IN RE STRASBERGER MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of S.S.S. and S.K.S., Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
August 20, 2002
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 236587
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 99-047728-NA
HOLLY STRASBERGER,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
SCOTT STRASBERGER,
Respondent.
In the Matter of S.S.S. and S.K.S., Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 236644
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 99-047728-NA
SCOTT STRASBERGER,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
HOLLY STRASBERGER,
Respondent.
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Before: Murray, P.J., and Fitzgerald and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondent Holly Strasberger (respondent mother), and
respondent Scott Strasberger (respondent father), each appeal as of right from the trial court’s
order terminating their parental rights to the minor children. Respondent mother’s parental rights
were terminated under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (i), (j) and (k)(ii), and respondent father’s
parental rights were terminated under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii) and (j). We affirm.
DOCKET NO. 236587 (Respondent Holly Strasberger)
Respondent mother asserts that she has a constitutional right to parent the minor children.
Although parents do have a liberty interest in the management of their children, once a court
finds a statutory ground for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3), that liberty interest no longer
includes the right to the companionship, care, and custody of the children. In re Trejo, 462 Mich
341, 355-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
Here, respondent mother has failed to establish any basis for disturbing the trial court’s
findings under MCL 712A.19b(3). Although we do not find record support for the trial court’s
determination, for purposes of § 19b(3)(i), that respondent mother’s parental rights to her two
older children were terminated on the basis of physical and sexual abuse, any error in this regard
is harmless because only one statutory ground for termination is required. Giving due deference
to the trial court’s special opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appear before
it, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that §§ 19b(3)(b)(i), (j) and (k)(ii)
were each established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); In re Miller, 433 Mich
331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Respondent mother’s reliance on In re Newman, 189 Mich
App 61; 472 NW2d 38 (1992), is misplaced. Unlike the circumstances in In re Newman, there
was nothing about the services provided here to preclude a finding that the statutory grounds for
termination were established.1 Further, the evidence did not clearly show that termination was
not in the children’s best interests. Thus, the trial court did not clearly err in terminating
respondent mother’s parental rights to the children. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, supra.
Respondent mother’s arguments regarding the guardian ad litem and the admissibility of
Laura Henderson’s testimony are not properly before us because they are outside the scope of the
statement of question presented. Meagher v McNeely & Lincoln, Inc, 212 Mich App 154, 156;
536 NW2d 851 (1995). In any event, respondent mother has not established her standing to seek
relief based on the guardian ad litem’s duties or provided this Court with any legal authority to
support her claim. See Eldred v Ziny, 246 Mich App 142, 150; 631 NW2d 748 (2001); Fieger v
Comm’r of Ins, 174 Mich App 467, 471; 437 NW2d 271 (1988); MCL 712A.17d. Further, even
assuming that it was evidentiary error for Henderson to give an opinion on whether parental
1
Although the record reflects that some services were provided in the case at bar, we note that
services are not mandated in all cases. See MCL 712A.18f(1)(b); In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14,
25 n 4; 610 NW2d 563 (2000). See also MCL 712A.19b(4) (authorizing termination at the initial
dispositional hearing); MCL 722.638(2) (requiring that a petition request termination at the
initial dispositional hearing in certain circumstances).
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rights should be terminated, it is apparent that the error was harmless. See In re IEM, 233 Mich
App 438, 455; 592 NW2d 751 (1999). See also MCR 5.901(B)(1) and MCR 5.902(A) (harmless
error standard in MCR 2.613 applies to child protection proceedings); MCR 2.613(A) (error in
admitting or excluding evidence not grounds for reversal unless the refusal to take the action
appears inconsistent with substantial justice).
Finally, we disagree with respondent mother that this case should be remanded to allow
her to apply for membership in the Bad River Indian tribe. As a threshold matter, while we note
that respondent mother’s attorney conceded that proper notice had been given to the Bad River
Indian tribe during the hearing, our consideration of this issue is appropriate because the failure
to comply with notice requirements may be a basis for invalidating a state proceeding to
terminate parental rights. See In re TM (After Remand), 245 Mich App 181, 185; 628 NW2d 570
(2001); 25 USC 1914. Nonetheless, respondent mother has not established record support for
her position that proper notice was not given to the Bad River Indian tribe. The evidence that
actual notice was received by the Bad River Indian tribe alone is sufficient to satisfy the notice
requirement of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 USC 1901 et seq. In re TM (After
Remand), supra at 191; see also 25 USC 1912(a); MCR 5.980(A). Because notice was proper
and the Bad River Indian tribe declined to intervene, the burden shifted to respondent mother to
show that the ICWA still applied. In re TM (After Remand), supra at 187. Because the record
establishes that neither the mother nor the minor children were members of the Bad River Indian
tribe, we find no basis for disturbing the trial court’s determination that the ICWA did not apply.
Id. at 186; 25 USC 1903(4). Respondent mother’s newly raised claim that she should be
afforded more time and assistance in applying for membership is insufficient to justify the
requested relief.2 Further, respondent mother’s reliance on In re IEM, supra, is misplaced
because the error in that case pertained to ICWA’s notice requirements and, as previously
discussed, there was no violation of the ICWA’s notice requirements in this case.
DOCKET NO. 236644 (Respondent Scott Strasberger)
Respondent father first argues that the trial court should have applied the reasonable
doubt standard in MCR 5.980(D), applicable to an Indian child. We reject this argument
because, for the reasons previously discussed, the trial court correctly determined that the ICWA
did not apply.3
Respondent father next argues that the trial court clearly erred by allowing hearsay
testimony at the termination hearing. Initially, we note that the mere existence of hearsay at a
termination hearing does not warrant reversal. In re CR, 250 Mich App 185, 207; 646 NW2d
506 (2002). In the case at bar, respondent father did not object to the challenged testimony on
2
In contrast to respondent mother’s argument on appeal, we note that her attorney argued at the
termination hearing that equity should be applied to enhance petitioner’s burden of proof to the
reasonable doubt standard for an Indian child. See MCR 5.980(D). We deem this argument
abandoned because respondent mother does not raise it on appeal.
3
Like respondent mother, we note that respondent father has failed to brief any issue with
regard to whether the reasonable doubt standard should be applied based on equitable principles.
Thus, we decline to consider this issue.
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this ground at the termination hearing and, therefore, failed to preserve this issue for appeal.4
Reviewing respondent father’s unpreserved claim for plain error, In re Snyder, 223 Mich App
85, 92; 566 NW2d 18 (1997), we find no basis for reversal. Unlike the situation in In re Gilliam,
241 Mich App 133, 137; 613 NW2d 748 (2000), the statutory grounds for terminating
respondent father’s parental rights were supported by legally admissible evidence.
Finally, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that §§ 19b(3)(b)(ii) and (j) were each
established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); In re Miller, supra. Further, the
evidence did not show that termination of respondent father’s parental rights was clearly not in
the children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, supra. Accordingly, we affirm the
trial court’s order terminating respondent father’s parental rights.
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
4
The objections made by respondent mother were insufficient to preserve this issue with respect
to respondent father. See People v Poindexter, 138 Mich App 322, 331; 361 NW2d 346 (1984).
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