DONNA CORDER V EDWARD LUCERO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DONNA CORDER,
UNPUBLISHED
July 30, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
EDWARD LUCERO, ARTHUR LUCERO, and
PATRICIA LUCERO,
No. 231656
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2000-021194-NI
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Murray, P.J., and Sawyer and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s grant of summary disposition to
defendants in connection with her claim for personal injuries arising out of an automobile
accident. We affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR
7.214(E).
Plaintiff filed suit against defendants following an automobile accident on June 12, 1997.
The police report indicated that the accident occurred at low speed and that the car plaintiff was
driving was only slightly damaged. Although emergency medical personnel were called to the
scene, plaintiff denied loss of consciousness, neck or back pain. She declined to be taken to the
hospital at that time. However, a few hours later, she presented at the hospital complaining of a
headache. The hospital records indicate that there were no obvious injuries and that the accident
occurred at five miles per hour. Plaintiff was discharged after x-rays of her cervical spine were
negative. Plaintiff returned to work full-time after two scheduled days off.
Although plaintiff complained of pain in her neck, back and shoulder, memory loss, and
numbness in her hand, subsequent testing revealed no objective evidence of injury. X-rays, an
MRI, CT scan, and an EMG were all normal except for evidence of carpal tunnel syndrome
unrelated to the accident. Plaintiff also underwent neuropsychological testing; the report
indicates that her complaints were inconsistent with the type of pattern associated with a motor
vehicle accident. Plaintiff was examined at defendants’ request on September 6, 2000 by Dr.
April Campbell, who found no objective evidence of injuries from the accident; according to
Campbell, the symptoms plaintiff was experiencing at the time were the result of conditions
unrelated to the accident.
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This action is governed by the no-fault act because the complaint alleged that plaintiff
suffered a serious impairment of bodily function as a result of the automobile collision, pursuant
to MCL 500.3135(1). Defendants moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10), arguing that the medical testimony all showed that plaintiff suffered nothing more
than soft tissue injury that did not affect her ability to lead a normal life. The trial court agreed
and granted the motion.
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo.
Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 454; 597 NW2d 28 (1999). MCR 2.116(C)(10)
provides that summary disposition is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In ruling on the motion, the
court must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other documentary evidence
submitted by the parties. Id. at 455.
A serious impairment of body function is statutorily defined as “an objectively
manifested impairment of an important body function that affects the person’s general ability to
lead his or her normal life.” MCL 500.3135(7). This Court has held that soft tissue injuries that
do not limit range of motion cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a serious impairment of an
important body function. See, e.g., Miller v Purcell, 246 Mich App 244, 249-250; 631 NW2d
760 (2001).
Just as in Miller, supra, plaintiff admitted in this case that she is able to work forty hours
per week and is able to perform household tasks, even performing aerobic exercises several
times per week. Id. In Miller, this Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that her inability to knit
and having to type one-handed at times was evidence of a serious impairment of body function
because “her ability to lead her normal life has not been significantly altered by her injury.” Id.
at 250. Similarly, in this case, plaintiff’s claim that, although she can still garden, she can no
longer plant flowers or build flower beds does not establish that her ability to lead a normal life
has been significantly altered; plaintiff testified that she can still cut grass and pull weeds.
Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in granting summary disposition to
defendants.
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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