PEOPLE OF MI V GREGORY MATTHEWS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 25, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 228538
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-012138
GREGORY MATTHEWS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Cavanagh and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, and
sentenced to concurrent terms of 100 to 240 months. Defendant appeals as of right, and we
affirm.
Defendant first argues that his statement to the police was not voluntary. Following an
evidentiary hearing, the trial court determined that the statement was voluntary. A trial court
must view the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether a defendant’s statement was
knowing, intelligent and voluntary. People v Manning, 243 Mich App 615, 620; 624 NW2d 746
(2000). This Court will not reverse the trial court’s factual findings unless they are clearly
erroneous. People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 395; 633 NW2d 376 (2001). Questions of
law are reviewed de novo. Manning, supra. Among the many factors to be considered in
determining whether a statement is voluntary are the defendant’s age, his lack of education or
intelligence level, his previous experience with the police, the length of detention, the lack of
advice regarding his rights, any unnecessary delay, the presence of injury, alcohol or drugs, the
defendant’s health, whether the defendant was deprived of food, sleep or medical attention,
whether the defendant was physically abused, and whether he was threatened with abuse. People
v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 333-334; 429 NW2d 781 (1988). The goal is to determine whether
the defendant’s “will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically
impaired,” and whether the statement is “the product of an essentially free and unconstrained
choice by the maker.” Id. (citations omitted).
Here, defendant was nineteen years old, with an eleventh grade education, and had little
previous contact with the police. He cites the delay between his arrest and his final statement, a
“filthy” holding cell where he was unable to sleep because it contained a rat, and the lack of
family contact due to the police restricting his phone access, as factors rendering his statement
involuntary. However, the record reflects that defendant was always permitted to use the
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telephone to call an attorney, that he understood and initialed his rights, that he reviewed his
statement and that he thought he would be able to go home “because I was only supposed to been
a lookout.” Defendant does not claim that he was ill or under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
Defendant admitted that he understood his rights. As the trial court noted, it gauged the
credibility of defendant and the officers in making its determination of voluntariness. The court
found that defendant was not promised anything and was not abused or threatened, that he
understood his rights and voluntarily waived them, and that his claim regarding the rat was
questionable. The court concluded that under the totality of the circumstances, defendant’s
statement was voluntary. We find no error.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence obtained in a search of his residence. Defendant argues on appeal that his aunt did not
have the authority to consent to a search of his house and that, in any event, she did not give free
and informed consent. We review the trial court’s decision regarding the validity of consent for
clear error. People v Goforth, 222 Mich App 306, 310; 564 NW2d 526 (1997). Whether consent
is freely and voluntarily given is a question of fact “based on an assessment of the totality of the
circumstances.” People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 294; 597 NW2d 1 (1999). We also
review the trial court’s decision regarding suppression of evidence de novo. Goforth, supra.
Police officers testified that defendant’s aunt gave them permission to enter the residence
and signed a consent to search form. One officer said that defendant’s aunt even offered to show
the police around. Defendant’s aunt testified that she did not give the police permission to enter
the house and that she could not give permission because it was not her house. The house
belonged to defendant’s parents, who were not home, but defendant’s aunt lived in the basement.
Defendant’s aunt claimed that the police “snatched” the door off its hinges and forced their way
in. She testified that the officers threatened her and the children in the house and told her to sign
the paper to prevent them from taking one of the children to juvenile hall. Defendant’s aunt
testified that she cannot read but that she can sign her name.
Consent may be given by a third-party who has common authority over the premises.
Goforth, supra. Here, where defendant’s aunt lived in the basement of the house, answered the
door and was the only adult on the premises, we find no clear error in the trial court’s conclusion
that she had the authority to consent to the search. Although defendant’s aunt testified that she
lacked authority, that she was threatened, and that she did not freely give consent, the police
officers testified that she let them into the house and told them they could search it. The trial
court, having heard the testimony, concluded that defendant’s aunt was not credible. We defer to
the trial court’s resolution of a factual issue when it involves the credibility of witnesses whose
testimony is in conflict. People v Parker, 230 Mich App 337, 341; 584 NW2d 336 (1998). We
find no error.
Finally, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial because the prosecutor elicited
testimony that the police followed the sound of gunshots when they arrived on the scene. We
review allegations of prosecutorial misconduct in context to determine whether the defendant
was denied a fair and impartial trial. People v Reid, 233 Mich App 457, 466; 592 NW2d 767
(1999). We find no reversible error.
An officer testified that he heard someone “jumping a fence” and then heard six
gunshots. The police followed the sound to a vacant house. They were then approached by
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someone who gave them information. They then went to the house where defendant was
arrested and evidence of the crime was found. We agree that the testimony concerning the
gunshots was unnecessary. However, no evidence was admitted to link defendant to the
gunshots, and the prosecutor did not attempt to introduce the evidence to establish guilt, but
rather, to explain how the police ended up at the house. Further, as the trial court noted, any
prejudice caused by the testimony was “cleared . . up” by defense counsel’s cross-examination
of the witness, and the trial court also offered a curative instruction. Defendant was not denied a
fair and impartial trial on this basis. Reid, supra.
Defendant further contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion
for a mistrial based on the evidence that a police officer pursued the sound of gunshots. This
Court will find an abuse of discretion only where the trial court’s denial of the motion deprived
defendant of a fair and impartial trial. People v Wolverton, 227 Mich App 72, 75; 574 NW2d
703 (1997). Defendant asserts that the prosecutor promised not to introduce evidence that
gunshots were fired without giving defendant an opportunity to challenge admission of the
testimony. The record establishes that the prosecutor told the court that he intended to introduce
the evidence that shots were fired but would not introduce evidence that they were fired at the
police officers, and that he would not mention the evidence in opening. The prosecutor should
have alerted the court when he reached the point that he intended to ask about the gun shots. On
the other hand, defendant should have objected immediately when the testimony was elicited. In
all events, because the evidence did not deprive defendant of a fair and impartial trial, the court
did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s request for a mistrial. Id.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Helene N. White
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