JASON ALAN SNELL V JAMES JEWELL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JASON ALAN SNELL,
UNPUBLISHED
August 30, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
JAMES JEWELL and UNGER ENTERPRISES,
INC., d/b/a EMPTY KEG PARTY STORE and
EMPTY KEG,
No. 223789
Isabella Circuit Court
LC No. 97-010475-NS
Defendants-Appellees,
and
MCBRIDES AVALON BAR, INC., and SNEAKS,
INC.,
Defendants.
Before: Kelly, P.J., and Saad and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this personal injury case, plaintiff Jason Snell appeals as of right from a jury verdict
against defendant James Jewell and the jury’s finding of no liability against defendant Unger
Enterprises Inc., d/b/a Empty Keg Party Store (Empty Keg). We affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
This case arises out of an automobile accident in which plaintiff suffered severe injuries.
In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that on the night of November 22-23, 1996, James Jewell was
driving a car while intoxicated and collided with plaintiff’s car. Plaintiff further alleged that
defendants McBride’s Avalon Bar, Inc. (Avalon Bar), and Sneaks, Inc., d/b/a Bar One (Bar
One), were liable for serving Jewell alcohol while he was visibly intoxicated. Thereafter,
plaintiff amended his complaint to include defendant Empty Keg Party Store, and alleged that,
on the night of the collision, employees of the store sold alcohol to Jewell when he was visibly
intoxicated.
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At trial, Jewell testified that, after drinking five or six beers and sharing two marijuana
“joints,” he bought a twenty-two-ounce can of beer and a pint of schnapps at Empty Keg.
Thereafter, Jewell walked to a friends’ house, consumed the alcohol he bought, drank two more
beers and smoked two more joints. Jewell then returned to Empty Keg and bought a forty-ounce
beer and a fifth of schnapps.1 Jewell returned to his friends’ house and continued to drink
alcohol and smoke marijuana. Jewell further testified that, at approximately 9:30 p.m., he
walked to Empty Keg again and bought a fifth of whiskey. Within the next thirty minutes,
Jewell drank two shots of whiskey and three more cans of beer. Jewell then left his friends’
house and continued to drink at Bar One and Avalon Bar. Defendant later stole a car and
ultimately collided with plaintiff’s vehicle and pushed plaintiff’s vehicle into a tree.
Bar One and Avalon Bar settled with plaintiff shortly before trial. Following the close of
proofs, the jury returned a verdict in plaintiff’s favor and allocated eighty percent fault to Jewell,
twenty percent fault to Sneaks/Bar One, and allocated no fault to the remaining defendants,
including Empty Keg.
II. Analysis
A. Motion for JNOV or New Trial
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for JNOV or new trial
because the great weight of the evidence showed that Jewell was visibly intoxicated when he
bought alcohol at Empty Keg.
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for JNOV de novo. Attard v Citizens Ins
Co of America, 237 Mich App 311, 321; 602 NW2d 633 (1999). “The grant or denial of a
motion for new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence
rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the exercise of that discretion will not be
disturbed on appeal unless a clear abuse is shown. Bosak v Hutchinson, 422 Mich 712, 737; 375
NW2d 333 (1985). “An abuse of discretion will be found only where the trial court’s denial of
the motion was manifestly against the clear weight of the evidence.” People v Daoust, 228 Mich
App 1, 16; 577 NW2d 179 (1998). The question before this Court is not whether it would have
decided the great-weight challenge as the trial court did, but whether the trial court’s ruling on
the motion was an abuse of discretion. Arrington v Detroit Osteopathic Hospital Corp (On
Remand), 196 Mich App 544, 564; 493 NW2d 492 (1992).
While plaintiff points to evidence showing that Jewell was visibly intoxicated when he
made at least the last of his three visits to Empty Keg, evidence also showed that Jewell was not
visibly intoxicated. As defendant emphasizes, Jewell was an experienced drinker who had food
in his stomach before visiting Empty Keg on the night of the collision. Further, Jewell’s friends
testified that Jewell was not visibly intoxicated when he left their house for his third trip to
Empty Keg. Kevin Unger, who appears to have served Jewell that day, testified that he served
no visibly intoxicated persons that night.
1
Jewell testified that, while he consumed all the beer he described, he drank about half of the
schnapps he bought.
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Furthermore, plaintiff’s expert toxicologist, John Paul Bederka, conceded that Jewell was
not visibly intoxicated upon his first visit to Empty Keg, offered no opinion concerning whether
Jewell should have been visibly intoxicated on his second visit, and did not rule out that Jewell
may have presented himself on the third visit without exhibiting clearly visible signs of
intoxication. Moreover, defendant’s toxicologist, Dr. Werner Spitz, opined that Jewell should
not have been visibly intoxicated at 10:00 p.m. on the night in question which, according to
Jewell, was after his final visit to Empty Keg.
It is well-settled that a jury is free to disbelieve the evidence favorable to one party, and
to believe evidence favorable to the other. See Zeeland Farm Services, Inc v JBL Enterprises,
Inc, 219 Mich App 190, 195; 555 NW2d 733 (1996). It is not this Court’s task to decide
between two plausible alternative interpretations of the evidence, but rather to decide whether
there was a reasonable evidentiary basis for the trial court’s decision to accept the jury’s verdict.
Ellsworth, supra, 236 Mich App at 194. The evidence that Jewell was an experienced drinker
who had eaten a meal that night, along with the testimony from Kevin Unger, Dr. Spitz, and
Jewell’s friends, supported the jury’s conclusion that Jewell was not visibly intoxicated when
purchasing alcohol from Empty Keg, despite other evidence that could have supported the
opposite conclusion. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying plaintiff’s motion for
JNOV and did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for new trial.
B. Jury Award
Defendant contends that the jury’s award of $260,853.58 in damages was inadequate in
light of the great weight of the evidence.
A jury is free to accept or reject a plaintiff’s testimony regarding damages. Joerger v
Gordon Food Service, Inc, 224 Mich App 167, 172; 568 NW2d 365 (1997). However, the
verdict is inadequate if the jury ignored uncontroverted damages. Burtka v Allied Integrated
Diagnostic Services, Inc, 175 Mich App 777, 780; 438 NW2d 342 (1989). In this area, a trial
court is entitled to considerable deference on appeal; having had the opportunity to evaluate the
jury’s reaction to the witnesses and other proofs, the trial court stands in the best position to
consider the merits of a motion to adjust the jury’s award of damages. See Palenkas v Beaumont
Hospital, 432 Mich 527, 533-534; 443 NW2d 354 (1989).
Plaintiff points to evidence that suggests he suffered severe injury to his brain, leaving
him with serious, and continuing, mental and physical disabilities. Again, however, other
evidence clearly supports the damage award.
Marvin DeVries, Ph.D., testified about the amount plaintiff would have earned had he not
been injured, and what his future accident-related expenses might be. However, on crossexamination, defendant elicited testimony that Dr. DeVries’ calculations had not made allowance
for plaintiff’s ordinary living expenses, and that he had assumed that plaintiff would need
assisted living for the rest of his life. Further, defendant elicited testimony from plaintiff’s
neurology expert, Dr. John Visser, that he found that plaintiff is alert, is in possession of a
normal fund of information, and lacks problems with language functioning. The expert further
testified that plaintiff does not need work restrictions other than to avoid injury in case of a
seizure, and that plaintiff does not need attendant or supervisory care. Defense counsel also
elicited testimony from another expert, Dr. Robert Kreitsch, that plaintiff is no longer using a
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cane to walk, and does not need special assistance to climb stairs. Dr. Kreitsch agreed that
plaintiff probably would not need attendant care in the future. The expert further reported that
plaintiff had achieved independence in basic activities, “including even mobility about the
community.”
The defense also offered testimony from expert Dr. John Baker, a clinical neuropsychologist, who testified that, although plaintiff suffered a “severe brain injury” from which he
retained “clear deficits in verbal memory and in motor skills with his left hand,” plaintiff had
otherwise “primarily recovered.” Dr. Baker also testified that plaintiff’s “executive functions”
tested average to superior and that plaintiff “did fine” and scored “in the normal range” when
tested for reading, spelling, and writing. Dr. Baker opined that plaintiff needed “some specific
assistance,” but that independent living would be possible in six months to a year. This evidence
clearly supports the jury’s damage award and, therefore, the trial court did not err in denying
plaintiff’s motion for JNOV or new trial.2
C. Evidence of Prior Sales to Jewell
Plaintiff next asserts that the trial court erred by denying the admission of evidence that
Jewell had purchased liquor from Empty Keg on prior occasions while he was visibly
intoxicated.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court reversed itself when it ruled, pursuant to People v
VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), amended 445 Mich 1205 (1994), that plaintiff
could elicit evidence concerning whether Jewell was a regular customer of Empty Keg, and later
ruled that evidence of Jewell’s state of intoxication on earlier visits was not admissible.
However, the record shows that the earlier ruling addressed only the question whether Unger
should have recognized Jewell as a regular customer and the later ruling addressed whether
Empty Keg had served Jewell on earlier occasions while he was visibly intoxicated. The former
evidence was admissible, the latter evidence was not. See Hilliker v Farr, 149 Mich 444, 449;
112 NW 1116 (1907).3
Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, defense counsel did not attempt to rely on the
responsible-business-practices defense despite his prior waiver of that defense. Plaintiff
maintains that defense counsel re-asserted the defense by eliciting testimony from Unger that he
did not sell alcohol to any visibly intoxicated person on the night in question. We agree with the
trial court’s conclusion that this brief exchange was not enough to “open the door” to allow
2
In his reply brief, plaintiff argues for the first time that defendant improperly emphasized in
closing argument that plaintiff did not appear and personally participate in the trial. Because this
unpreserved attorney misconduct argument was not included within the statement of the issues in
the brief on appeal, we will not address it. Meagher v McNeely & Lincoln, Inc, 212 Mich App
154, 156; 536 NW2d 851 (1995); MCR 7.212(C)(5).
3
Plaintiff asserts that Hilliker is distinguishable because it addressed evidence of sales to third
parties, while this case involved prior sales to a defendant. However, this is a distinction without
a difference. Either way, such evidence would suggest nothing other than that because Empty
Keg had illegally sold alcohol in the past it probably did so on the occasion in question, in
violation of MRE 404(b)(1).
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further evidence of prior sales to Jewell while he was visibly intoxicated. Moreover, defense
counsel did not elicit testimony from Unger concerning general store policies on serving
intoxicated persons or his own procedures in the months before the collision.4 The trial court did
not abuse its discretion in ruling that defense counsel’s tenuous reference to this issue fell short
of opening the door to rebuttal of the responsible-business-practices defense.5
Finally, we need not reach the merits of plaintiff’s claim that the trial court erred by
instructing the jury to allocate fault among the parties under the tort reform act. As is clear from
the jury’s allocation of no fault to Empty Keg, the jury found that that Empty Keg employees did
not contribute to this incident by selling alcohol to Jewell while he was visibly intoxicated. “An
issue is moot if an event has occurred that renders it impossible for the court, if it should decide
in favor of the party, to grant relief.” Michigan Nat Bank v St Paul Fire & Marine Ins Co, 223
Mich App 19, 21; 566 NW2d 7 (1997). In essence, the jury found no cause of action against
Empty Keg. This conclusion, which we affirm above, renders this issue moot. Moreover, were
we to find that the trial court erred in instructing the jury to allocate a percentage of fault to each
defendant the jury found liable, any alleged error was clearly harmless; a defendant cannot be
held severally liable and share the burden of a jury award if, as here, the jury found no liability
on the part of that defendant.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
4
We also reject plaintiff’s claim that the trial court incorrectly ruled that plaintiff actually
injected the business-practices defense into evidence. Clearly, however, the record reflects that
plaintiff’s counsel crossed this line when he elicited testimony from Unger that he never served
visibly intoxicated people “on any day.”
5
It remains the rule that “an abuse of discretion will be found when the decision is ‘so palpably
and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of
will, not the exercise of judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of
passion or bias.’” Kurtz v Faygo Beverages, Inc, 466 Mich 186, 193; 644 NW2d 710 (2001),
quoting Spalding v Spalding, 355 Mich 382, 384-385; 94 NW2d 810 (1959) (citation omitted).
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