PEOPLE OF MI V JASON ANTHONY WILLIAMS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 21, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 231240
Wayne Circuit Court
Criminal Division
LC No. 00-002777
JASON ANTHONY WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Neff and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a bench trial, of first-degree premeditated murder,
MCL 750.316, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b.
He was sentenced to the mandatory statutory terms of life imprisonment without parole for the
first-degree murder conviction, and a consecutive two-year term for the felony-firearm
conviction. He appeals as of right, and we affirm.
Defendant admitted shooting the victim after a fight broke during a dice game. The
prosecution's witnesses testified that the victim was involved in a fight with defendant's cousin,
but was unarmed at the time he was shot several times by defendant. Defendant and his cousin
both claimed that the victim was armed with a gun and that defendant shot the victim to protect
his cousin.
I
Defendant first argues that he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial. A defendant has
the constitutional right to a speedy trial. US Const, Ams VI and XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 20.
People v Mackle, 241 Mich App 583, 602; 617 NW2d 339 (2000). See also MCL 768.1 and
MCR 6.004(A). In deciding if a defendant has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy
trial, this Court considers "(1) the length of delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's
assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and (4) any prejudice to the defendant." People v Gilmore,
222 Mich App 442, 459; 564 NW2d 158 (1997).
Applying the above factors, we find no violation of defendant’s right to a speedy trial.
The record indicates that defendant was arrested in Georgia and extradited to Michigan, arriving
in this state on February 9, 2000. He was arraigned on the warrant on February 11, 2000, and his
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preliminary examination was held on February 24, 2000. On March 10, 2000, he was arraigned
in circuit court. On April 27, 2000, the trial court set a trial date of September 18, 2000, and
defendant’s trial actually commenced on that date.
Although the reasons for delay are not apparent from the record, the total length of the
delay, less than eight months after defendant’s arrival in Michigan, was not substantial.
Moreover, even if some of the delay is attributable to docket congestion, this would be
considered a neutral factor, which is given only minimal weight. People v Wickham, 200 Mich
App 106, 111; 503 NW2d 701 (1993). Defendant did not assert his right to a speedy trial in the
trial court, a factor we consider significant given that defendant was aware as early as April 2000
that his trial was scheduled for September 18, 2000. Thus, this factor weighs against finding that
defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial. Id. at 112.
As for prejudice, because the delay was less than eighteen months, the burden is on
defendant to show prejudice as a result of the delay. People v Daniel, 207 Mich App 47, 51; 523
NW2d 830 (1994). There are two types of prejudice involved in a speedy trial claim, prejudice
to the person and prejudice in the defense. Id. Because the delay in this case was not
substantial, we are not persuaded that defendant has shown prejudice to his person. See People v
Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 112-113; 605 NW2d 28 (1999). Further, defendant’s generalized
allegations of prejudice to his defense are insufficient to establish that he was denied his right to
a speedy trial. Gilmore, supra at 462.
In light of the foregoing, defendant has not demonstrated that he was denied his right to a
speedy trial.
Defendant also argues that his attorney was ineffective for not raising this issue in the
trial court and that this Court should remand this case to allow defendant to properly raise this
issue. Because we find no basis in the record for concluding that defendant’s right to a speedy
trial was violated, we reject both of these claims. See People v Simmons, 140 Mich App 681,
685-686; 364 NW2d 783 (1985).
II
Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of first-degree
murder and felony-firearm. We disagree.
Our review is de novo to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to justify a
rational trier of fact in finding defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440
Mich 508, 513; 489 NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
To convict a defendant of first-degree murder, the prosecution must prove that the
defendant intentionally killed the victim and that the killing was premeditated and deliberated.
Premeditation and deliberation require sufficient time to allow the defendant to take a second
look. People v Anderson, 209 Mich App 527, 537; 531 NW2d 780 (1995). The elements of
felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the
attempt to commit, a felony. People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999).
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Defendant does not dispute that the evidence showed that he intentionally killed the
victim. Instead, he challenges only the evidence of premeditation and deliberation. The evidence
indicated that defendant left the fighting and walked to his car to retrieve his gun, whereupon he
returned to the scene of the fighting and shot the victim several times. Defendant then began to
walk away, took time to unjam his gun, and then fired a second set of shots at the victim.
Viewed most favorably to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to enable the trial court, as
the trier of fact, to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant shot the victim with
premeditation and deliberation. Additionally, because the evidence showed that defendant used a
firearm to commit the killing, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for
felony-firearm.
To the extent defendant argues that the trial court's findings were inadequate, we disagree.
Under MCR 6.403, a trial court sitting without a jury is required to state its findings and
conclusions either on the record or in a written opinion. The court's findings are sufficient so
long as it appears that the court was aware of the issues in the case and correctly applied the law.
People v Legg, 197 Mich App 131, 134; 494 NW2d 797 (1992).
Here, the trial court was not required to make specific findings on each element of the
charged offense. Id. It is apparent from reviewing the trial court's findings that the court was
well aware of the elements for the offenses charged and the defense theories presented. The case
turned on the conflicting versions of the events presented by the defense and prosecution
witnesses, and the trial court expressly indicated that it did not find any of the defense witnesses
to be credible. The court also expressly found that defendant shot the victim “in cold blood.”
Defendant has not shown that the trial court's findings were inadequate.
III
Defendant further argues that the great weight of the evidence established that he was
guilty, at most, of voluntary manslaughter.
Relief may be granted on the basis that the verdict was against the great weight of the
evidence only where the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict so that a miscarriage
of justice would result if the verdict was allowed to stand. People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625,
642; 576 NW2d 129 (1998).
"The elements of voluntary manslaughter are (1) the defendant must kill in the heat of
passion, (2) the passion must be caused by an adequate provocation, and (3) there cannot be a
lapse of time during which a reasonable person could control his passions." People v Sullivan,
231 Mich App 510, 518; 586 NW2d 578 (1998), aff'd 461 Mich 992 (2000). The offense of
manslaughter is distinguished from murder by the element of provocation. Id. The decision on
what constitutes reasonable provocation is a question for the trier of the facts. Id.
The evidence of provocation in this case was not so extreme or severe to compel the
conclusion that a reasonable person would have been provoked to commit the offense in this
case. Sullivan, supra at 519. Defendant was not directly involved in the fight at the time of the
shooting, and the trial court rejected the defense claim that the victim was armed with a gun. The
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trial court’s verdict finding defendant guilty of first-degree murder rather than manslaughter is
not contrary to the great weight of the evidence.
IV
Defendant further argue that the trial court did not adequately resolve on the record the
defense theory that defendant acted either in self-defense or in defense of his cousin. We
disagree. The defense theories were directly dependent on the credibility of the defense
witnesses. The trial court expressly stated that it did not find either defense witness credible.
The trial court’s statements on the record are sufficient to show that the court was aware of the
defense theories presented and how it resolved those issues. Legg, supra.
V
In his final issue, defendant argues that his trial attorney was ineffective for (1) raising
inconsistent defenses and (2) not properly investigating the criminal backgrounds of the
prosecution's witnesses and the victim.
In order for this Court to reverse due to ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must
show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that the
representation so prejudiced him that he was denied his right to a fair trial. People v Pickens,
446 Mich 298, 338; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). Defendant must overcome the presumption that the
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. People v Tommolino, 187 Mich App
14, 17; 466 NW2d 315 (1991). To establish prejudice, defendant must show that there was a
reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's error, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. People v Johnnie Johnson, Jr, 451 Mich 115, 124; 545 NW2d 637 (1996). The
burden is on defendant to produce factual support for his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999).
First, defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for raising inconsistent defenses
of self-defense and defense of others. Defendant testified that he shot the victim because the
victim fired first and defendant was trying to stop the victim from hurting his cousin. While
there was evidence that defendant was trying to protect his cousin from the victim, there was also
evidence that the victim both assaulted and threatened defendant shortly before the shooting. In
his closing arguments, defense counsel argued that, apart from the case involving the defense of
others, it could also involve imperfect self-defense in light of the victim’s conduct towards
defendant, thereby reducing the crime to manslaughter. We are satisfied that defense counsel
appropriately argued plausible theories that were consistent with the testimony and evidence
presented at trial. Defendant has not shown that defense counsel was ineffective, or that if he
was, it affected the court’s decision.
Defendant also argues that defense counsel was ineffective for not investigating the
criminal records of the prosecution's witnesses or the victim. First, it is not apparent from the
record what efforts, if any, were made to investigate the criminal backgrounds of the
prosecution’s witnesses or the victim. Thus, we cannot conclude that defense counsel was
deficient in this regard. People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 77; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). Further,
defendant has not established that any of the witnesses had prior convictions that would have
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been admissible for purposes of impeaching their credibility. MRE 609. In his offer of proof,
defendant has shown that one witness had a prior conviction for possession of less than twentyfive grams of cocaine, which would not have been admissible for impeachment purposes,
because it does not contain an element of dishonesty, false statement, or theft, and another
witness had a misdemeanor conviction for larceny, which although involving theft, was not
punishable for more than one year. MRE 609(a); People v Parcha, 227 Mich App 236, 241; 575
NW2d 316 (1997). Because defendant does not allege that any of the other witnesses had a prior
conviction that could have been admitted under MRE 609, he has failed to demonstrate either
that defense counsel was deficient, or resulting prejudice.
Defendant further requests that the case be remanded for an evidentiary hearing on his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
This Court previously denied defendant’s motion to remand. Because defendant has not
identified any facts justifying a remand, we decline to do so. Simmons, supra.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Helene N. White
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