LYNN DIEBOLT V MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LYNN DIEBOLT,
UNPUBLISHED
June 4, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY and JANVER
KREHBEIL,
No. 227903
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 98-088923-NZ
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Owens and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the circuit court’s order granting summary disposition to
defendants on plaintiff’s Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA) claim, MCL
37.1101 et seq. The trial court also held that there was no genuine issue regarding whether
plaintiff—a student in defendant Michigan State University’s doctorate of veterinary medicine
program—had claims for tortious interference with a contract/expectation and gross negligence
against defendant Krehbeil. We affirm.
I
Plaintiff was granted admission into defendant Michigan State University’s college of
veterinary medicine (CVM) program in 1995. However, prior to beginning this professional
program, plaintiff suffered severe injuries after being struck by a drunk driver. As a result of her
injuries, plaintiff claimed that she was neurologically disabled. Defendants granted plaintiff an
admission deferral for one year, but refused to grant her a second deferment. After completing
three semesters, plaintiff was dismissed from the program in 1997.
We review decisions on motions for summary disposition de novo. Spiek v Dep’t of
Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). A motion pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support of a plaintiff’s claim and is only appropriate if no genuine
issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.1
1
We note that defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and
(continued…)
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Auto-Owners Ins Co v Allied Adjusters & Appraisers, Inc, 238 Mich App 394, 397; 605 NW2d
685 (1999). “In reviewing a motion for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10),
we consider the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, or any other documentary
evidence submitted in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party to decide whether a genuine
issue of material fact exists.” Singer v American States Ins, 245 Mich App 370, 374; 631 NW2d
34 (2001). After the moving party identifies matters that have no disputed factual issues, it is
incumbent upon the non-moving party to present admissible documentary evidence that a
material fact exists. Karbel v Comerica Bank, 247 Mich App 90, 97; 635 NW2d 69 (2001).
II
A. Claim Against Individual Defendant
As a threshold matter, defendants contend that plaintiff’s PWDCRA claim against
defendant Janver Krehbeil, the associate dean of the CVM, as an individual, is improper because
these claims lie only against educational institutions. We disagree.
The PWDCRA generally provides:
(1) The opportunity to obtain employment, housing, . . . full and equal
utilization of public accommodations, public services, and educational facilities
without discrimination because of a disability is guaranteed by this act and is a
civil right.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in article 2, a person shall accommodate
a person with a disability for purposes of employment, public accommodation,
public service, education, or housing unless the person demonstrates that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship. [MCL 37.1102.]
Accordingly, “persons” must accommodate the disabled for purposes of education. MCL
37.1102(2). In the general definition portion of the statute, a “person” is defined as "an
individual, agent, . . . or any other . . . governmental entity or agency.” MCL 37.1103(g).
Moreover, while educational institutions are prohibited from discriminating against students,
article 4 defines “educational institutions” to include an institution’s agent. MCL 37.1401; MCL
37.1402. As an agent of the CVM, defendant Krehbeil is subject to the requirements of the
PWDCRA.
(…continued)
(10). The trial court did not specify which subsection of MCR 2.116 it relied upon to grant
defendants’ motion. However, it appears from the record that the trial court’s ruling was based
on MCR 2.116(C)(10).
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B. Claim Against Michigan State University
A prima facie case of discrimination under the PWDCRA requires proof that plaintiff
was disabled within the meaning of the statute, that her disability was unrelated to her ability to
benefit from the educational opportunities and programs offered by CVM, and that she was
discriminated against in one of the ways described by the statute. Kerns v Dura Mechanical
Components, Inc (On Remand), 242 Mich App 1, 12; 618 NW2d 56 (2000); see also MCL
37.1103(d)(i)(C).
Here, the first element of the PWDCRA is satisfied because the parties agree that plaintiff
is disabled. However, plaintiff’s claim fails because she is unable to establish the second
element; specifically, that her disability is “unrelated to the [her] ability to utilize and benefit
from educational opportunities, programs, and facilities at an educational institution.” MCL
37.1103(d)(i)(C), (l)(iii); see also Kerns, supra at 12. A review of the record reveals that
plaintiff has not provided any evidence that she is otherwise qualified for the CVM program.
The majority of plaintiff’s grades were at the minimum passing or failing levels. Plaintiff has
failed to explain how the accommodations she requested would insure her success in future
classes. Rather, CVM’s student performance committee (SPC) seems correct in its conclusion
that plaintiff’s “difficulty with multisensory inputs would make it difficult for her to deal with
future laboratory and clinical situations.” This Court defers to the academic policies and
judgments of colleges and universities. See Crancer v Bd of Regents of University of Michigan,
156 Mich App 790, 796-797; 402 NW2d 90 (1986); see also Kaltenberger v Ohio College of
Podiatric Medicine, 162 F3d 432, 436 (CA 6, 1998), citing Board of Regents of University of
Michigan v Ewing, 474 US 214, 225; 106 S Ct 507; 88 L Ed 2d 523 (1985).
Even if plaintiff were otherwise qualified, there is still no evidence that she was
“discriminated against in one of the ways described in the statute.” Kerns, supra at 12. Plaintiff
advances two main instances of discrimination: (1) defendants’ failure to give her the
opportunity to recycle; and (2) their failure to allow her the specific accommodations she
requested. See MCL 37.1102, 37.1402(a)-(b), (e). Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, a review of
the record reveals that the SPC did not make the mandatory recommendation that plaintiff be
allowed to recycle.2 Moreover, plaintiff indicated to defendants that recycling would impose a
financial hardship. Thus, recycling was not a protected benefit, service, or opportunity under the
PWDCRA. See MCL 37.1402(a)-(b), (e); Crancer, supra at 796-798.
With regard to the accommodation claim, MCL 37.1102, plaintiff provided no evidence
that defendants unreasonably denied her accommodation requests. See Rourk v Oakwood Hosp
Corp, 458 Mich 25, 36; 580 NW2d 397 (1998). Indeed, plaintiff did not adequately explain how
the accommodations would assist her in raising her grade point average or whether defendants
even possessed these aids. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314
(1996) (party may not rely on allegations in pleadings to create an issue of fact). Moreover,
defendants offered plaintiff legitimate explanations for denying the accommodations and
reasonable alternatives. Crancer, supra at 796-798; Kaltenberger, supra at 436. “And, although
a hunch or intuition may, in reality, be correct, the law requires more if a plaintiff is to avoid
2
According to the record, recycling refers to the opportunity to repeat a class.
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summary disposition.” Fonseca v Michigan State University, 214 Mich App 28, 31; 542 NW2d
273 (1995).
Plaintiff argues that defendant Krehbeil tortiously interfered with the contract between
defendant Michigan State University and plaintiff. We disagree.
Plaintiff must prove that defendant is a third-party stranger to her contract in order to
succeed in a tortious interference claim. Dzierwa v Michigan Oil Co, 152 Mich App 281, 287;
393 NW2d 610 (1986). Defendant Krehbeil is not a third-party stranger to plaintiff’s contract
with defendant Michigan State University (MSU) and the CVM; rather, defendant Krehbeil is
MSU’s agent. Defendant Krehbeil was the associate dean at the CVM and was acting in this
capacity when making decisions that affected plaintiff’s participation in that program.
“[C]orporate agents are not liable for tortious interference with the corporation’s contracts unless
they acted solely for their own benefit with no benefit to the corporation.” Reed v Michigan
Metro Girl Scout Council, 201 Mich App 10, 13; 506 NW2d 231 (1993). Plaintiff has offered no
supportable evidence that Krehbeil interfered with plaintiff’s contract with defendant MSU for
his sole benefit.
Plaintiff further says that defendant Krehbeil was grossly negligent by failing to inform
plaintiff about recycling, not monitoring her progress, and refusing to accommodate her needs
pursuant to the PWDCRA. We disagree.
Plaintiff’s articulated theory sounds in educational malpractice, which is not a recognized
claim in Michigan. Page v Klein Tools, Inc, 461 Mich 703, 713; 610 NW2d 900 (2000).
Further, as we said above, defendant Krehbeil did not unlawfully fail to inform plaintiff of the
SPC’s recommendation and her opportunity to “recycle.” Moreover, it appears that defendant
Krehbeil attempted to monitor plaintiff’s academic progress as the SPC recommended. There is
no evidence that he unreasonably failed to accommodate plaintiff under the PWDCRA. Thus, no
duty was breached that was “so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for
whether an injury results.” MCL 691.1407(2)(c).
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
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