TERRY ALBANYS V 19055 INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
TERRY ALBANYS,
UNPUBLISHED
April 30, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 220505
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 97-732662-NO
19055, INC., d/b/a COYOTE II,
Defendant-Appellant.
ON REMAND
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Hood and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appealed as of right from a judgment entered in favor of plaintiff following a
jury trial. In Albanys v 19055, Inc, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals,
issued March 20, 2001 (Docket No. 220505), we affirmed the judgment. In lieu of granting
defendant’s application for leave to appeal, our Supreme Court remanded this matter back to us
for reconsideration in light of MacDonald v PKT, Inc, 464 Mich 322; 628 NW2d 33 (2001).
Albanys v 19055, Inc, 465 Mich 944; 639 NW2d 805 (2002). Upon reconsideration, we
conclude that the trial court did err in failing to grant defendant’s motion for judgment not
withstanding the verdict regarding plaintiff’s negligence claim. Accordingly, we reverse our
previous opinion and the judgment.
In our original opinion, we rejected defendant’s argument that the trial court erred when
it denied defendant’s motion for JNOV, stating:
[I]t was foreseeable that a friend of the other individual involved in the
argument with plaintiff could have left the bar and had a fight with plaintiff in the
parking lot. See Mason v Royal Dequindre, Inc, 455 Mich 391, 404; 566 NW2d
199 (1997). Moreover, the jury could have found that defendant was negligent
because defendant’s head of security allowed plaintiff to engage in a fight on
defendant’s property. Our Supreme Court has stated that merchants have a duty
to use reasonable care to protect their identifiable invitees from the foreseeable
criminal acts of third parties. Id. at 405. The measures they take must be
reasonable. Id. A reasonable jury could have found that defendant did not take
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reasonable steps to prevent plaintiff’s injury. Although defendant forcefully
removed plaintiff from the bar, defendant did not make reasonable attempt to
protect plaintiff while he was on defendant’s property. [Albanys, supra, slip
opinion at 2.]
In MacDonald, supra at 345-346, our Supreme Court, addressing the duty of premises
owners concerning the criminal acts of third parties, held:
[W]e conclude that merchants have a duty to respond reasonably to
situations occurring on the premises that pose a risk of imminent and foreseeable
harm to identifiable invitees. We hold that the duty to respond is limited to
reasonably expediting the involvement of the police, and that there is no duty to
otherwise anticipate the criminal acts of third parties. Finally, we affirm that
merchants are not required to provide security personnel or otherwise resort to
self-help in order to deter or quell such occurrences.”
The Supreme Court additionally held that there is no duty to prevent the criminal acts of third
parties. Id. at 326.
Here, the jury specifically found that plaintiff did not sustain an injury to his right eye as
a result of being battered by an employee of defendant. The jury did find that defendant was
negligent; however, the verdict form does not indicate on what basis defendant was negligent.1
We can only conclude, considering the jury’s ultimate finding of liability, that the jury believed
that a third party battered plaintiff causing the injuries, but that defendant was negligent in some
form or manner for the occurrence. We outlined possible negligence scenarios in our original
opinion as quoted above.
The record indicates that defendant’s head of security contacted police. Because
defendant contacted the police, and because defendant was not otherwise required to resort to
self-help to quell any third-party criminal act, it cannot be said that defendant breached any duty
regarding an assault against plaintiff. MacDonald, supra at 345-346. Further, defendant could
not be held liable under a negligence theory on the basis that it failed to anticipate or prevent any
assault and battery against plaintiff. Id. at 326, 345. Whether the criminal act was foreseeable
under the facts is also not relevant. Id. at 339. Therefore, plaintiff’s negligence theory fails in
this action.
1
The jury was instructed as follows:
It was the duty of the defendant in connection with this occurrence to use
ordinary care for the safety of the plaintiff. A possessor of premises has a duty to
maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition. A possessor has a duty to
exercise ordinary care to protect an invitee from unreasonable risks of injury that
were known to the possessor or that should have been known in the exercise of
ordinary care.
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Reversed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
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