IN RE SZABO MINORS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of K.F.S. and F.A.S., Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
July 23, 2002
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 236258
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 00-385369
EVI SZABO,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
RICHARD KALSTEING,
Respondent.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Cooper and D.P. Ryan*, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent claims an appeal from the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to
her children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j).1 We affirm. This appeal is being
decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
We review a trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights for clear error. MCR
5.974(I); In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). If the trial court determines
that the petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence the existence of one or more
statutory grounds for termination, the court must terminate parental rights unless it finds from
evidence on the whole record that termination is clearly not in the child’s best interests. MCL
712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 353-354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). We review the trial
court’s decision regarding the child’s best interests for clear error. Id. at 356-357.
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
1
The trial court’s order also terminated the parental rights of respondent Richard Kalsteing, the
children’s putative father. He has not appealed the order.
-1-
We hold that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that petitioner established one or
more statutory grounds for termination of respondent’s parental rights. Petitioner initiated this
action after the children’s grandmother took them to the police and stated that respondent could
not care for them. Petitioner offered respondent various services and a treatment plan, but
respondent made little effort to comply with the plan. The evidence showed that respondent’s
circumstances at the time of the permanent custody hearing were essentially unchanged from the
time the children were taken into custody. Respondent’s assertion that in light of her diagnosed
bipolar disorder she should have been afforded additional time to comply with the treatment plan
is without merit in light of her admission that she voluntarily discontinued the prescribed course
of treatment for the disorder.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of respondent’s parental
rights was warranted on the grounds the conditions that led to adjudication continued to exist and
were not reasonably likely to be rectified within a reasonable time considering the children’s
ages, MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), that respondent failed to provide proper care or custody for the
children and could not be expected to do so within a reasonable time, MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), and
that it was reasonably likely the children would be harmed if returned to respondent’s care, MCL
712A.19b(3)(j). The evidence did not show that termination of respondent’s parental rights was
clearly contrary to the children’s best interests. MCR 5.974(I); Trejo, supra.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Daniel P. Ryan
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
