MARY LOMERSON V FRANK BUJOLD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARY LOMERSON and DAVID LOMERSON,
UNPUBLISHED
June 25, 2002
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
FRANK BUJOLD and CHANDLER, BUJOLD, &
CHANDLER,
No. 231505
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 00-020089-NM
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Cavanagh and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of
defendant in this legal malpractice action. We affirm.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his legal malpractice
claim because he “had a legal claim under Michigan’s No-Fault Act to compensation for the
care-taking services his mother provided to him,” i.e., David was the person entitled to receive
no-fault benefits. We disagree. This Court reviews the grant or denial of a motion for summary
disposition de novo. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201
(1998). Because the trial court looked beyond the pleadings in reaching its decision, we will
consider the motion granted under MCR 2.116(C)(10). See Ottaco, Inc v Gauze, 226 Mich App
646, 650; 574 NW2d 393 (1997).
To establish a legal malpractice claim, the plaintiff must plead and prove the following
elements: (1) an attorney-client relationship, (2) the attorney negligently represented the
plaintiff, (3) the negligence was a proximate cause of an injury, and (4) the fact and extent of the
claimed injury. Charles Reinhart Co v Winiemko, 444 Mich 579, 585-586; 513 NW2d 773
(1994), quoting Coleman v Gurwin, 443 Mich 59, 63; 503 NW2d 435 (1993). In this case, the
trial court effectively held that David did not establish an actual injury even if defendant was
negligent and, accordingly, could not establish a legal malpractice claim. We agree with the trial
court.
Pursuant to the no-fault act, particularly MCL 500.3105 and MCL 500.3112, personal
protection insurance (PIP) benefits are payable to or for the benefit of a person who sustained an
accidental bodily injury as a result of a motor vehicle accident as provided in the act. PIP
benefits are payable for “[a]llowable expenses consisting of all reasonable charges incurred for
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reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations for an injured person's care,
recovery, or rehabilitation.” MCL 500.3107(1)(a). The value of attendant care services provided
by a parent is such an allowable expense. See Booth v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 224 Mich App 724,
729-730; 569 NW2d 903 (1997). Insurers may, and commonly do, render the payment of PIP
benefits directly to their insured’s service provider. See MCL 500.3112; Lakeland Neurocare
Centers v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 250 Mich App 35; ___ NW2d ___ (2002).
Disagreements between the insured’s service provider and the no-fault insurer related to PIP
payment issues may result in litigation. See, e.g., Mercy Mt Clemens Corp v Auto Club Ins
Ass'n, 219 Mich App 46, 48; 555 NW2d 871 (1996); Munson Medical Center v Auto Club Ins
Ass’n, 218 Mich App 375, 378; 554 NW2d 49 (1996).
Here, it is undisputed that David was entitled to PIP benefits and, in 1988, his mother,
Mary, sought and received direct payments for attendant care services that she provided to
David. This claim arises as a consequence of Mary allegedly receiving negligent advice from
defendant regarding the value of these services, which allegedly resulted in her receiving
inadequate payments from David’s PIP insurer. However, for David to establish a legal
malpractice claim he must prove that he was actually injured by defendant’s alleged negligence.
It is well established that a claim of malpractice requires a showing of actual injury caused by the
malpractice. See Colbert v Conybeare Law Office, 239 Mich App 608, 620; 609 NW2d 208
(2000); Keliin v Petrucelli, 198 Mich App 426, 430; 499 NW2d 360 (1993). Plaintiff argues on
appeal that, because David was entitled to PIP benefits, he automatically has a cause of action
because of defendant’s negligent advice concerning those benefits. Plaintiff’s position is
untenable because it disregards a critical element—the fact and extent of the claimed injury, i.e.,
actual injury.
Here, David received attendant care services, as provided by the no-fault act. David’s
mother, Mary, received payments for the attendant care services that she provided to David.
Although Mary claims that she was under-compensated for her services as a result of defendant’s
allegedly negligent advice, David has failed to establish that he sustained an actual injury as a
result of defendant’s allegedly negligent advice to his mother regarding the value of her attendant
services. In other words, David has failed to demonstrate an identifiable and appreciable loss
suffered as a result of defendant’s alleged malpractice. See Gebhardt v O’Rourke, 444 Mich
535, 545; 510 NW2d 900 (1994). Consequently, the trial court’s summary dismissal of his legal
malpractice action was proper. In light of our resolution of this dispositive issue, we need not
consider plaintiff’s other issue on appeal.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Helene N. White
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