LINDA LOUISE FORSHEE V RALPH GERALD FORSHEE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LINDA LOUISE FORSHEE,
UNPUBLISHED
July 26, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
v
No. 229051
Osceola Circuit Court
LC No. 99-008226-DM
RALPH GERALD FORSHEE,
Defendant-Appellant/CrossAppellee.
Before: Neff, P.J., and White and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals and plaintiff cross-appeals from a judgment of divorce, challenging,
respectively, the trial court’s decision to treat as part of the marital estate certain properties
conveyed to others by plaintiff and defendant between the time of the separation and divorce,
and to require each party to pay its own costs. We affirm.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by ruling that certain properties the parties
ostensibly conveyed to others between the time of the separation and filing for divorce ought to
be included in the marital estate. In support of his argument, he states, correctly, that property
settlements in contemplation of divorce, like other contracts, cannot be undone on the ground
that they were made under duress or distress unless the duress or distress amounted to virtual
coercion or compulsion. Beachlawn Building Corp v St Clair Shores, 370 Mich 128, 133; 121
NW2d 427 (1963). However, while the trial court did refer to plaintiff’s “duress” and “distress,”
it never found that the conveyances were part of a property settlement, and there was evidence to
the contrary. Plaintiff testified that when the conveyances were made, she had not yet decided to
file for divorce, and that the purpose of the conveyances was to shield the property from
attachment in the event that the parties’ teenaged babysitter obtained a judgment against
defendant as a result of his and the parties’ twelve-year old sons’ sexual relationships with her.
Defendant’s own testimony on this subject was contradictory. Thus there was a credibility
question on this issue, the resolution of which is entitled to deference on appeal. Whitson v
Whiteley Poultry Co, 11 Mich App 598, 601; 162 NW2d 102 (1968).
Further, rather than finding that the property was transferred out of the marital estate, the
trial court found that no valid transfer took place. We review factual findings on property issues
in a divorce for clear error. Stoudemire v Stoudemire, 248 Mich App 325, 336-337; 639 NW2d
274 (2001). Here, the trial court’s findings were amply supported by the evidence that defendant
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continued to collect rents and mineral royalties on the properties, and to pay the taxes, insurance
and other expenses on the properties. The trial court noted that defendant testified at his
deposition that he owned the properties, although he tried at trial, contrary to the plain meaning
of his earlier testimony, to assert that what he actually had meant was that he had once owned the
properties. In light of defendant’s own testimony, we cannot say that the trial court committed
clear error in concluding that notwithstanding the purported transfers, the properties remained
part of the marital estate. Id.
Plaintiff cross-appeals, claiming that it was error for the trial court not to have ordered
defendant to pay a share of her expert witness fees. An award of costs may be made in a divorce
suit upon a showing of need, such that the party will lack means adequately to litigate the suit
without such an award, MCL 552.13(1); MCR 3.206(C); Stackhouse v Stackhouse, 193 Mich
App 437, 443; 484 NW2d 723 (1992), or where the expenses were incurred as the result of the
opposing party’s unreasonable conduct during the litigation. Id. at 445. Here, as a result of the
property disposition made by the trial court, plaintiff has assets of approximately $600,000, in
addition to the income from her job. The costs at issue total approximately $6,000, which
expense plaintiff was able to meet during trial by taking out a loan. Plaintiff makes arguments
based on defendant’s fault in causing the divorce, but does not point to any unreasonable conduct
in the litigation causing unwarranted expert fees. In light of these facts, we cannot say that the
trial court, in denying the award of costs, abused its discretion. Ianitelli v Ianitelli, 199 Mich
App 641, 645; 502 NW2d 691 (1993).
Affirmed.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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