THOMAS D NASH V USS GREAT LAKES FLEET INC
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
THOMAS D. NASH,
UNPUBLISHED
May 14, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v
No. 228948
Presque Isle Circuit Court
LC No. 98-002281-NO
USS GREAT LAKES FLEET, INC,
Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Owens and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the circuit court’s order granting defendant’s motion for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). Defendant cross-appeals, challenging the
circuit court’s earlier ruling denying a separate motion for summary disposition pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(7). We affirm.
Plaintiff sought to recover for injuries he sustained while employed as a seaman aboard
defendant’s ship. Plaintiff asserted two theories of recovery: 1) defendant’s negligence under the
Jones Act, 46 USC 688, which is the merchant seaman’s version of the Federal Employers’
Liability Act (FELA), 45 USC 51 et seq, and 2) defendant’s failure to provide a safe workplace
under the common-law maritime doctrine of “unseaworthiness.”
Defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), contending
plaintiff had not filed the action within the three-year statute of limitation. 46 USC 763a.
Plaintiff did not dispute that it filed this action more than three years after his injury aboard
defendant’s ship. However, the circuit court denied defendant’s motion, finding that plaintiff’s
previous filing of these claims in a Pennsylvania state court equitably tolled the limitations
period.
Defendant challenges this decision on cross-appeal. Because our resolution of this issue
could render plaintiff’s appeal moot, we will consider it first. Generally, a trial court’s denial of
a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456
Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).
Equitable tolling of a federal statute of limitations is appropriate where the congressional
purpose in enacting a statute and the corresponding limitations period is effectuated by tolling
-1-
that period in given circumstances. Burnett v New York Central Railroad Co, 380 US 424, 427;
85 S Ct 1050; 13 L Ed 2d 941 (1965). In a Jones Act action, the congressional purpose is served,
and tolling appropriately applied, when (1) a plaintiff begins an action in a state court of
competent jurisdiction, (2) the plaintiff makes service of process on the opposing party, and (3)
the state court dismisses the action because of improper venue. Id. at 427-428.
In plaintiff’s earlier action filed in Pennsylvania, that state’s Court of Common Pleas and
Superior Court deemed invalid plaintiff’s personal service on a security guard at the headquarters
of defendant’s parent corporation. Another state’s judgment is presumptively valid and subject
to recognition in Michigan under the federal Constitution’s full faith and credit clause. US
Const, art IV, § 1; Poindexter v Poindexter, 234 Mich App 316, 325; 594 NW2d 76 (1999).
Indeed, the purpose of the clause is to prevent the litigation of issues in one state that have
already been decided in another. Martino v Cottman Transmission Systems, 218 Mich App 54,
58; 554 NW2d 17 (1996). Therefore, the Pennsylvania ruling that plaintiff’s service of process
was ineffective precludes relitigation of this issue in Michigan.
As such, because plaintiff did not properly serve defendant in Pennsylvania, plaintiff’s
filing in that state was insufficient to equitably toll the statute of limitations. Burnett, supra at
427. Accordingly, plaintiff’s Michigan claim was time-barred, and the trial court erred in
denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7).1
It is well established that we may affirm where the trial court reaches the right result,
even if it is for the wrong reason. People v Jory, 443 Mich 403, 425; 505 NW2d 228 (1993).
Having determined that the trial court should have granted defendant’s motion for summary
disposition based on MCR 2.116(C)(7), we need not consider plaintiff’s claim that the trial court
improperly granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
1
Alternatively, we would note that equitable tolling is, by definition, an equitable remedy. See
Covey v Arkansas River Co, 865 F2d 660, 662 (CA 6, 1989). In fact, the Covey court declined to
apply the doctrine of equitable tolling where it found that the plaintiff failed to exercise due
diligence in “asserting her claim.” Id. Here, although the Ohio state court’s ruling fell short of a
mandatory order for plaintiff to re-file his lawsuit in Michigan, it was plaintiff’s decision to
disregard the “suggestion,” and instead attempt to commence the lawsuit in Pennsylvania. While
an argument could be made that the Pennsylvania courts’ application of the jurisdictional rules to
plaintiff’s case could have been resolved in his favor, it was plaintiff’s choice to bring his lawsuit
in that jurisdiction, rather than the obvious forum: Michigan. Moreover, we agree with
defendant’s assertion that plaintiff could have diligently protected his right to bring his claim
here, and have the matter stayed while he pursued the establishment of Pennsylvania as a venue.
Simply put, equity does not favor plaintiff, as necessary to allow him to benefit from the doctrine
of equitable tolling.
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
