PEOPLE OF MI V CLEVELAND EVANS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 16, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 226511
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 99-007724
CLEVELAND EVANS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Cavanagh and White, JJ.
WHITE, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The identification testimony of the victims was the only evidence linking defendant to the
robberies. He was not seen near the area. He was not chased from the area. He was not found
in possession of any stolen property. He had not disposed of any stolen property. He was not
found with clothing resembling that worn in either robbery. He was not previously known by the
victims and recognized during the robberies. The victims gave differing descriptions regarding
the height of the robber. Snaden described a small man, similar in stature to defendant. Styles
described a larger man. Other witnesses to the Snaden robbery described the robber as being
larger than Snaden did and than defendant is. Although defendant admitted to being laid off,
there was evidence that he had received an unemployment check and that when he needed
money in the past, he pawned a particular necklace, which he owned. Snaden testified that two
days after she was robbed, she observed defendant in his car in the parking lot of a pawn shop
and recognized him as the man who robbed her. She recorded his license plate number and
reported it to the police. Defendant was then arrested and a lineup was held. Snaden identified
defendant immediately and Styles made a somewhat tentative identification. Defendant was
found not guilty of the Styles robbery.
The jury was apparently persuaded by the certainty of Snaden’s identification, and her
description of the robber, although other witnesses thought he was taller. There was no other
evidence upon which to convict. Understanding the importance of the identification testimony,
defendant sought to retain and present the testimony of an expert on eyewitness identification.
Specifically, defendant identified to the court the issue of the certainty of the witness. Defendant
explained that while the common person believes that the more certain the witness is of the
identification, the greater the likelihood of accuracy, expert studies indicate that in fact there is
no such correlation. In voir dire, jury members confirmed that they shared the belief attributed to
them by defense counsel. During trial, counsel again sought leave to present the expert
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testimony. Without a hearing on the matter, the court expressed its opinion that the testimony
would be “junk science” and again denied the motion.
In the particular circumstances presented, I conclude that defendant made an adequate
showing that the expert was necessary to his defense, and that the trial court abused its discretion
in summarily denying the request. I would remand for a hearing to permit defendant to present
the witness’ testimony, for the court to make a decision on admissibility based on the record
made on remand, and for a new trial if the court determines that the testimony is sufficiently
reliable to be admissible.
I agree that none of the other claims of error warrant reversal.
/s/ Helene N. White
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