DOROTHY SCOTT V CITY OF TROY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DOROTHY SCOTT and FRANK STRAUB,
UNPUBLISHED
June 14, 2002
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
No. 228278
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 99-017781-CZ
v
CITY OF TROY and TROY HISTORICAL
SOCIETY,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: White, P.J., and Murphy and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right, challenging the circuit court’s orders granting summary
disposition to defendants and awarding defendant City of Troy taxable costs of $40, and attorney
fees of $900 pursuant to MCL 600.2591, as a sanction for filing a frivolous action. We reverse.
Plaintiffs argue that the circuit court erred in relying on a prior case, Kessler v City of
Troy, Oakland Circuit Court No. 97-551870-CH, to conclude that res judicata barred the instant
action. Plaintiffs maintain that the prior action in Kessler was treated as an appeal from a
decision of the Troy Historic District Commission (hereinafter the “commission”) for which the
court did not properly have jurisdiction because an appeal was never filed. Therefore, plaintiffs
contend that the judgment in Kessler is void and may not be recognized for purposes of applying
res judicata. We disagree with plaintiffs’ analysis but agree that res judicata was not applicable.
The applicability of res judicata is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Ditmore v
Michalik, 244 Mich App 569, 574; 625 NW2d 462 (2001). “Res judicata bars relitigation of
claims that are based on the same transaction or events as a prior suit.” Id. at 577. Res judicata
is applicable when (1) the prior action was decided on the merits, (2) the decree in the prior
decision was a final decision, (3) both actions involved the same parties or their privies, and (4)
the matter in the second case was or could have been resolved in the first. Id. at 576. A
judgment is not res judicata unless it is valid and rendered by a court having jurisdiction. Reid v
Gooden, 282 Mich 495, 498; 276 NW 530 (1938).
Notwithstanding language to the contrary in the order denying summary disposition in
Kessler, it is clear that the action in Kessler was not treated as a conventional appeal. The prior
action was initiated by the Kessler plaintiffs, members of the commission and residents of the
city, as a complaint for injunctive relief to enjoin defendants from relocating the church and
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parsonage. Consistent with this posture, defendants were permitted to submit evidence and call
witnesses relative to the plaintiffs’ request for an injunction, and the court’s decision deciding
the matter addressed the requirements for injunctive relief.
However, in addressing whether the Kessler plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive relief,
the court discussed the conditions to be considered under Chapter 13 of the Troy City Ordinance
Code. It is clear from the ordinances and MCL 399.205 that the analysis and determination of
whether the structures could be moved was to be made by the commission based on evidence
presented to that body, and not by the circuit court. Further, the circuit court could only review
the matter on an appellate basis and reverse the commission's decision after an initial appeal to
the state historic preservation review board. Therefore, to the extent the court in Kessler denied
injunctive relief based on a failure to show the requisite harm, the decision has no bearing on the
instant case, in which plaintiffs challenge defendant's authority to move the structures in the face
of the commission's refusal to grant such authority. And, to the extent the court in Kessler
denied relief on the basis that the commission erred in denying permission to move the
structures, the decision was not pursuant to a proper appeal.
In sum, the court in Kessler never decided the question whether defendant could move
the structures in light of the commission's denial of permission. If commission permission is
required under the city ordinances, defendants should be enjoined from moving the structures
subject to any proper appeal undertaken by defendants.1 If approval is not required, then the
request for injunction should be denied. We remand to the circuit court for a determination
whether the ordinances require that defendant obtain commission approval to move the
structures.
In light of our decision, we also reverse the trial court’s decision to award sanctions under
MCL 600.2591.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
1
This assumes that plaintiffs have standing, an issue raised by defendants, but not addressed by
the circuit court. On remand, the court shall address this issue if again raised by defendants and
necessary to decision.
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