TRAVERSE CITY AUTO MALL V WOLVERINE AUTO SUPPLY INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
TRAVERSE CITY AUTO MALL,
UNPUBLISHED
August 2, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
WOLVERINE AUTO SUPPLY, INC., formerly
known as TOP VALUE EXHAUST SYSTEMS,
INC.,
No. 226824
Grand Traverse Circuit Court
LC No. 99-018517-CK
Defendant,
and
INTERNATIONAL TOP VALUE
AUTOMOTIVE, LLC,
Defendant-Appellee.
TRAVERSE CITY AUTO MALL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
WOLVERINE AUTO SUPPLY, INC., formerly
known as TOP VALUE EXHAUST SYSTEMS,
INC.,
Defendant,
and
INTERNATIONAL TOP VALUE
AUTOMOTIVE, LLC,
Defendant-Appellee.
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No. 227554
Grand Traverse Circuit Court
LC No. 99-018517-CK
Before: Meter, P.J., and Markey and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by right from a grant of summary disposition and award of mediation
sanctions to defendant International Top Value Automotive (ITVA). We reverse the grant of
summary disposition, vacate the order awarding mediation sanctions, and remand this case for
further proceedings.
Defendant Wolverine Auto Supply (Wolverine) originally leased commercial space from
plaintiff, but when Wolverine encountered financial problems, it sold many of its assets to ITVA.
The transaction included an apparent sublease on plaintiff’s space. ITVA initially paid rent to
plaintiff but vacated the premises and stopped paying rent before the end of Wolverine’s lease
term. Plaintiff sued Wolverine and included ITVA as a defendant on the theory that ITVA had
impliedly assumed Wolverine’s liabilities. Wolverine defaulted, and ITVA later moved for
summary disposition, arguing that it was a subtenant of Wolverine and therefore not liable to
plaintiff. The trial court agreed.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court should not have granted summary disposition to ITVA
because the documentary evidence raised genuine issues of fact regarding ITVA’s implied
assumption of Wolverine’s obligations to plaintiff. We agree.
This Court reviews de novo an order granting summary disposition. Spiek v Dep’t of
Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). “When reviewing a motion granted
under MCR 2.116(C)(10), we must examine all relevant documentary evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether there exists a genuine issue of material
fact on which reasonable minds could differ.” Progressive Timberlands, Inc v R & R Heavy
Haulers, Inc, 243 Mich App 404, 407; 622 NW2d 533 (2000). “The nonmoving party may not
rest on its pleadings but must demonstrate a factual issue using documentary evidence.” Id.
The applicable rule of successor liability depends on the nature of the transaction
between the predecessor and successor corporations. Foster v Cone-Blanchard Mach Co, 460
Mich 696, 702; 597 NW2d 506 (1999). “If the acquisition is accomplished by merger, with
shares of stock serving as consideration, the successor generally assumes all its predecessor’s
liabilities.” Id. If the purchase occurs through an exchange of cash for assets (which was the
case here), the successor is not liable for the predecessor’s liabilities except in five narrow
situations. Id. The exceptions are:
“‘“(1) where there is an express or implied assumption of liability; (2)
where the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger; (3) where the
transaction was fraudulent; (4) where some of the elements of a purchase in good
faith were lacking, or where the transfer was without consideration and the
creditors of the transferor were not provided for; or (5) where the transferee
corporation was a mere continuation or reincarnation of the old corporation.” (19
Am Jur 2d, Corporations, § 1546, pp 922-924; Malone v Red Top Cab Co, 16 Cal
App 2d 268, 273 [60 P2d 543 (1936)].)’” [Foster, supra at 702-703, quoting
Turner [v Bituminous Casualty Co, 397 Mich 406,] . . . 417, n 3 [; 244 NW2d 873
-2-
(1976)], quoting Schwartz v McGraw-Edison Co, 14 Cal App 3d 767; 92 Cal Rptr
776 (1971) (footnote omitted).]
In the instant case, plaintiff relies on the first enumerated exception. This Court
addressed this exception in Antiphon, Inc v LEP Transport, Inc, 183 Mich App 377, 384; 454
NW2d 222 (1990), noting that implied liability may be found “where the conduct or
representations relied upon by the party asserting liability indicate an intention on the part of the
buyer to pay the debts of the seller.” “Whether such an intent exists must be determined from
the facts and circumstances of each case.” Id. The relevant factors to consider are the effect of
the transfer on the creditors of the predecessor corporation and any admissions of liability on the
part of spokespersons of the successor corporation. Id.
We conclude that under an Antiphon analysis, the trial court should not have granted
summary disposition to ITVA. Indeed, documentary evidence demonstrated that (1) the seller
was in dire financial straits and was likely uncollectible; (2) the seller and buyer used similar
names: Top Value Exhaust Systems, LLC, and “International Top Value Automotive, LLC,
respectively; (3) after the seller and buyer signed the asset purchase agreement, the chief
financial officer of ITVA informed plaintiff’s manager that ITVA would pay the current rents
and the rental arrears; and (4) plaintiff’s manager did not know of a change in tenants after the
asset purchase agreement was signed. These circumstances parallel, in relevant part, the
circumstances relied on by the Antiphon Court to find an implied assumption of liability. See id.
at 385. Therefore, the issue of this potential assumption of liability should have been fully
explored at trial, and the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to ITVA.
The trial court found that the exception to the general rule of corporate successor liability
discussed in Antiphon could not form the basis of a cause of action but could only be used as a
type of equitable estoppel defense. We disagree. Indeed, Antiphon can be read as stating that a
court of equity should imply an assumption of liability by a successor corporation if the facts
show that the predecessor is uncollectible and the successor represented that it would assume the
predecessor’s obligations.1
The order granting summary disposition is reversed, the order awarding mediation
sanctions is vacated, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
1
ITVA argues that because “[t]here cannot be an express and implied contract covering the same
subject matter at the same time,” see Campell v City of Troy, 42 Mich App 534, 537; 202 NW2d
547 (1972), and because the asset purchase agreement signed by ITVA specifically disavowed
the assumption of any of the seller’s obligations, the rule of implied liability from Antiphon
cannot be used here. We disagree. Indeed, there was no express agreement between ITVA and
plaintiff in this case; thus, an implied agreement under Antiphon may be found. ITVA is not in
privity of contract with plaintiff, and concluding that the express disavowal of liability in the
contract between ITVA and Wolverine superceded the rule of corporate successor liability found
in Antiphon would render the Antiphon rule virtually meaningless, because successor
corporations could always sign such disavowals to avoid liability.
-3-
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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