PEOPLE OF MI V LEEMAN REED WHITE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 18, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 230408
Kalkaska Circuit Court
LC No. 00-1991-FH(M)
LEEMAN WHITE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Smolenski and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his conviction on the charge of fourth-degree criminal
sexual conduct (CSC IV), MCL 750.520e. On September 6, 2000, the trial court sentenced
defendant to 16 to 24 months imprisonment, with credit for 94 days already served.1 We affirm.
I. Facts and Proceedings
Defendant’s CSC IV conviction arose out of the events of December 6, 1999. On that
date, defendant and the victim, both of whom were employed by Eagle Trim in Kalkaska, left
work and proceeded to their respective cars in the parking lot. As the victim started to open her
car door, she noticed defendant approaching her as though he was going to his car, which was
parked behind the victim’s car. Because the space between the cars was just large enough to
open the car door, the victim decided not to open the car door, and instead turned and faced her
car in order to give defendant room to pass. The victim testified that as defendant passed by her
he grabbed her between her legs, continued to walk toward his car, and laughed. The victim
filed a complaint with the Michigan State Police, and sought and was granted a personal
protection order (PPO) against defendant. As a result of the State Police investigation, defendant
was arrested on December 14, 1999. Following a preliminary examination held on March 15,
2000, defendant was bound over for trial on one count of CSC IV, and one count of stalking,
MCL 750.411h.
Defendant’s trial commenced on June 23, 2000, and the victim testified as follows:
1
As discussed infra, defendant was also convicted of misdemeanor stalking, MCL 750.411h, and
sentenced to twelve months in jail to run concurrently with defendant’s CSC IV sentence. The
stalking conviction and resulting sentence is not appealed by defendant.
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Q. You say he grabbed you up under, or something like that. Can you help us
understand just where . . . he grab[bed] you?
A. Just . . . underneath my private areas. Just grabbed me and – it was real quick.
...
Q. And was this from behind you?
A. Yes.
Q. How far . . . up, or forward did his hand go?
A. All the way underneath.
Q. As far around as the zipper on the front of your pants?
A. Maybe the bottom of the zipper.
The victim also testified that beginning around June of 1999, defendant repeatedly stalked her by
following her around the workplace, staring at her while at work, offering her money for sex, and
following her while she traveled to Traverse City, work, home, or other places. The victim also
testified that defendant came to her house uninvited on November 15, 1999, staying in his car for
over ten minutes, causing the victim to remain in her car instead of going into her house. The
victim also testified that she had complained to her supervisor about defendant’s conduct, that
she had not encouraged defendant’s behavior and had told him several times to leave her alone,
and that defendant had followed her and her brother-in-law on at least one occasion after she had
obtained the PPO against defendant.2 The prosecution presented corroborating testimony of the
victim’s account of the stalking through various witnesses, including defendant’s supervisor,
Charles Bushey. Bushey testified that on October 18, 1999, defendant was formally notified that
the victim had complained that defendant had sexually harassed her at work, and that any further
credible allegations that defendant had sexually harassed the victim or any other coworker would
result in termination. Bushey also testified that he was aware that on at least two occasions,
defendant left work after noticing that the victim either had left early or was not working.
Defendant testified in his own defense. He denied staring at or following the victim
around at work, and explained the victim’s testimony that he had offered her money in exchange
for sex as a misunderstanding. According to defendant, while he did offer the victim $100 for
“stuff,” meaning antique toys and other items, the victim apparently misinterpreted the meaning
of the word “stuff,” and wrongfully assumed he was referring to sex. Defendant admitted that he
went to the victim’s house on two separate occasions, and explained that his reason for going to
her home was to discuss his reprimand for allegedly offering her $100 for sex. Defendant also
admitted that he had gone to Traverse City on the same day as the victim, but claimed that this
was just a coincidence, and that he had not intentionally followed her to Traverse City.
2
Defendant was charged in this incident with aggravated stalking, MCL 750.411h. Defendant
was tried for this charge at a separate trial, and therefore that charge is not a part of this appeal.
-2-
With regard to the CSC IV allegation, defendant denied intentionally grabbing or
touching the victim. Instead, defendant testified that the victim leaned against her car so that he
could get between her and the adjacent car, and that he accidentally brushed up against her while
trying to pass.
Following closing arguments and jury instructions, the jury deliberated for thirty-six
minutes, finding defendant guilty of both CSC IV and misdemeanor stalking. The trial court then
sentenced him to 16 to 24 months imprisonment on the CSC IV conviction, and to twelve
months in jail for the stalking conviction. In sentencing defendant, the trial court departed from
the statutory sentencing guidelines and did not follow the presentence investigation report (PSIR)
recommendation of 0 to 11 months probation on the CSC conviction, and 24 months probation,
the first 12 months in the county jail, on the stalking conviction. In support of its departure, the
trial court stated:
Well, this is a very difficult matter because of the guidelines and the
sentencing information scoring grid for CSC fourth which is the first count;
stalking, of course being the second count. The CSC fourth having the two-year
maximum, the stalking having a one-year maximum. CSC fourth being a felony .
. . . The stalking being a misdemeanor having a penalty of one year or less.
And an important factor in this whole case was the evidence at the trial of
the -- of a few things. Number one, the very serious mental and emotional impact
that this has had upon the victim which I don’t believe the guidelines sufficiently
measure or gauge. Although they do take into account whether a person needs
counseling, et cetera.
But based on the testimony and observing the witness who is very timid
and shy, this did have a tremendous serious and detrimental mental and emotional
impact. And that’s based on her own testimony which -- and the testimony of her
husband and others. And the victim has become paranoid as a result of
[defendant’s] assault and stalking. And that’s very uncharacteristic of how she
was prior to the offense -- the offenses here.
“The husband reports a change in demeanor in his wife.” This is quoting
from the presentence report. Fear -- “she’s fearful and does not want to go
anywhere.” And that is very different from the way she used to be. And she
states, “It’s made me nervous not knowing what to expect next, looking behind
me when I walk around or drive around.” So the impact has been quite
substantial on the victim. And I don’t believe the guidelines do take that
sufficiently into account.
And more importantly here, I don’t – again, I don’t think it’s taken into
account is the fact that part of the testimony here involved a violation of a court
order by [defendant]; a blatant violation. And here -- with probation being part of
the recommendation, I think that’s just an improper step; because here we have a
man who’s already demonstrated disregard for court orders and he’s expected to
be put on probation with a series -- a multiple series of court orders? I just don’t
believe that’s prudent.
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He also has a prior conviction involving very similar conduct. Not that’s
not, again, scored or reflected or categorized in the sentence guidelines, the
different variables, because it’s just not one of the scoring factors; whether his
prior conviction was involving a similar assaultive conduct male -- male upon
female. So I think that’s very serious. It only scores it, I think, as a CCW. It
involved must more than that. It involved an assault on his ex-wife.
And I think the observations of the . . . probation officer, who’s very
experienced as well, are important. He states this is a difficult case. The
guidelines call for probation on the one hand, yet the offender could be extremely
dangerous to the victim. And I think that’s a reasonable conclusion based on the
testimony. The way he kept -- kept up with his conduct and the stalking of this
lady who -- there was no relationship at all between them. This isn’t a normal
staking care where it’s an ex-boyfriend/girlfriend situation. Here there was never
any relationship between the victim and the offender. Just, essentially, coworkers. He has -- he became infatuated with -- with the victim and projected his
feelings upon her, similar to a celebrity stalker.
***
Someone who’s shown a propensity to violate court orders in connection
with the PPO and has that type of criminal background with a similar offense, I
thing this is not a probationable type case in my view. I don’t think that would be
prudent.
I think the only proper sentence and one that would serve the goals of the
sentencing, and for deterrence and protection of society, and some punishment -hopefully [defendant] will think twice before engaging in this conduct in the
future, which would be a third time because, really, essentially he’s done the same
thing in the past, doing it here in -- in this case. And I don’t think he’s a
candidate for probation at all. It -- it would be unreasonable.
So I think for the reasons stated, I do have to exceed the guidelines and
sentence [defendant] on CSC fourth degree. You’re sentenced to 16 to 24
months. And on stalking, you’re sentenced to twelve months.
II. Defendant’s Insufficient Evidence Claim
Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his CSC IV conviction.
We disagree. When a defendant claims the evidence is insufficient to support conviction, we
review the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the prosecution in order to
determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that all the elements of the crime were
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 723; 597 NW2d 73
(1999); People v Taylor, 245 Mich App 293, 296; 628 NW2d 55 (2001).
-4-
In order to convict defendant of CSC IV, the prosecution had to prove, among other
things, that defendant intentionally3 touched either the victim’s intimate parts or the clothing
covering the victim’s intimate parts. People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 76; 508 NW2d 127
(1993); see also MCL 750.520e(1), MCL 750.520a(c), MCL 750.520a(l). Defendant contends
that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence that he touched the victim in an intimate
area. The victim testified that defendant touched her “just underneath [her] private areas,” from
behind, and that his hand went “all the way underneath” her pants to “the bottom of the zipper.”
MCL 750.520a(c) defines “intimate parts” as “the primary genital area, groin, inner thigh,
buttock, or breast of a human being.” The victim’s testimony would permit a rational trier of
fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant touched the victim’s intimate parts.
Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude
that the prosecution presented the jury with sufficient evidence of defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Johnson, supra; Taylor, supra.
III. Sentencing
Defendant also contends that his sentence of 16 to 24 months imprisonment on the CSC
IV conviction is not proportional. See People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 635; 461 NW2d 1
(1990). We again disagree. We review for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision that
objective and verifiable factors constitute substantial and compelling reasons for departing from
the guidelines’ recommended minimum sentence. People v Armstrong, 247 Mich App 423, 424;
636 NW2d 785 (2001), citing People v Fields, 448 Mich 58, 69-70; 528 NW2d 176 (1995), and
People v Babcock, 244 Mich App 64, 75-75-76; 624 NW2d 479 (2000); see also People v
Hegwood, 465 Mich 432, 439; 636 NW2d 127 (2001).
Because defendant committed the instant offense on December 6, 1999, defendant’s
sentence was subject to the statutory sentencing guidelines. MCL 769.34(2); People v Reynolds,
240 Mich App 250, 253; 611 NW2d 316 (2000). Although MCL 750.52e(2) enumerates CSC IV
as misdemeanor, because it is punishable by a two-year term of imprisonment, it is considered a
class G felony for sentencing purposes. MCL 761.1(g), 777.16y; see also People v Ackels, 190
Mich App 30, 33-34; 475 NW2d 413 (1991); People v McGill, 131 Mich App 465, 477; 346
NW2d 572 (1984). In the instant case, defendant’s guideline score placed him in the B-III
category, which provides for a minimum sentence range of between 0 and 11 eleven months,
MCL 777.68. Because the upper limit of this sentence range was below eighteen months, the
trial court was required to impose an intermediate sanction (such as probation or jail, see MCL
769.31), unless it found substantial and compelling reasons to sentence defendant to prison. See
MCL 769.34(4). In addition, pursuant to MCL 769.34(3)(a) and (b), the trial court is only
permitted to depart from the guidelines if it finds that there are legitimate nondiscriminatory
3
Although defendant claimed below that any touching of the victim was accidental, defendant
has not raised this issue on appeal. We note, in any event, that the prosecution also charged
defendant with stalking the victim, and the jury convicted the defendant of this charge. There is
no question that the jury could have reasonably concluded that, consistent with defendant’s
stalking conduct, defendant intentionally touched the victim’s intimate parts in a sexual manner
or for his sexual arousal or gratification. See MCL 750.520a(l).
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factors that have not been considered in the guidelines, or that the factors used in the guidelines
were given inadequate or disproportionate weight. Armstrong, supra, citing People v Castillo,
230 Mich App 442, 448; 584 NW2d 606 (1998), and People v Nelson, 234 Mich App 454, 464;
594 NW2d 114 (1999).
Here, the trial court, in departing from the guidelines, found that defendant’s altercation
with his ex-wife and defendant’s violation of the PPO which prohibited him from having contact
with the victim, were incidents not sufficiently accounted for by the guidelines.4 The trial court
also found that the emotional and mental distress suffered by the victim as the result of
defendant’s conduct was not given appropriate consideration by the guidelines. See Armstrong,
supra at 424. Additionally, the trial court concluded that the guidelines did not adequately
account for defendant’s contemporaneous misdemeanor conviction for stalking, and for the
importance of ensuring both the victim’s safety and the protection of society. See id.
Accordingly, we find the trial court articulated objective and verifiable factors supporting
its departure from the minimum sentencing range, Babcock, supra; MCL 769.34(3); MCL
769.34(4), and that defendant’s sentence adequately reflects the seriousness and nature of the
crime committed, People v Oliver, 242 Mich App 92, 98; 617 NW2d 721 (2000); People v Rice
(On Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 446; 597 NW2d 843 (1999). Thus, defendant’s sentence was
not disproportionate, Milbourn, supra, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by departing
from the guidelines in sentencing defendant. Babcock, supra at 75-76.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
4
When defendant violated the PPO his bond was revoked and he was charged with aggravated
stalking. The trial court found that neither of these facts was accounted for by the guidelines and
the trial court felt they were factors requiring consideration at sentencing. See People v Coulter,
205 Mich App 453, 456; 517 NW2d 827 (1994), and People v Parr, 197 Mich App 41, 46; 494
NW2d 768 (1992) (indicating that a sentencing court may consider the facts underlying
uncharged offenses and pending charges).
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