RYAN RICHARD LACKIE V MATT FULKS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RYAN RICHARD LACKIE,
UNPUBLISHED
June 11, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 231479
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 99-922599-NO
v
MATT FULKS, and BRETT RICCINTO, and
SEAN FITZGERALD, Jointly and Severally,
Defendant-Appellees.
and
CITY OF DETROIT
Defendant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Jansen and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting all three defendants summary
disposition. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
I. Basic Facts and Procedural History
On October 7, 1998, plaintiff, Ryan Lackie, was at the 4-M Lounge in the city of Detroit.
Three off-duty police officers, defendants herein, were also present at the bar. In addition, David
Copland, a long time acquaintance of defendants Fulks and Fitzgerald was also at the 4-M
Lounge that evening and observed the incident giving rise to the instant litigation. Copland,
however, was not familiar with defendant Brett Riccinto, the third individual in Fulks and
Fitzgerald’s company.
Plaintiff does not recall any of the events which he claims culminated in his extensive
personal injuries. Consequently, what plaintiff knows about the events of that evening derive
from what other individuals told him occurred. That said, according to plaintiff’s version of the
incident, plaintiff was sitting at the bar having a drink with an acquaintance, “Fat Jerry”
(hereinafter referred to as Jerry). One of the three off-duty police officers “suddenly” and
without provocation, approached him, struck him in the jaw with such force that he toppled over
in his bar stool, hit the floor and was rendered unconscious. No one at the bar could positively
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identify Brett Riccinto as the individual in defendants Fulks’ and Fitzgerald’s company who
delivered the blow. Notwithstanding, in his answers to interrogatories, defendant Riccinto
placed himself at the bar on the night of the incident and further solidified Fulks’ and
Fitzgerald’s presence.
After plaintiff was knocked to the floor, the individual that struck plaintiff grabbed him
by the shirt collar and dragged him outside of the bar and into the parking lot. Copland got up to
see what was going on. He grabbed defendant Fulks by the arm and said, “no,” further advising
that dragging plaintiff out into the parking lot was not right, to which Fulks assured Copland,
“[d]on’t worry about it. Nothing’s going to happen.” Fulks further advised that they were not
going to harm plaintiff; they were merely escorting him out of the bar and that everything was
under control. Copland testified that when he attempted to follow plaintiff outside into the
parking lot, defendant Fitzgerald blocked the doorway and would not let him exit the building.
Accordingly, he remained inside while Fulks and the individual that struck plaintiff went outside
into the parking lot. Copland testified in his deposition that part of his reason for not going
outside or otherwise calling for assistance was that he knew that defendants Fulks and Fitzgerald
were both police officers. Copeland did not observe any injuries or blood on plaintiff.
Approximately ten or fifteen minutes later, the individual that struck plaintiff and Fulks
came back inside of the bar. Plaintiff did not follow. There are no witnesses who could
specifically testify as to what transpired outside in the parking lot. In his deposition, plaintiff
indicated that he has no recollection of any of the events that occurred that evening because he
was knocked out from behind. According to plaintiff, when he regained consciousness, he was
in Jerry’s vehicle and he had a bloody nose along with cuts and abrasions on his face. Plaintiff
testified that Jerry told him that the three off-duty police officers at the bar were the individuals
that “assaulted” plaintiff.
Eventually, plaintiff returned home and slept for thirty-six hours before a friend drove
him to the hospital to receive medical attention. The injuries that plaintiff claims that he
sustained from a beating in the parking lot of the 4-M Lounge included several fractures of the
various bones located in the face requiring surgery to correct, a closed head injury causing
“cognitive defects,” along with fractures in several of his teeth. Plaintiff claims that as a result of
the injuries sustained in the beating, he underwent reconstructive sinus surgery with cranial bone
graft, implantation of six skull plates and a second surgery for displacement of a surgical pin
from a previous hand fracture.
Plaintiff filed an assault and battery suit against all three defendants seeking damages for
his extensive injuries. Finding no genuine factual issues, the trial court granted summary
disposition as to all three defendants.
II. Standard of Review
This court reviews decisions on motions for summary disposition de novo. Maiden v
Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). A motion brought pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of plaintiff’s complaint. Int’l Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, Local 58 v McNulty, 214 Mich App 437, 443-444; 543 NW2d 25 (1995). Where
plaintiff’s claims are “so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development
could possibly justify recovery,” summary disposition in accord with (C)(8) is appropriate. Id.
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When a trial court rules on this motion, it may only consider the pleadings and may not consider
affidavits, depositions or any other documentary evidence. MCR 2.116(C)(G)(4).
Conversely, a motion brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency
of the underlying complaint. The inquiry relative to a (C)(10) motion is whether, looking at all
of the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are genuine factual issues
presented upon which reasonable minds may differ. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597
NW2d 817 (1999). Where the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine issue of any
material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
In this case, the trial court did not indicate upon which court rule it relied to grant
defendants’ motions. A review of the lower court record, however, reveals that the trial court
went beyond the pleadings when considering defendants’ respective motions for summary
disposition. Accordingly, the trial court granted all three defendants’ respective motions in
accord with MCR 2.116(C)(10) finding no genuine factual issues upon which reasonable minds
could differ thus entitling defendants’ to judgment as a matter of law.
III. Plaintiff’s Claims for Assault and Battery
Plaintiff filed suit against all three defendants alleging assault and battery. Although
related, these are separate and distinct causes of action. Under the circumstances of this case,
each must be addressed separately.
A. Assault
This Court has recently explained: “An assault is `any intentional unlawful offer of
corporal injury to another person by force, or force unlawfully directed toward the person of
another, under circumstances which create a well-founded apprehension of imminent contact,
coupled with the apparent present ability to accomplish the contact.” Smith v Stolberg, 231 Mich
App 256, 260; 586 NW2d 103 (1998) (citing Espinoza v Thomas, 189 Mich App 110, 119; 472
NW2d 16 (1991)).
Since the tort of assault compensates a plaintiff for the fear or apprehension generated by
an imminent battery, to recover for an assault, a plaintiff must experience the fear or
apprehension prior to experiencing the battery. In the Restatement of Torts, Prossor explained:
In the ordinary case, both assault and battery are present; it is an assault
when the defendant swings his fist to strike the plaintiff, and the plaintiff sees the
movement, a battery when the fist comes into contact with the plaintiff’s nose.
The two terms are so closely associated in common usage that they are generally
used together, or regarded as more or less synonymous. [I]t is not accurate to say
that “every battery includes an assault,” but in practice the difference between the
two is often entirely ignored.” (Footnote omitted.) 2 Restatement Torts, 2d § 21,
p. 41. (Emphasis added.)
In the case at bar, plaintiff repeatedly testified that his assailant struck him from behind
and that prior to being knocked unconscious, he did not see anyone approach him. Because
plaintiff was struck from behind, he did not see his assailant preparing to effectuate contact with
his person. Considering plaintiff’s own version of the events, plaintiff did not see the attack
coming and thus never experienced any apprehension immediately preceding the actual contact.
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Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim for assault fails as a matter of law and the trial court did
not err by granting all three defendants summary disposition as to the assault.
B. Battery
Conversely, a battery is “`the willful and harmful or offensive touching of another person
which results from an act intended to cause such contact.’” Smith, supra at 260 (citation
omitted.) In accord with this definition, the battery is complete once the perpetrator makes
contact with the person of the plaintiff. In the case at bar, plaintiff does not recall the contact
that rendered him unconscious inside of the bar.
David Copland, however, testified in his deposition that prior to the incident, he observed
plaintiff arguing with defendants Fulks and Fitzgerald and a third person with whom he was not
personally familiar but was sitting with the other two defendants. According to Copland, the
argument culminated with the third individual, with whom Copland was not familiar, punching
plaintiff in the jaw thereby knocking him completely out of his bar stool and then grabbing him
by the shirt collar and dragging him out of the bar.
In his answers to interrogatories, defendant Riccinto admits that he was at the bar on the
night of the incident. Defendant Riccinto also places defendants Fulks and Fitzgerald at the
scene. Aside from being present at the bar on the night that the incident occurred, defendant
Riccinto disavows any involvement in the incident resulting in plaintiff’s harm.
Although Copland could not identify defendant Riccinto by name, his testimony
unequivocally establishes that the individual in the company of Fulks and Fitzgerald was the
individual that struck plaintiff in the jaw which knocked him out of his bar stool and which
caused plaintiff to come into contact with the floor thereby rendering plaintiff unconscious and
who thereafter physically dragged plaintiff out of the establishment and into the parking lot.
Considering that Riccinto was present at the bar along with defendants Fulks and Fitzgerald and
Copland observed all three sitting together and arguing with plaintiff, reasonable minds could
find that defendant Riccinto was indeed the third unidentified individual with defendants Fulks
and Fitzgerald who approached plaintiff, knocked him out of his stool and dragged him outside
of the bar. Accordingly, we find that a genuine factual issue exists as to whether defendant
Riccinto is the individual that initially battered plaintiff sufficient to preclude judgment as a
matter of law on plaintiff’s claim for battery.
Furthermore, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we find genuine issues of
material fact are present as to whether defendants Riccinto and Falks battered plaintiff in the
parking lot. Copeland testified that both defendants were outside with plaintiff. He did not
observe any injuries or blood on plaintiff when he was dragged outside. When plaintiff awoke
he was bloodied and suffered injuries. This presents a sufficient question of fact to preclude
summary disposition. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s decision in that regard.
IV. Plaintiff’s Concert of Action Theory
Similarly, we find that genuine factual issues exist regarding whether Fulks and
Fitzgerald participated in the events that resulted in plaintiff’s injuries. Plaintiff argues that even
though all three defendants may not have physically touched plaintiff’s person, all three
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defendants are nevertheless responsible for the whole of plaintiff’s injuries because all three
defendants acted in concert and in accord with a common understanding or design to accomplish
the battery.
To proceed upon a concert of action theory, a plaintiff must establish that “all defendants
acted tortiously pursuant to a common design.” Abel v Eli Lilly & Co, 418 Mich 311, 338; 343
NW2d 164 (1984). If plaintiff satisfies these two elements, then a legal fiction is created
whereby all defendants are found to be the cause in fact of plaintiff’s injury although only one
may have actually struck plaintiff. Id. Stated another way, “[e]ven if a particular defendant
caused no harm himself, that defendant is liable for the harm caused by the others because all
acted jointly.” Holliday v McKeiver, 156 Mich App 214, 218; 401 NW2d 278 (1986). For a
plaintiff to establish concerted action, plaintiff need not establish that the defendants had an
express agreement; a tacit understanding or agreement will suffice. Cousineau v Ford Motor Co,
140 Mich App 19, 32; 363 NW2d 721 (1985).
In the instant case, plaintiff alleges that all three defendants acted in concert to
accomplish the battery inflicted upon him. Plaintiff argues that defendant Riccinto actually made
the contact thus completing the battery, defendant Fulks assisted Riccinto in dragging plaintiff
out of the bar and into the parking lot, while defendant Fitzgerald remained in the bar to stop
anyone from rendering assistance or otherwise witnessing what transpired outside.
Consequently, plaintiff argues these facts create a reasonable inference for a jury to find that all
three defendants acted together, pursuant to a common design, to complete the battery thus
rendering all three defendants the cause in fact of plaintiff’s extensive injuries. We agree.
In his deposition, Copland testified that after plaintiff was knocked out of his bar stool
and dragged outside, he attempted to tell Fulks that what they were doing was not right
whereupon Fulks advised, “don’t worry about it. Nothing’s going to happen.” Fulks counseled
further that “they” were not going to harm plaintiff; “they” were simply removing him from the
bar and that everything was under control. A reasonable fact finder could conclude that Fulks’
use of the word “they” suggests that all three defendants were acting together according to some
unspoken plan to accomplish some end known to all three.
Additional evidence of a common scheme or plan is Fulks’ statement upon returning
from the parking lot, that “it” was “taken care of” and that plaintiff was “all right.” This
testimony implies that Riccinto, Fulks, and Fitzgerald all knew what “it” was. That is, they all
knew what they wanted to accomplish and they all assumed their appropriate role toward
accomplishing the ultimate end which a reasonable fact finder could conclude was to remove
plaintiff from the bar, drag him into the parking lot and physically accost him. Based on
Copland’s testimony, there are genuine factual issues regarding whether all three defendant’s
working “in concert,” inflicted plaintiff’s extensive injuries thereby rendering all three
defendants jointly responsible for plaintiff’s damages and thereby precluding judgment as a
matter of law.
On appeal, defendant Fulks argues that joint and several liability predicated upon a
concert of action theory is no longer viable in light of the statutory changes brought about by the
1995 tort reform legislation. We do not agree.
As this Court recently noted:
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[a]s part of its tort reform, the Michigan Legislature abolished and replaced joint
and several liability with `fair share liability.’ The significance of the change is
that each tortfeasor will pay only that portion of the total damage award that
reflects the tortfeasor’s percentage of fault. . . . not the entire damage award as
would have been the case under the former joint and several liability (Emphasis
added.) Smiley v Corrigan, 248 Mich App 51, 55; 638 NW2d 151 (2001).
In accord with the reform, a plaintiff’s recovery against multiple defendants is limited to
the percentage of fault that the finder of fact ascribes to each participating defendant. See Kokx v
Bylenga, 241 Mich App 655, 663; 617 NW2d 368 (2000). Stated otherwise, several liability
precludes a plaintiff from seeking compensation for the entire amount of damages from only one
tortfeasor. Pursuant to several liability, each individual tortfeasor is only accountable for the
amount of damages directly proportionate to his or her assessed percentage of fault Smiley, supra
at 53 and the right of contribution only exists in favor of the tortfeasor that paid more than his or
her pro rata share of the common liability. Kokx, supra at 662; see also MCL 600.2925a(2).
Simply put, multiple tortfeasors, acting in concert and pursuant to a common design that
cause a single harm, can be jointly liable for the damages caused but will only have to pay that
part of the total damages award directly attributable to that specific tortfeasors’ assessed
percentage of fault. Indeed, all joint tortfeasors are jointly liable for the injury, but a plaintiff
cannot collect the entire amount of the damages awarded from only one of the tortfeasors thus
mandating that plaintiff collect, from each of the tortfeasors individually, in accord with their
ascribed percentages of fault. Hence, the term “fair share liability.” Smiley, supra at 55.
Accordingly, defendant Fulks’ position that the 1995 tort reform legislation abrogated plaintiff
concert of action theory is without merit.
V. Propriety of Granting Plaintiff Cross-Summary Disposition.
As a final matter, plaintiff contends that he is entitled to cross-summary disposition in
accord with the provisions contained in MCR 2.116(I)(2). We do not agree.
Plaintiff failed to raise this issue in the trial court. Indeed, issues raised for the first time
on appeal are not properly preserved and, thus, "[n]ot subject to review" save for "exceptional
circumstances." Upon review of the record in the in case at bar, we do not discern the requisite
"extraordinary circumstances" to abandon this cardinal rule. See Booth Newspapers, Inc. v.
Univ. of Michigan Bd. of Regents, 444 Mich 211, 234, n 23; 507 N.W.2d 422 (1993) (stating that
the Court "has repeatedly declined to consider arguments not presented at a lower level,
including those relating to constitutional claims.") Accordingly, we decline to address this issue.
However, because we find that genuine factual issues remain as to all defendants
premised upon a concert of action theory, we find that the trial court improvidently granted
defendants summary disposition. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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Affirmed in part, reversed, in part and remanded for further proceedings. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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