PEOPLE OF MI V THERESA M KEMP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 3, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 229609
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 99-012607
THERESA M. KEMP,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: White, P.J., and Murphy and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right her jury convictions for assault with intent to do great
bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84, and possession of a firearm during the commission
of a felony, MCL 750.227b. We affirm.
This case arises out of a shooting outside a bar, in which the victim was struck in the
neck by a single bullet.
Defendant first asserts that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to support her
felony-firearm conviction on either a principal or an aider and abettor theory. We disagree.
This Court reviews a party’s claim of insufficient evidence to determine whether the
evidence presented would justify a rational trier of fact in finding that each element of the charge
was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515-516; 489 NW2d
748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). All conflicts of fact are to be viewed in a light favorable
to the prosecution. Id.
A defendant’s conviction for felony-firearm requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant (1) carried or possessed a firearm (2) during the commission or attempted
commission of a felony. MCL 750.227b(1). A defendant who did not actually possess or carry a
firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony may be convicted as an
aider or abettor if the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant assisted
in the acquisition or retention of the firearm. People v Johnson, 411 Mich 50, 54; 303 NW2d
442 (1981); People v Eloby (After Remand), 215 Mich App 472, 478; 547 NW2d 48 (1996). In
the absence of a defendant’s personal possession of the firearm during the commission of a
felony, a felony-firearm conviction requires a sufficient factual basis for finding that the
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defendant counseled, aided, or abetted the actual possessor of the firearm in its acquisition or
retention. Johnson, supra at 54.
Reasonable inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to prove the
elements of a crime, People v Jolly, 442 Mich 458, 466; 502 NW2d 177 (1993), but the trier of
fact may not indulge in inferences completely unsupported by any direct or circumstantial
evidence. People v Vaughn, 186 Mich App 376, 379-380; 465 NW2d 365 (1990). In our
opinion, defendant’s conviction for felony-firearm was supported with sufficient circumstantial
evidence indicating that she provided her codefendant with the gun, and direct evidence that she
counseled her codefendant in the use and retention of the gun, directing him to shoot the victim.
Moreover, the evidence supports a finding that defendant had constructive possession of the gun.
In People v Hill, 433 Mich 464, 470; 446 NW2d 140 (1989), our Supreme Court, noting that
constructive possession of a firearm is sufficient to establish the element of possession, stated:
Although not in actual possession, a person has constructive possession if
he “knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise
dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person or
persons . . . .” [Quoting United States v Burch, 313 F2d 628, 629 (CA 6, 1963).]
Here, defendant had the power and intention to exercise dominion or control over the gun
through her codefendant, where there was evidence that defendant instructed her codefendant to
shoot the victim, and the codefendant proceeded to do so on command.
Defendant’s conviction for felony-firearm rested solely on the jury’s assessment of the
witnesses’ credibility – a constitutionally guaranteed province exclusive to the jury and accorded
great respect by an appellate court. People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 637, 642; 576 NW2d 129
(1998).
Defendant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her
motion for new trial. We disagree. This Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion for new
trial for an abuse of discretion. People v Jones, 236 Mich App 396, 404; 600 NW2d 652 (1999).
Defendant asserts here – as she did before the trial court – nothing more than her trial
attorney’s unsolicited interpretation of the proposed witness’ testimony in support of her
argument that this “newly discovered evidence” merits a new trial. Although the trial court
refused defense counsel’s spontaneous request to create an unscheduled record, the court noted
that the reasons already offered for counsel’s failure to produce a witness listed on defendant’s
own witness list did not satisfy the definition of newly discovered evidence. We agree.
To merit a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, a defendant must meet a
four-part test showing that: (1) the evidence was newly discovered; (2) the evidence is not
merely cumulative; (3) admission of the evidence likely would have resulted in a different
outcome; and (4) the evidence could not have been discovered and produced at trial through the
exercise of due diligence. People v Mechura, 205 Mich App 481, 483; 517 NW2d 797 (1994).
This Court declined to remand a defendant’s case for retrial where the defendant failed to
file an affidavit or make an offer of proof in support of a newly discovered evidence motion.
People v Messenger, 221 Mich App 171, 178-179; 561 NW2d 463 (1997). Notwithstanding the
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trial court’s refusal to make an instant record of the witness’ testimony, defendant’s motion for
new trial contained no affidavit, deposition, or offer of proof, showing the substance of that
testimony for this Court’s review. The trial court did not prohibit defendant from creating and
providing her own record. Where a proposed witness’ newly discovered testimony does not
support a finding that a different result would have occurred, and the court deems the witness
incredible, there is no abuse of discretion. People v Miller (After Remand), 211 Mich App 30,
54; 535 NW2d 518 (1995). What evidence the witness might have offered fails the four-part test
noted in Mechura, supra, and we question whether due diligence was exercised by defendant.
Defendant finally asserts that her counsel’s failure to produce the bar owner’s testimony
deprived her of the effective assistance of counsel. Appellate review of a defendant’s
unpreserved claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is limited to the existing record. People v
Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 423; 608 NW2d 502 (2000). An unpreserved constitutional error
warrants reversal only when it was plain error affecting the defendant’s substantial rights.
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
A reversal based on ineffective assistance of counsel is justified if a defendant
affirmatively shows that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and prejudiced him to the extent that he was denied a fair trial. People v
Williams, 240 Mich App 316, 331; 614 NW2d 647 (2000). A defendant bears a heavy burden of
disproving his counsel’s presumption of competence. People v Effinger, 212 Mich App 67, 69;
536 NW2d 809 (1995). He must also show that actual prejudice resulted from his counsel’s
ineffectiveness – that is, had his counsel not erred, there existed a reasonable probability that the
result of his trial would have been different. People v Murray, 234 Mich App 46, 65; 593 NW2d
690 (1999).
Defendant has produced insufficient evidence by which this Court can evaluate the
diligence or lack thereof with which his counsel attempted to discover and produce the bar
owner’s testimony. Moreover, there is no evidence to ascertain actual prejudice where there is
no affidavit or offer of proof concerning the bar owner’s potential testimony. Because this
Court’s review of defendant’s unpreserved claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is limited to
the existing record, her claim is unsupported. Snider, supra at 423.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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