizable in negligence. Summers
v Detroit, 206 Mich App 46, 52; 520 NW2d 356 (1994). We believe these principles are equally
applicable to alleged regulatory violations. Having determined that defendants did not owe any
duty to plaintiff, we conclude that the alleged regulatory violations do not give rise to a
cognizable action against defendants.
We also find no merit to plaintiffs’ claim that defendants may be liable under MCL
436.1801. By its terms, that statute applies only when a person is injured by reason of the
unlawful sale of alcohol to a minor or a visibly intoxicated person. There is no evidence here
that the assault was alcohol-related in that regard.
Finally, plaintiffs argue the trial court abused its discretion in denying their request for
discovery of the names of defendants’ employees during the year preceding the incident and of
all customer complaints during this time period. Plaintiffs sought discovery of this information
to substantiate their claim that defendants had notice of prior incidents involving Garmo and,
therefore, should have foreseen his actions against plaintiff. Because MacDonald holds that it is
only a present situation on the premises, not past incidents, that creates a duty to respond, we
conclude that the learned trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying plaintiffs’ discovery
request.
Affirmed.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.