PEOPLE OF MI V TASHIENA L COMBS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 14, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 226549
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 99-167507-FC
TASHIENA L. COMBS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Kelly, P.J., and Murphy and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder,
MCL 750.316, carrying a concealed weapon in a vehicle, MCL 750.227, and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. She was sentenced to mandatory life
imprisonment for the murder conviction, one to five years’ imprisonment for the CCW
conviction, and a consecutive two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant
appeals as of right. We affirm.
I
Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for a
new trial on the basis of juror misconduct. We disagree.
Defendant contends that she is entitled to a new trial because Juror 580 did not reveal that
his wife is an employee at the district court where defendant had been convicted of misdemeanor
offenses, and also that he is a member of the National Rifle Association (NRA). According to
defendant, Juror 580 concealed facts from the court that, if he had revealed them, would have led
defense counsel to challenge him for cause. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for a new
trial on this issue. We review the trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion, and the trial
court's factual findings for clear error. People v Crear, 242 Mich App 158, 167; 618 NW2d 91
(2000).
A lower court may grant a new trial on any ground that would support appellate reversal
of the defendant’s conviction or if the court believes that the verdict has resulted in a miscarriage
of justice. MCR 6.431(B). To justify a new trial on the basis of juror misconduct, the defendant
must show actual prejudice resulting from the presence of the juror, or that the juror was
excusable for cause. Crear, supra at 167; People v Daoust, 228 Mich App 1, 9; 577 NW2d 179
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(1998). The level of juror misconduct must be such as to affect the impartiality of the juror or to
disqualify him from exercising the powers of reason and judgment. People v Nick, 360 Mich
219, 230; 103 NW2d 435 (1960); People v Fetterley, 229 Mich App 511, 545; 583 NW2d 199
(1998).
Here, contrary to defendant’s claim, the record does not demonstrate that Juror 580 was
excusable for cause or that defendant was actually prejudiced by the juror’s presence on the jury.
Defendant correctly argues that jurors have a duty to reveal relevant information. People v
DeHaven, 321 Mich 327, 334; 32 NW2d 468 (1948). Nevertheless, there has been no showing
that Juror 580 knowingly concealed, misled or gave false information during voir dire. First, the
record does not support defendant’s claim that Juror 580 concealed his wife’s occupation or his
membership in the NRA. Rather, Juror 580 was not asked during voir dire whether his wife or
any member of his family worked for a court, nor was Juror 580 directly asked whether he was a
member of any gun-related organizations. Further, Juror 580 wrote on his jury questionnaire that
his wife was employed by the district court as a criminal division supervisor, and trial counsel
was able to review the questionnaire pursuant to MCR 2.510(C).
Moreover, there is no indication that the juror’s wife’s occupation or his NRA affiliation
affected his impartiality or disqualified him from exercising the powers of reason and judgment.
There is no indication that the juror’s wife had any personal knowledge of defendant or her
misdemeanor convictions, or that the juror and his wife discussed the case. Further, defendant’s
general claim that the juror’s affiliation with the NRA evidences bias because the organization
favors harsh punishment for individuals who “misuse[] gun ownership” is unpersuasive. It can
be presumed that all law-abiding citizens are in favor of punishment for the illegal use of guns,
regardless of their affiliation with the NRA. In addition, Juror 580 stated that he could be fair,
would maintain an open mind, and would take seriously the prosecutor’s burden of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt. In light of defendant’s failure to further question Juror 580, and the juror’s
indication that he could be fair, defendant did not meet her burden of showing that she was
prejudiced as a result of the juror’s alleged misconduct. See People v Johnson, 245 Mich App
243; 631 NW2d 1 (2001). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
defendant's motion for a new trial.
Within this issue, defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to review
the jury questionnaires. We decline to review this argument because it is not identified in
defendant’s statement of questions. MCR 7.212(C)(5); People v Brown, 239 Mich App 735,
748; 610 NW2d 234 (2000). We briefly note, however, that an attorney’s decisions relating to
the selection of jurors generally involve matters of trial strategy, which we normally decline to
evaluate with the benefit of hindsight. Johnson, supra at 259. Further, based on Juror 580’s
indication that he could be fair and impartial, and defendant’s failure to establish actual prejudice
or that the juror was excusable for cause, there is no reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
omission, the outcome of the case would have been different. People v Effinger, 212 Mich App
67, 69; 536 NW2d 809 (1995).
II
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in denying her request to instruct the jury
on the lesser included misdemeanor offense of careless, reckless, or negligent discharge of a
firearm causing death. See MCL 752.861 and CJI2d 11.20. We disagree.
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A trial court must instruct on a lesser included misdemeanor when, inter alia, the
instruction is supported by a rational view of the evidence adduced at trial. People v Stephens,
416 Mich 252, 262-263; 330 NW2d 675 (1982); People v Corbiere, 220 Mich App 260, 262263; 559 NW2d 666 (1996). This requires not only that there be some evidence that would
justify a conviction on the lesser offense, but that proof on the elements distinguishing the two
crimes must be sufficiently in dispute so that the jury may consistently find the defendant
innocent of the greater offense and guilty of the lesser offense. Stephens, supra at 262-263. The
failure to give an appropriate instruction is an abuse of discretion if a reasonable person would
find no justification or excuse for the ruling. People v Malach, 202 Mich App 266, 276; 507
NW2d 834 (1993).
A conviction for the offense of careless, reckless, or negligent discharge of a firearm
requires proof that the firearm was discharged as a result of the defendant’s carelessness,
recklessness, or negligence. MCL 752.861; CJI2d 11.20(6). Contrary to defendant's contention,
no evidence was presented to suggest that defendant’s discharge of the firearm was careless,
reckless or negligent. Defendant relies on her testimony that, after she fired the gun twice into
the air, the gun jammed and discharged again as she was re-hacking it. However, defendant
acknowledged during trial that she pulled the trigger in order to cause the gun to discharge.
Because defendant’s testimony established that the firing of the weapon was intentional, her
conduct did not fall within the scope of the conduct prohibited by the statute. People v
Cummings, 458 Mich 877; 585 NW2d 299 (1998). Moreover, in light of the other evidence
presented at trial, the instruction was not supported by a rational view of the evidence as defined
in Stephens, supra at 262-263. Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing to give the
requested instruction.1
III
Defendant’s final argument is that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction
of first-degree premeditated murder because there was no evidence of premeditation and
deliberation. We disagree.
1
We note that the trial court instructed the jury on the charged offense of first-degree
premeditated murder, and the lesser included offenses of second-degree murder, voluntary
manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter – firearm intentionally aimed. The court also
instructed on the defense of accident. The jury’s rejection of several lesser offenses in favor of
first-degree murder reflects an unwillingness to convict on a lesser included offense, such as
careless and reckless discharge of a weapon. See People v Raper, 222 Mich App 475, 483; 563
NW2d 709 (1997); People v Zak, 184 Mich App 1, 16; 457 NW2d 59 (1990). Thus, any error in
failing to give the instruction would have been harmless. Although not entirely clear in
defendant’s brief, it appears that he argues that the court should also have instructed the jury on
simple involuntary manslaughter, CJI2d 7.3 and 16.10. We reject the argument because the
evidence did not support such an instruction, and assuming error, it was harmless in light of the
jury’s decision to convict on first-degree murder and not on the other lesser offenses which the
jury was instructed on.
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When ascertaining whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support a
conviction, this Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and
determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515-516; 489 NW2d 748
(1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). This Court will not interfere with the trier of fact’s role
of determining the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Id. at 514-515.
In order to convict a defendant of first-degree premeditated murder, the prosecution must
prove that the defendant intentionally killed the victim and that the killing was premeditated and
deliberate. People v Anderson, 209 Mich App 527, 537; 531 NW2d 780 (1995). Premeditation
and deliberation require sufficient time to allow the defendant to take a second look. Id. The
elements of premeditation and deliberation may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding
the killing. People v Jolly, 442 Mich 458, 466; 502 NW2d 177 (1993). The following
nonexclusive list of factors may be considered to establish premeditation and deliberation: (1)
the previous relationship between the victim and the defendant, (2) the defendant's actions before
and after the crime, and (3) the circumstances surrounding the killing itself, including the
weapon used and the location of the wounds inflicted. People v Coddington, 188 Mich App 584,
600; 470 NW2d 478 (1991). Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom may
be sufficient to prove the elements of a crime. People v McKenzie, 206 Mich App 425, 428; 522
NW2d 661 (1994).
In this case, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, sufficient
evidence was presented from which a jury could infer premeditation and deliberation. All
conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the prosecution. People v Terry, 224 Mich
App 447, 452; 569 NW2d 641 (1997). Here, there was evidence that defendant and the decedent
were linked through defendant’s younger sister. Defendant’s sister and the decedent’s boyfriend,
Eugene, had relations, resulting in defendant’s sister becoming pregnant. Defendant and her
sister were angered by Eugene’s alleged disregard of the pregnancy and his relationship with the
decedent. On the day of the incident, defendant’s sister called Eugene several times, and he
failed to come to her house. Eventually, defendant, her sister, and their cousin, Marsha, went to
a bowling alley expecting to find Eugene and the decedent. Defendant took a gun and
ammunition, which she had obtained from her boyfriend’s house. Given defendant’s anger with
Eugene and the decedent and the fact that she went looking for them, defendant’s procurement of
a deadly weapon in advance of the murder is a fact from which premeditation and deliberation
may be inferred, although insufficient in and of itself. People v Waters, 118 Mich App 176, 186187; 324 NW2d 564 (1982); People v Livingston, 63 Mich App 129, 133; 234 NW2d 176
(1975).
Further, there was testimony that, upon entering the bowling alley, the women appeared
angry and started arguing with the decedent and other parties in Eugene’s group. A bowling
alley security guard, who knew defendant and her sister, described the two as looking “rough,
like they were ready to fight.” There was also testimony that defendant said, “I am going to kill
you,” “I am going to f*** you up,” and “It’s going down tonight.” Prior threats are indicia of
premeditation. See People v Lewis, 95 Mich App 513, 515; 291 NW2d 100 (1980).
After being asked to leave and being escorted out of the bowling alley, defendant and her
associates waited in the parking lot in a Ford Explorer. Approximately a half hour later, the
decedent came out of the bowling alley, and got into the front passenger seat of a Cavalier with
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three female friends. After the cars left the parking lot and were on a road, defendant, who was
seated in the backseat of the Explorer, fired two shots out of the window. Defendant testified
that, before using the gun, she put on a glove to avoid leaving any fingerprints on the weapon.
At one point, the Explorer, along with the Cavalier and Eugene’s car, stopped aligned at a traffic
light and several parties began arguing. A fistfight ensued between the decedent and Marsha on
the street. While the fight was going on between Marsha and the decedent, a witness saw
defendant loading the gun as she sat in the rear of the Explorer. There was testimony that, after
the fight between Marsha and the decedent ended and the decedent was walking towards the
Cavalier, defendant leaned out of the backseat of the Explorer, pointed the gun at the decedent,
and fired four to five shots, causing the decedent’s death. Defendant was twelve to fifteen feet
from the decedent. Defendant then fled the scene and, when apprehended, gave false statements
to the police. In sum, this evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, is
sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude that the elements of first-degree murder,
including premeditation and deliberation, were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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