PEOPLE OF MI V MELVIN O BELL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 13, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 222174
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-009839
MELVIN O. BELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
ON REMAND
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Murphy and Jansen, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appealed as of right from a jury conviction of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct [CSC I], MCL 750.520b(1)(a)(sexual penetration with a person under the age of
thirteen; the victim was a nine-year-old girl) for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment.
We affirmed the conviction, but remanded for resentencing in People v Bell, unpublished
opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued September 21, 2001 (Docket No. 222174).
Defendant was in fact resentenced by the trial court after remand. In the meantime, our Supreme
Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, remanded the case to us to address the issues raised in
defendant’s Standard 11 brief, which was filed late in this Court and therefore not addressed.
466 Mich 865. After consideration of the issues presented in defendant’s Standard 11 brief, we
once again affirm defendant’s conviction.
Defendant first argues that he was denied a fair trial where the prosecutor elicited
testimony from a police officer that defendant smoked marijuana. We disagree. It is
unnecessary to determine whether the evidence was improper under MRE 404(b) because
defendant was not prejudiced by the testimony and any error was harmless. MCL 769.26;
People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). We fail to see how a minor
reference to marijuana use denied defendant’s right to a fair trial in relation to a CSC case, and
the police officer further testified that defendant gave no indication that he had smoked
marijuana on the day of the crime.
Defendant next argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial
counsel (1) failed to investigate and call numerous favorable witnesses, (2) failed to object to
prosecutorial misconduct concerning the prosecutor’s recitation of incorrect law to the jury, (3)
failed to investigate or request questioning of a juror who was sleeping during trial, and (4) failed
to request that the jury view the crime scene.
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In People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 599-600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001), our Supreme Court,
addressing the basic principles involving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, stated:
To justify reversal under either the federal or state constitutions, a
convicted defendant must satisfy the two-part test articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed
2d 674 (1984). See People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797
(1994). “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel
was not performing as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.”
Strickland, supra at 687. In so doing, the defendant must overcome a strong
presumption that counsel’s performance constituted sound trial strategy. Id. at
690. “Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense.” Id. at 687. To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show the
existence of a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. Because the
defendant bears the burden of demonstrating both deficient performance and
prejudice, the defendant necessarily bears the burden of establishing the factual
predicate for his claim. See People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999).
Regarding the claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to call numerous favorable
witnesses, our review is limited to the record, People v Williams, 223 Mich App 409, 414; 566
NW2d 649 (1997), and we have no evidence as to what the allegedly favorable witnesses would
testify to if actually called upon. Therefore, defendant has failed to overcome the strong
presumption that counsel’s performance constituted sound trial strategy. Regardless, considering
the victim’s multiple identifications of defendant, whom she had seen before at her neighbor’s
house, there did not exist a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have
been different had the proposed witnesses testified.
Regarding the claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to prosecutorial
misconduct concerning the prosecutor’s recitation of incorrect law to the jury, defendant’s
argument lacks merit. The prosecutor did not assert that sexual penetration could be
accomplished by simply touching the vaginal area for purposes of CSC I, and even assuming a
misstatement of law, defendant was not prejudiced because the trial court properly instructed the
jury on CSC I.
Regarding the claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to question a juror who was
allegedly sleeping, we do not believe that counsel’s actions were deficient and could have been a
matter of strategy so as to not alienate the juror by reacting in an overly aggressive manner to the
incident. Moreover, assuming ineffectiveness, there was no reasonable probability that the result
of the proceeding would have been different.
Regarding the claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury view,
defendant’s argument lacks merit. A jury view is proper when it is believed that a personal view
of the scene would enable the jurors to comprehend more clearly the evidence already received.
People v Connor, 295 Mich 1, 6; 294 NW 74 (1940); People v Curry, 49 Mich App 64, 67; 211
NW2d 254 (1973). A review of the record does not indicate the need for a jury view, and we
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cannot say that had a view occurred, there would have been a reasonable probability that the
result of the proceeding would have been different.
Defendant next argues that his conviction should be vacated because the victim’s version
of the offense was contrary to indisputable physical facts. We disagree. The so-called
indisputable physical facts recited by defendant did not negate or make impossible the victim’s
allegations concerning the circumstances of the offense. Those facts may have lead one to
question the credibility of the victim; however, this Court defers to the jury’s determination
regarding the credibility of witnesses. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514-515; 489 NW2d 748
(1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). Moreover, as held in our first opinion, there was
sufficient evidence for the jury to find defendant guilty of CSC I. Bell, supra, slip op at 2.
Defendant next argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the presentence
investigation report [PSIR] contained prejudicial inaccurate information. We disagree. Under
MCR 6.429(C), a defendant may not raise an issue challenging the accuracy of information
contained in a PSIR unless the issue was raised at or before sentencing. People v Bailey (On
Remand), 218 Mich App 645, 647; 554 NW2d 391 (1996). Here, there was no challenge to the
information defendant now challenges on appeal. Regardless, we do not find the PSIR to be
inconsistent, in any meaningful manner, with the testimony presented at trial.
Defendant finally argues that he was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel
because of counsel’s failure to preserve issues contained in defendant’s Standard 11 brief, which
failure was allegedly caused by budget cuts at the State Appellate Defenders Office. We
disagree. As indicated in this opinion, the issues raised by defendant in his Standard 11 brief
lack merit; therefore, there is no basis to find appellate counsel ineffective for failing to preserve
issues contained within the brief.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
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