PEOPLE OF MI V MARVIN A COUCH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 28, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 224827
Wayne Circuit Court
Criminal Division
LC No. 99-003525
MARVIN A. COUCH,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Neff and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317,
assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of twenty
to thirty years for the second-degree murder conviction and ten to twenty years for the assault
conviction, to be served consecutive to a two-year term for the felony firearm conviction. He
appeals as of right. We affirm.
I. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defendant first claims that he was denied a fair trial because of improper comments made
by the prosecutor during closing and rebuttal arguments. Generally, we review allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct de novo by examining the prosecutor’s remarks in context to determine
whether the defendant received a fair and impartial trial. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 266267; 531 NW2d 659 (1995); People v Pfaffle, 246 Mich App 282, 288; 632 NW2d 162 (2001);
People v Paquette, 214 Mich App 336, 342; 543 NW2d 342 (1995). However, we review
unpreserved claims of misconduct for plain error. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597
NW2d 130 (1999); People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 720; 613 NW2d 370 (2000). No
reversible error will be found where the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s comments could
have been cured by a timely requested instruction. Id. at 721.
The prosecutor’s remarks about Officer Simon’s testimony were supported by the
evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Bahoda, supra. The prosecutor’s
statement about a line-up, while perhaps disingenuous, was responsive to defendant’s claim that
another person was the real shooter. Viewed in context, the statement did not deny defendant a
fair trial. Although some of the prosecutor’s other remarks were hard and emotional, viewed as a
whole and in context with the defense theories and arguments, the remarks were not improper.
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Bahoda, supra; People v Kennebrew, 220 Mich App 601, 608; 560 NW2d 354 (1996); People v
Ullah, 216 Mich App 669, 678; 550 NW2d 568 (1996). Further, any prejudice potentially
caused by the prosecutor’s comments regarding defendant’s alternative theories could have been
cured by a timely objection and curative instruction. Because defendant did not place such an
objection or request such an instruction, the prosecutor’s remarks do not merit reversal. Schutte,
supra at 721. In addition, any prejudice that did arise was sufficiently cured by the court’s
instruction that the statements of the attorneys are not evidence.
II. Prior Consistent Statements
Defendant next argues that the trial court erroneously permitted the prosecutor to elicit
testimony of a prior consistent statement made by Jimmy Morgan to Shenita Pippins, wherein
Morgan identified defendant as the shooter.1
On direct examination, Morgan testified that defendant fired the shots from the back seat
of the vehicle that Morgan was driving. Morgan testified that, immediately after the shooting, he
drove to Pippins’ home. When he arrived, he telephoned his mother and told her that defendant
had committed a shooting. Morgan also testified that, after placing that telephone call, he told
Pippins that defendant was the shooter. According to Morgan, he left Pippins’ house and went to
his girlfriend’s house. While there, his mother telephoned him and told him that the police were
at her house, and that they wanted to talk to him. Morgan testified that he went home to his
mother’s house, where he told the police officers that defendant was the shooter.2 The police
took Morgan down to the police station, where he subsequently gave a written statement in
which he identified defendant as the shooter.
Darryl Webster, a.k.a. “Baby Dell,” testified that he was riding in the back seat of the
vehicle, behind Morgan. He testified that he heard the gunshots from somewhere right behind
him, but denied that he saw anyone in the vehicle brandish a handgun. Baby Dell testified that,
immediately after the shooting, he asked Morgan to drive the vehicle over to the home of Baby
Dell’s stepmother, Shenita Pippins. He admitted telling Pippins that he was riding in the car
when some gunshots went off. Further, he testified that Morgan, Etter, and defendant were all
with him when they told Pippins that a shooting had occurred. However, he explicitly denied
telling Pippins that defendant was the shooter. He also denied knowing what happened to the car
after they arrived at Pippins’ house, and denied parking the car in Pippins’ garage.
Shenita Pippins testified that Morgan, Etter, Baby Dell, and defendant all arrived at her
home together. When the prosecutor asked Pippins whether the boys gave her any information
when they arrived at her house, Pippins responded that they wanted to park the car in her garage.
Defense counsel objected to that testimony on hearsay grounds. The prosecutor argued that the
1
Pippins testified that both Morgan and Darryl Webster, a.k.a. “Baby Dell,” told her that
defendant was the shooter. On appeal, defendant does not challenge Pippins’ testimony
regarding Baby Dell’s statement. Defendant challenges only Pippins’ testimony regarding
Morgan’s statement.
2
Detroit police officer Phillip Cook also testified that he talked to both Morgan and Etter on the
night of the shooting, and that both boys identified defendant as the shooter.
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testimony was properly admissible because it went to impeach Baby Dell’s testimony that he did
not know what happened to the car and he did not personally park the car in the garage. Defense
counsel maintained his objection, arguing that the question should be asked regarding a specific
person, if it was intended to elicit impeachment. The prosecutor thereafter elicited from Pippins
that all of the boys wanted to park the car in her garage, and that Baby Dell had been the one to
actually park it there.
Pippins also testified that she spoke to both Morgan and Baby Dell after they arrived at
her house, and they both gave her a specific name regarding who committed the shooting. When
the prosecutor asked Pippins what name Baby Dell had given her, defense counsel lodged a
hearsay objection. The prosecutor responded that the testimony was properly admissible because
it directly impeached Baby Dell’s testimony that he did not tell Pippins who had committed the
shooting. The court overruled defense counsel’s hearsay objection and Pippins testified that
Baby Dell told her that defendant committed the shooting.
The prosecutor later recalled Pippins to the stand, in order to ask her whom Morgan had
identified as the shooter. At that point, the trial court summarized the earlier testimony and
objections thereto. The court stated that defense counsel had not objected to Pippins’ testimony
regarding what Morgan had told her about the shooter. Rather, the court recalled defense
counsel objecting to Pippins’ testimony regarding what the boys had said about hiding the car in
her garage. The court then stated that it would allow the prosecutor to recall Pippins for the
purpose of testifying whom Morgan had identified as the shooter. Defense counsel did not
object, stating only that his recollection was the same as that of the trial court. Thereafter,
Pippins testified that when Morgan arrived at her home, he told her that defendant had been the
shooter.
On appeal, defendant argues that Pippins’ testimony regarding Morgan’s identification of
the shooter was improperly admitted under MRE 801(d)(1)(B). Because defendant did not
timely object to the admission of this testimony on this ground, we review the issue only for
plain error. Carines, supra at 763. The admission of evidence is within the trial court’s
discretion. People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 494; 577 NW2d 673 (1998). The admission of a prior
consistent statement through a third party is appropriate if the requirements of MRE
801(d)(1)(B) are satisfied. People v Jones, 240 Mich App 704, 706; 613 NW2d 411 (2000).
MRE 801(d)(1)(B) provides that a statement is not hearsay if:
[t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement, and the statement is . . . consistent with the declarant’s
testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the
declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive[.]
In Jones, supra at 707, this Court identified the elements that must be established by a
party offering a prior consistent statement:
(1) the declarant must testify at trial and be subject to cross-examination;
(2) there must be an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive of the declarant’s testimony; (3) the proponent must offer a
prior consistent statement that is consistent with the declarant’s challenged in-3-
court testimony; and, (4) the prior consistent statement must be made prior to the
time that the supposed motive to falsify arose. [Citation omitted.]
Thus, “a consistent statement made after the motive to fabricate arose does not fall within the
parameters of the hearsay exclusion for prior consistent statements.” People v McCray, 245
Mich App 631, 642; 630 NW2d 633 (2001), quoting People v Rodriquez (On Remand), 216
Mich App 329, 332; 549 NW2d 359 (1996).
On appeal, defendant argues that Pippins’ testimony regarding Morgan’s identification of
the shooter was impermissible under MRE 801(d)(1)(B) because Morgan’s statement was made
after the motive to fabricate arose. Defendant contends that Morgan, Etter and Baby Dell
conspired to lie about the shooter’s identity in an attempt to protect Joseph Winston, whom
defendant claimed was the real shooter. However, defense counsel’s questioning of the
witnesses at trial did not suggest that Morgan’s alleged motive to fabricate arose until after
Morgan and Winston were arrested by police. Under these circumstances, plain error did not
occur when the trial court allowed Pippins to testify that Morgan identified defendant as the
shooter shortly after the event and before he was arrested.
III. Jury Instructions
Next, defendant argues that the court gave an improper jury instruction on reasonable
doubt. Because defendant did not object to the instruction given, this issue is not preserved.
Therefore, appellate relief is precluded absent a plain error affecting defendant’s substantial
rights. Carines, supra. The record indicates that the court instructed the jury in accordance with
CJI2d 3.2(3). The court’s instruction did not constitute plain error. People v Snider, 239 Mich
App 393, 420-421; 608 NW2d 502 (2000). Further, defense counsel was not ineffective for
failing to object to the court’s instruction. Id. at 424-425.
IV. Right to a Fair Trial
Next, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial because a number of jurors had
connections to law enforcement. The record shows that three of the deliberating jurors had some
connection to law enforcement officers. One worked with a woman who was married to a police
officer, one was a retired police officer, and the third had a brother who was a county sheriff.
Because defense counsel did not challenge any of the jurors in question, this issue is not
preserved. People v Ho, 231 Mich App 178, 183; 585 NW2d 357 (1998). Therefore, we limit
our review to plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Carines, supra.
A mere relationship with a law enforcement officer is not grounds for dismissal for cause.
MCR 2.511(D); MCR 6.412(D)(1). Apart from his mere contention that the jurors could not be
fair and impartial, defendant has not identified any evidence suggesting that the jurors in fact
were biased or could not be fair and impartial. On the contrary, each of the jurors stated that
they could remain fair and impartial and could base their verdict on the evidence presented at
trial. Therefore, plain error has not been shown.
Defendant also argues that the trial court’s failure to question the jurors concerning their
pre-trial knowledge about the case requires reversal. Again, we find no merit to this unpreserved
claim. People v Hack, 219 Mich App 299, 311; 556 NW2d 187 (1996). Defendant has made no
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showing that the case was subject to a level of pretrial publicity requiring voir dire on this issue.
Id. Thus, plain error has not been shown.
Defendant also argues that he was denied a fair trial because the victim’s mother worked
in the courthouse where his trial was held. Again, defendant has supplied no legal or factual
support for this unpreserved claim. Because there is no indication in the record that any of the
jurors knew the victim’s mother or knew where she worked, defendant has failed to show that
plain error occurred. A party may not merely state a position and then leave it to this Court to
discover and rationalize the basis for the claim. People v Griffin, 235 Mich App 27, 45; 597
NW2d 176 (1999). Additionally, nothing in the trial court’s statement at sentencing describing
defendant as a dangerous person indicates that the court was improperly influenced by the fact
that the victim’s mother worked at the courthouse. Accordingly, we find no merit to this issue.
V. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant also argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.
disagree.
We
For a defendant to establish a claim that he was denied his state or federal
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel, he must show that his
attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
that this was so prejudicial to him that he was denied a fair trial. As for deficient
performance, a defendant must overcome the strong presumption that his
counsel’s action constituted sound trial strategy under the circumstances. As for
prejudice, a defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different . . . .” [People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302-303; 613 NW2d 694 (2000)
(citations omitted).]
Upon review of the record, defendant has not demonstrated that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel.
Finally, in light of our disposition of the foregoing issues, we reject defendant’s claim
that the cumulative effect of several errors deprived him of a fair trial. People v Daoust, 228
Mich App 1, 16; 577 NW2d 179 (1998).
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Helene N. White
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