PEOPLE OF MI V JOSEPH W WRIGHT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 28, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 231400
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-000797
JOSEPH W. WRIGHT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Cavanagh and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of receiving and concealing stolen
property in excess of $20,000, MCL 750.535(2)(a), involuntary manslaughter with a motor
vehicle, MCL 750.321, and leaving the scene of a serious personal injury accident, MCL
257.617. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of two to five years for the stolen property
conviction, five to fifteen years for the manslaughter conviction, and two to five years for the
leaving the scene conviction. Defendant appeals as of right, and we affirm.
I
Defendant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of
manslaughter because there was no evidence that he was driving in a grossly negligent manner at
the time he struck the decedent’s car. We disagree.
When assessing whether sufficient evidence was presented to support a conviction, this
Court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determines whether a
rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441
Mich 1201 (1992). Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from the evidence
may be sufficient to prove the elements of a crime. People v McKenzie, 206 Mich App 425, 428;
522 NW2d 661 (1994). This Court will not interfere with the trier of fact’s role of determining
the weight of evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Wolfe, supra at 514.
To establish that defendant was guilty of involuntary manslaughter with a motor vehicle,
the prosecutor was required to prove that defendant committed an unlawful act in a grossly
negligent, wanton, or reckless manner, causing the death of another. People v Datema, 448 Mich
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585, 606; 533 NW2d 272 (1995); People v Rettelle, 173 Mich App 196, 199; 433 NW2d 401
(1988). To establish gross negligence, the following elements must be proven:
(1) Knowledge of a situation requiring the exercise of ordinary care and
diligence to avert injury to another.
(2) Ability to avoid the resulting harm by ordinary care and diligence in
the use of the means at hand.
(3) The omission to use such care and diligence to avert the threatened
danger when to the ordinary mind it must be apparent that the result is likely to
prove disastrous to another. [People v McCoy, 223 Mich App 500, 503; 566
NW2d 667 (1997) (citations omitted).]
In Datema, supra at 604, our Supreme Court explained:
[C]riminal intention anchors one end of the spectrum and negligence
anchors the other. Intention . . . “emphasiz[es] that the actor seeks the proscribed
harm not in the sense that he desires it, but in the sense that he has chosen it, he
has decided to bring it into being.” Negligence, lying at the opposite end of the
spectrum, “implies inadvertence, i.e., that the defendant was completely unaware
of the dangerousness of this behavior although actually it was unreasonably
increasing the risk of occurrence of an injury.”
Criminal negligence, also referred to as gross negligence, lies within the
extremes of intention and negligence. As with intention, the actor realizes the
risk of his behavior and consciously decides to create that risk. As with
negligence, however, the actor does not seek to cause harm, but is simply
“recklessly or wantonly indifferent to the results.” [Citations omitted; emphasis
added.]
In this case, a trier of fact could properly infer that defendant knew that the act of driving
requires ordinary care and diligence to avert injury to others. Similarly, a trier of fact could
properly infer, under these facts, that defendant had the ability to avoid the harm that occurred by
exercising ordinary care and diligence, but failed to do so. In other words, defendant could have
chosen not to drive at an excessive speed, with obstructed vision. Defendant admitted that he
was driving the stolen Jeep at a speed of 35 to 40 miles-per-hour in a 25-mile-per-hour zone in
an attempt to escape the police. He also admitted that his vision was hindered because he could
only see out of a small area in the bottom of the fogged windshield. Ultimately, defendant ran a
final stop sign and struck the decedent’s car broadside, causing her death. A rational trier of fact
could properly find that defendant’s act of driving through a residential neighborhood at
excessive speeds, with obstructed vision, and disregarding traffic signs was likely to prove
disastrous to another. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
sufficient evidence was presented to sustain defendant’s conviction of involuntary manslaughter
with a motor vehicle.
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II
Next, defendant argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court
impermissibly departed upward from the sentencing guidelines’ recommended minimum
sentence range of twelve to twenty-four months for the manslaughter conviction without a
substantial and compelling reason to do so, contrary to MCL 769.34(3). The court sentenced
defendant to a minimum term of five years.
Because defendant committed the offenses in December 1999, the legislative sentencing
guidelines were properly applied. MCL 769.34(2); People v Reynolds, 240 Mich App 250, 253;
611 NW2d 316 (2000). Under the sentencing guidelines statute, the trial court must impose a
minimum sentence in accordance with the calculated guidelines range, MCL 769.34(2), and may
not depart from the recommended range unless it “has a substantial and compelling reason for
th[e] departure and states on the record the reasons for departure.” MCL 769.34(3); People v
Hegwood, 465 Mich 432, 438; 636 NW2d 127 (2001); People v Babcock, 244 Mich App 64, 72;
624 NW2d 479 (2000). Substantial and compelling reasons are to be found only in
“exceptional” cases. People v Fields, 448 Mich 58, 67-68; 528 NW2d 176 (1995). The reasons
for departure should “keenly and irresistibly grab” the court’s attention and should be recognized
as being of considerable worth in deciding the length of the sentence. Babcock, supra at 75,
quoting Fields, supra. The trial court's stated reasons for departure must also be objective and
verifiable, Babcock, supra at 78, which is defined as “actions or occurrences which are external
to the minds of the judge, defendant and others involved in making the decision . . . [that are]
capable of being confirmed.” Fields, supra at 66 (quotation omitted).
On review, this Court must first determine as a matter of law whether the trial court's
stated reason for departure is objective and verifiable. Babcock, supra at 78. The existence or
nonexistence of a particular factor is a factual determination that this Court will review for clear
error. The trial court's determination that the objective and verifiable factors present in a
particular case constitute substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the guidelines is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. at 75-76. An abuse of discretion exists if the result was so
palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences a perversity of will, a defiance
of judgment, and the exercise of passion or bias. Id. at 76.
We find that the trial court relied on certain factors in this case that are objective and
verifiable, and that the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that there were substantial and
compelling reasons to depart from the sentencing guidelines. The trial court found that the
recommended guidelines range did not adequately account for defendant’s behavior, noting that
the circumstances of this case could rise to the level of second-degree murder. The court’s stated
reasons for departure included the fact that defendant was in a stolen car, which he drove at
excessive speeds while unable to see where he was going, and that the length of the police
pursuit was long enough for defendant to reconsider his actions and stop the car. The court’s
stated reasons also included defendant’s familiarity with the residential neighborhood where the
police pursuit occurred, his knowledge that an elementary school was in the area, the fact that
school children were likely to be in the area given the time of the pursuit, and the fact that the
fatal accident occurred directly outside of the elementary school. Because the factors considered
by the court are objective and verifiable and constituted substantial and compelling reasons to
depart from the twelve to twenty-four-month guidelines’ range, resentencing is not required.
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Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Helene N. White
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