REBECCA A DUBY V WILLIAM H BARBER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
REBECCA A. DUBY, as Next Friend of ARON
GENE DUBY, a Minor,
UNPUBLISHED
May 3, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 227457
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 96-045573-NI
WILLIAM H. BARBER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Wilder and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from a judgment of negligence resulting from an accident
in which defendant’s truck collided with plaintiff’s minor child’s bicycle. We affirm.
The accident occurred when defendant’s truck, traveling below the speed limit, attempted
to pass Aron Duby and his companion, Ryan Johnston, who were bicycling side-by-side in the
westbound lane of Carpenter Road in Genesee County. Defendant, Duby, and Johnston were all
traveling west. Defendant saw the two boys well in advance and moved at least partially into the
eastbound lane to pass them. Before defendant could pass the boys, Duby moved near the
centerline of the road and was struck. The jury found defendant negligent and Duby
comparatively negligent.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court should not have instructed the jury
pursuant to SJI2d 12.01, which allows jurors to infer negligence based on a statutory violation,
and erred in reading several specific statutory provisions. We disagree.
A violation of a civil statute can establish a prima facie case from which negligence may
be inferred. Johnson v Bobbie’s Party Store, 189 Mich App 652, 661; 473 NW2d 796 (1991).
This Court reviews de novo claims of instructional error. Case v Consumers Power Co, 463
Mich 1, 6; 615 NW2d 17 (2000).
Defendant first claims that the trial court erred in reading the jury a portion of MCL
257.402, which raises a presumption of negligence in cases involving rear-end collisions,
because Duby’s bicycle was not proceeding in the same direction as defendant at the time of the
accident. Although defendant’s argument reflects a correct understanding of the law, see
Cassibo v Bodwin, 149 Mich App 474; 386 NW2d 559 (1986), there was evidence from which
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the jury could find that Duby and defendant were indeed traveling in the same direction when the
collision occurred. The testimony of eyewitness Tommy Ragonese suggested that while Duby
swerved into the eastbound lane as defendant approached, he returned to the westbound lane
where he was struck by the front, right corner of defendant’s truck. Jurors could reasonably
conclude from the trial testimony that plaintiff and defendant were both traveling west when the
collision occurred. An instruction is properly given if there is evidence, however scant, that
raises an issue for the jury. Klanseck v Anderson Sales & Service, Inc, 426 Mich 78, 91; 393
NW2d 356 (1986). Thus, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury regarding this statutory
provision.
Next, defendant claims that the trial court erred in instructing the jury pursuant to MCL
257.627, regarding the duty to drive at a speed which allows the driver to stop within an assured,
clear distance, because Duby suddenly intersected defendant’s assured clear distance. This Court
has held this instruction inapplicable in cases where an object suddenly intersects the assured
clear distance of the motorist. See, e.g., Cassibo, supra, at 478; Green v Richardson, 69 Mich
App 133, 139; 244 NW2d 385 (1976).
In this case, there was testimony that defendant was aware of Duby’s presence well in
advance of his approach and had moved at least partially into the eastbound lane to avoid Duby.
Moreover, testimony at trial created a fact question in regard to whether Duby suddenly
intersected defendant’s path. Defendant testified that he was approximately 150 feet from the
boys when he began moving into the eastbound lane to pass. When asked at what point he
realized that he might hit one of the boys, defendant responded:
When I seen him pull up over the side line and into my lane of traffic, I thought I
could miss him, but I hit the brakes and-and ‘fore I could turn the wheels, I was
sliding. And I made a swerve to get around him. And I almost did it. But I
didn’t quite clear him.
When Johnston was asked whether Duby swerved sharply across the centerline, Johnston
responded: “He might’ve. I don’t know.” Ragonese testified that he was following behind
defendant and observed the collision. Ragonese slowed his vehicle and “start[ed] to back off”
when he saw Duby move toward the centerline of the road. According to Ragonese, Duby was
on his way back into the westbound lane when defendant’s fender collided with the bike. Given
that evidence, it cannot be said as a matter of law that Duby suddenly intersected defendant’s
assured clear distance. Ragonese’s testimony, in particular, supports the finding that defendant
had time to observe Duby’s move toward the centerline and that Duby’s movement did not
suddenly precede the collision. Compare Cassibo, supra; Green, supra. Therefore, there was
evidence supporting the instruction and we cannot say that the trial court erred in reading this
statutory provision. Klanseck, supra.
Defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in reading the remaining two sections of the
assured clear distance statute does not require reversal. Although these sections were
inapplicable to the case at bar, including them in the instructions was harmless error. See MCR
2.613(A) and Burnett v Bruner, 247 Mich App 365, 375; 636 NW2d 773 (2001) (instructional
error is a proper basis for reversal only when failure to reverse would be inconsistent with
substantial justice). It was undisputed at trial that the posted speed on the relevant stretch of
Carpenter Road was 55 mph and that defendant was traveling under that speed limit. The
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inclusion of the portion of the assured clear distance statute, which states it is prima facie lawful
for a driver to drive 25 mph or less in business or residential districts or in public parks could not
have affected the verdict. See MCL 257.627(2)(a) and (b). Likewise the inclusion of MCL
257.627(3), which states it is prima facie unlawful to exceed the speed limits prescribed in
subsection (2), could not have affected the verdict because no evidence suggested the collision
occurred in the areas described in subsection (2). We conclude that the court’s inclusion of
subsections (2) and (3) did not confuse the jury given that the undisputed evidence suggested the
circumstances described therein did not apply.
Defendant further claims that the trial court erred in reading a portion of MCL 257.643,
which requires a driver to keep a reasonable and prudent distance when following another
vehicle. Defendant contends on appeal that MCL 257.636 governs this situation because it
specifically involves overtaking and passing. However, defendant did not raise any argument
below regarding the applicability of MCL 257.636. Trial testimony suggested that defendant
approached the boys who were traveling at a much slower speed and struck Duby while partially
in the westbound lane. Thus, the trial court did not err in reading the portion of MCL 257.643.
Klanseck, supra.
The trial court’s instruction pursuant to MCL 257.706(a) regarding horns and other
warning devices also was not error. Although some testimony indicated that Johnston warned
Duby of defendant’s presence, the evidence is unclear as to whether Duby heard and understood
Johnston’s warning,1 or whether Duby would have reacted differently had defendant’s horn
alerted him to the truck’s proximity. Because the question whether defendant’s failure to sound
his horn was a proximate cause of the accident was one of fact, the trial court did not err in
giving the instruction. Klanseck, supra.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that Duby
had a duty to use ordinary care for his own safety. Defendant did not object to the challenged
instruction below and, therefore, our review is limited to whether the instruction resulted in
manifest injustice. Phinney v Perlmutter, 222 Mich App 513, 557; 564 NW2d 532 (1997). On
review, jury instructions are viewed as a whole, not extracted piecemeal to establish error. Cox v
Flint Bd of Hosp Managers (On Remand), 243 Mich App 72, 85; 620 NW2d 859 (2000). A
reading of the instructions as a whole makes clear that the court adequately defined Duby’s
standard of care in the context of the parties’ respective duties.2 The adequacy of the instruction
1
At one point during his trial testimony, Johnston stated that when he told Duby defendant’s
truck was approaching them from behind, Duby responded “okay.” However, later in his
testimony, Johnston stated that upon being warned, Duby “Never really said anything.” Duby,
himself, did not remember the accident and could not testify whether he was aware of
defendant’s approach. Defendant and Ragonese both testified at trial that they did not see Duby
look back or otherwise acknowledge defendant’s presence.
2
The trial court instructed, in pertinent part:
It was the duty of the defendant in connection with this occurrence to use ordinary
care for the safety of Aaron [sic] Duby.
(continued…)
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is borne out by the jury’s finding of Duby’s comparative negligence, which it could not have
reached without understanding that Duby had a duty to use care for his own safety. Under these
circumstances, no manifest injustice resulted from the trial court’s instructions regarding the
parties’ duties of care. Phinney, supra.
Finally, as discussed, the only instructions that were erroneously given were those
pertaining to MCL 257.627(2) and (3). The inclusion of those instructions was harmless. Under
these circumstances, we reject defendant’s cumulative error claim. See Stitt v Holland Abundant
Life Fellowship (On Remand), 243 Mich App 461, 471; 624 NW2d 427 (2000).
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
(…continued)
Now, a minor is not held to the same standard of conduct as an adult. When I use
the words “ordinary care” with respect to Aaron Duby, I mean that degree of care
which a reasonably careful minor of the age, mental capacity, and experience of
Aaron [sic] Duby would use under the circumstances which you find exist in this
case. And once again, it’s for you to decide what a reasonably careful minor
would do under the circumstances that exist in this case, or would not do.
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