PEOPLE OF MI V CLIFFORD LAMAR TERRY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 16, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 223284
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 99-167196-FC
CLIFFORD LAMAR TERRY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murray, P.J., and Fitzgerald and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, and
was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 17-1/2 to 30 years for each conviction. He appeals
as of right. We affirm.
I
Defendant first argues that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to convict
him of two counts of armed robbery. We disagree.
Defendant’s convictions arise from the robbery of two employees of a video store. The
evidence indicated that the two employees, Vezina and Angus, were both required to take the
store receipts to the bank, thereby establishing that each had a right to possession of the store
receipts superior to that of defendant. People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 707-708, 712-713;
___ NW2d ___ (2001); People v Beebe, 70 Mich App 154, 158-159; 245 NW2d 547 (1976).
Vezina’s temporary relinquishment of physical control of the bank receipts did not preclude the
jury from finding that the money was taken from her presence, nor was the jury precluded from
finding that defendant was equally responsible for the robbery of Angus, where the evidence
indicated that defendant was acting in concert with an unidentified assailant who took the money
from Angus while defendant was assaulting Vezina with a handgun. Rodgers, supra; Beebe,
supra; see also MCL 767.39, People v Wakeford, 418 Mich 95, 112-113; 341 NW2d 68 (1983),
People v Abernathy, 39 Mich App 5, 7; 197 NW2d 106 (1972), and People v Dykes, 37 Mich
App 555, 559; 195 NW2d 14 (1972). Viewed most favorably to the prosecution, the evidence
was sufficient to enable the jury to find defendant guilty of two counts of armed robbery beyond
a reasonable doubt. People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 723; 597 NW2d 73 (1999); Rodgers,
supra.
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II
Defendant next argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. This issue
presents a mixed question of law and fact in which the trial court first finds the facts and then
decides whether those facts constitute a violation of defendant’s constitutional right to effective
assistance. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; ____ NW2d ____ (2002). We review the trial
court’s factual findings for clear error and decide the constitutional issue de novo. Id.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient and that, under an objective standard of reasonableness, counsel made
an error so serious that counsel was not functioning as an attorney guaranteed under the Sixth
Amendment. Defendant must overcome the presumption that the challenged action might be
considered sound trial strategy. Second, defendant must show that the deficiency was prejudicial
by showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. Strickland
v Washington, 466 US 668, 687-689; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984); LeBlanc, supra at
575.
Defendant argues that trial counsel failed to adequately prepare for trial, thereby
preventing him from properly cross-examining witness Pillion and victim Vezina. Our review of
counsel’s cross-examination of these witnesses in light of the strategy outlined at the Ginther1
hearing demonstrates that counsel was not constitutionally deficient in his trial preparation or
cross-examination. The fact that the strategy employed was not successful does not establish
that counsel was ineffective. People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 151 n 6, 167; 560 NW2d 600
(1997); People v LaVearn, 448 Mich 207, 216; 528 NW2d 721 (1995); People v Kevorkian, 248
Mich App 373, 414-415; 639 NW2d 291 (2001).
Defendant also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a Wade2
hearing to challenge Vezina’s pretrial identification of him at a custodial lineup. We agree with
the trial court that the record does not factually support this claim. Defendant failed to present
evidence that the pretrial identification was unduly suggestive. People v McElhaney, 215 Mich
App 269, 286; 545 NW2d 18 (1996).
Defendant also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to testimony
by a police officer that defendant made incriminating statements during a videotaped interview.
Although defendant maintains that the officer misrepresented defendant’s recorded statements
during his trial testimony, our review of the videotaped interview fails to disclose factual support
for this claim.
We likewise reject defendant's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce
the videotape into evidence to contradict the officer’s testimony. Counsel decided, as a matter of
trial strategy, to cross-examine the officer about the interview and have defendant testify
personally regarding his version of the events. Defendant has not overcome the presumption of
sound trial strategy. Counsel’s failure to object to the officer’s reference to defendant’s criminal
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
2
US v Wade, 388 US 218; 87 S Ct 1926; 18 L Ed 2d 1149 (1967).
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record so as not to draw attention to the matter to a seemingly inattentive jury was also a matter
of trial strategy that we will not second guess.
Defendant also argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to several
allegedly improper remarks by the prosecutor during closing arguments. We disagree. Viewed
in context, the prosecutor’s remarks regarding the testimony of the investigating police officer
were proper comments on the evidence. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659
(1995); People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 721; 613 NW2d 370 (2000). Similarly, the
prosecutor’s comments concerning the assault on the victim, although reflecting hard language,
were supported by the evidence and, therefore, were proper. People v Fisher, 449 Mich 441,
452; 537 NW2d 577 (1995). Although the prosecutor argued that the victim should be believed
and that defendant and his alibi witnesses were not credible because they had a reason to lie, the
remarks were based on the evidence and the prosecutor did not suggest that she had special
knowledge to this effect. Thus, the remarks were not improper. People v Knapp, 244 Mich App
361, 382; 624 NW2d 227 (2001); People v Launsburry, 217 Mich App 358, 361; 551 NW2d 460
(1996). Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that counsel’s failure to object to the
prosecutor’s remarks was not objectively unreasonable. People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393,
425; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).
Defendant also argues that counsel was ineffective for calling Lisa Miller as an alibi
witness, thereby allowing the prosecutor to introduce a number of incriminating statements made
by Miller to the investigating police officer. Defendant has failed to overcome the presumption
of sound trial strategy in connection with counsel’s decision to call Miller. Mitchell, supra at
163; People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). Similarly, counsel was not
ineffective for failing to object to the rebuttal testimony of Detective Dare. The testimony was
responsive to the denials made by Miller regarding statements made during the investigative
interview. Also, the substance of Miller’s denials were first raised by defense counsel on direct
examination and related to the central issue of defendant's involvement in the charged robbery.
As such, Dare’s testimony was admissible as rebuttal evidence. MRE 613(b); People v
Figgures, 451 Mich 390, 399; 547 NW2d 673 (1996); People v Vasher, 449 Mich 494, 504; 537
NW2d 168 (1995).
Defendant also argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to call an expert witness on
eyewitness identification. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court rejected defendant’s
testimony regarding this issue and, instead, credited the testimony of trial counsel, who claimed
that it was defendant who decided not to retain an expert and to proceed instead with alibi
witnesses. Recognizing the trial court’s superior ability to judge the credibility of the witnesses,
People v Northey, 231 Mich App 568, 577; 591 NW2d 227 (1998), we find no clear error in this
regard.
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that defendant has failed to establish that trial
counsel was ineffective.
III
Defendant contends that the conduct of the prosecutor and the investigating officer
denied him a fair trial. Although defendant again complains that the investigating officer gave
“misleading” testimony about his interview with defendant, as discussed previously, our review
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of the videotaped interview fails to disclose factual support for this claim. Thus, this
unpreserved issue does not warrant appellate relief. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764;
597 NW2d 130 (1999); Bahoda, supra at 282; People v Noble, 238 Mich App 647, 660; 608
NW2d 123 (1999). Also, we are not persuaded that defendant’s substantial rights were affected
by the officer’s fleeting reference to defendant’s criminal history or his interjection of his belief
in defendant’s guilt. Indeed, the record reveals that defense counsel deliberately chose not to
object to these matters, reflecting counsel’s determination that defendant was not unduly
prejudiced. People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998); People v Pollick, 448
Mich 376, 387; 531 NW2d 159 (1995).
IV
We reject defendant’s argument that the cumulative effect of several errors deprived him
of a fair trial. Knapp, supra at 361, 387-388.
V
Defendant maintains that he was denied his right to due process because the trial court
refused to allow him to call Alisha Vezina as a witness at the Ginther hearing. We disagree.
Despite being given repeated opportunities to do so, defendant failed to present an offer of proof
as to the relevancy of Vezina’s testimony at the Ginther hearing. The trial court’s decision was
not an abuse of discretion. MRE 403.
VI
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to award him twenty-four days of
“good time” credits, pursuant to MCL 51.282(2), for time spent in jail awaiting trial. Because
defendant did not preserve this issue by raising it below, appellate relief is foreclosed absent a
plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Carines, supra at 763.
Defendant has failed to establish plain error. MCL 51.281 authorizes a county sheriff to
establish rules and regulations for the conduct of prisoners in his custody. MCL 51.282(2)
provides that every prisoner who has not violated the rules and regulations is entitled to a
sentence reduction of one day for every six days of the sentence. The term "good time" refers to
a graduated reduction from sentences being served by inmates as a reward for their good
behavior. Cf. OAG, 1955, No 2,141, p 396 (August 1, 1955). Because a prisoner serving a
sentence is entitled to a reduction of his sentence for every six days served if he has not violated
the rules and regulations, a court cannot circumvent the statute by setting a jail term with a
specific release date. People v Cannon, 206 Mich App 653, 656-657; 522 NW2d 716 (1994).
Because the statute requires that the sheriff award good time credit against a sentence being
served by a prisoner in the county jail, and because defendant here was not serving a sentence
while awaiting trial, we conclude that defendant was not entitled to good time credit. Thus, plain
error has not been shown.
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Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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