IN RE GREGORY PETTY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 26, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 219348
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 96-341045
GREGORY PETTY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Bandstra and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his convictions of felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b),
armed robbery, MCL 750.529, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony,
MCL 750.227b. Defendant was sentenced to serve mandatory consecutive terms of two years’
imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction, and life imprisonment without parole for his
conviction of felony murder. We affirm, but remand for correction of the judgment of sentence1
and for resentencing.
I
This case arises from the robbery and murder of fifty-five-year-old Calvin Lee Whitlow
in the city of Detroit. Defendant, who was fifteen years old at the time these offenses were
committed, was arrested and charged by petition, along with twelve-year-old McKinley Duane
Moore, with first-degree premeditated murder, felony murder, armed robbery, and felonyfirearm. The prosecutor designated defendant’s case as a matter in which the juvenile was to be
tried as an adult for his role in the events leading to Whitlow’s death.2 The prosecution’s theory
at the resulting trial was that defendant aided and abetted Moore, who was the shooter, in
1
Both the original and amended judgments of sentence erroneously reflect that defendant was
additionally convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), a count that,
although originally charged, was dismissed by the trial court. We note further that the amended
judgment of sentence does not reflect any disposition regarding defendant’s armed robbery
conviction, i.e., imposition of sentence or vacation of the conviction. These oversights should be
corrected on remand.
2
See MCL 712A.2(a)(1)(A) and MCL 712A.2d(1).
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robbing and killing Whitlow. Defendant argues, however, that the prosecution failed to present
sufficient evidence to support his convictions under this theory. We disagree.
When reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must “view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecutor and determine whether a rational trier of
fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”
People v Izarraras-Placante, 246 Mich App 490, 495; 633 NW2d 18 (2001). Circumstantial
evidence and the reasonable inferences that arise therefrom can constitute satisfactory proof of
the elements of the crime. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
A person who aids or abets the commission of a crime may be convicted and punished as
if that individual directly committed the offense. MCL 767.39; People v Turner, 213 Mich App
558, 568; 540 NW2d 728 (1995). To establish that a defendant aided and abetted the
commission of a crime, the prosecutor must put forth evidence proving that:
(1) the crime charged was committed by the defendant or some other person, (2)
the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the principal in
committing the crime, and (3) the defendant intended the commission of the crime
or knew that the principal intended its commission at the time he gave aid or
encouragement. [People v Norris, 236 Mich App 411, 419; 600 NW2d 658
(1999).]
In this case, defendant does not argue that the murder-robbery did not occur. Rather, he
argues that the evidence was insufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to conclude that he
participated in those crimes or that, if he did, he possessed the requisite intent to support a
conviction for aiding and abetting those crimes.3 We disagree.
With respect to the quantum of participation required to support a defendant’s
convictions under a theory of aiding and abetting, this Court has explained that aiding and
abetting contemplates “all forms of assistance rendered to the perpetrator of a crime and
comprehends all words or deeds that might support, encourage, or incite the commission of a
crime.” Turner, supra. Here, despite defendant’s claim that, although present, he did not
participate in the events leading to Whitlow’s death, Marcus Fitzgerald testified that he
witnessed both Moore and defendant chasing Whitlow onto Woodward Avenue. According to
Fitzgerald, as Moore continued the pursuit, defendant positioned himself inside a crosswalk
where he appeared to be guarding Whitlow, as if he were guarding an opponent in a basketball
game. Fitzgerald further testified that defendant’s actions in this regard appeared to cause
Whitlow to alter his course, after which defendant “galloped” to the sidewalk on the opposite
side of the street while Moore continued the chase. When Whitlow began to break away from
3
Although, in his statement of questions presented, defendant challenges the sufficiency of
evidence with regard to each of his three convictions, he has restricted his argument to the
evidence in support of the malice and participation required for a valid conviction of felony
murder under a theory of aiding and abetting. Accordingly, we will not address the sufficiency
of evidence to support the remainder of defendant’s convictions. See People v Anderson, 209
Mich App 527, 538; 531 NW2d 780 (1995) (issues raised but not briefed on appeal are
considered abandoned).
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Moore, the boy raised a gun and shot Whitlow, who fell face down in the street. Moore then
approached Whitlow, put down his gun, and went through Whitlow’s pockets. As he did so,
defendant stood at the corner on the opposite side of the street yelling “something”4 to Moore,
who, when finished rifling through Whitlow’s pockets, picked up his gun and ran off. Fitzgerald
then witnessed defendant himself run to Whitlow, where he went through a pocket, apparently
missed by Moore, before fleeing in the same direction.
A search of defendant’s home conducted shortly after the murder led to the discovery of a
cellular telephone identified at trial as belonging to Whitlow. Telephone company records
associated with that phone and also admitted at trial showed several calls made from that phone
to defendant’s home only moments after the killing. When viewed in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, the foregoing evidence was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to
conclude that defendant rendered the necessary assistance or encouragement to support his
convictions under a theory of aiding and abetting.
The evidence at trial was also sufficient to support that defendant possessed the requisite
intent at the time he rendered such assistance or encouragement. The intent necessary for
conviction of a crime as an aider and abettor is “‘that necessary to be convicted of the crime as a
principal.’” People v Mass, 464 Mich 615, 628; 628 NW2d 540 (2001), quoting People v Kelly,
423 Mich 261, 278; 378 NW2d 365 (1985). For purposes of felony murder, this requires a
showing that the defendant acted with malice, i.e., with the specific intent to kill or do great
bodily harm, or to set in motion a force likely to cause death or great bodily harm. Turner, supra
at 566; see also People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672, 727-729; 299 NW2d 304 (1980). Here,
videotape evidence obtained from a nearby gas station surveillance camera and played for the
jury at trial, suggested that defendant personally selected and identified Whitlow as the target
Moore was to rob. Given that it is unlikely that a twelve-year-old boy would attempt to rob a
grown man while unarmed, the jury could reasonably conclude that, in directing Moore in this
manner, defendant was aware that his accomplice possessed a gun. Accordingly, we find that
when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence is sufficient to support a
rational trier of fact in concluding that defendant aided and abetted Moore in Whitlow’s killing,
and that he did so with malice, at least insofar as he set in motion a force likely to cause death or
great bodily harm.
II
Defendant also argues that remand for resentencing is required because the trial court
failed to make findings of fact regarding each of the six factors it was required to consider when
determining whether to sentence him as a juvenile or adult offender. We agree.
Under Michigan law, a juvenile tried and convicted as an adult in a “designated” case
may be immediately sentenced as either an adult or a juvenile, or may receive a delayed
sentence. MCL 712A.18(1)(n). The delayed sentence option permits the family court to delay
sentencing of a minor until the juvenile becomes an adult. While the juvenile is still a minor, the
4
Testimony offered by Casey Durham indicated that the “something” Fitzgerald heard yelled by
defendant to Moore was a directive to check Whitlow’s pockets a second time before leaving.
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court imposes probation, but may attach any term that could be imposed as a disposition. Id.; see
also People v Thenghkam, 240 Mich App 29, 40 n 12; 610 NW2d 571 (2000), citing MCL
712A.18(1)(n). In determining which of these sentencing options are appropriate in a given case,
the court must consider each of the following six factors:
(i) The seriousness of the offense in terms of community protection,
including, but not limited to, the existence of any aggravating factors recognized
by the sentencing guidelines, the use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon, and
the impact on any victim.
(ii) The juvenile’s culpability in committing the offense, including, but not
limited to, the level of the juvenile's participation in planning and carrying out the
offense and the existence of any aggravating or mitigating factors recognized by
the sentencing guidelines.
(iii) The juvenile’s prior record of delinquency including, but not limited
to, any record of detention, any police record, any school record, or any other
evidence indicating prior delinquent behavior.
(iv) The juvenile’s programming history, including, but not limited to, the
juvenile’s past willingness to participate meaningfully in available programming.
(v) The adequacy of the punishment or programming available in the
juvenile justice system.
(vi) The dispositional options available for the juvenile.
712A.18(1)(n).]
[MCL
The prosecution has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that
the best interests of the juvenile and the public would be served by imposing a sentence as
though the juvenile were an adult offender. MCR 5.955(B). Here, after receiving extensive
testimonial and documentary evidence, the trial court ruled at the sentencing hearing that
defendant would be sentenced as an adult, and imposed the mandatory sentence for conviction of
first-degree murder of life imprisonment without parole. In doing so, the court stated in toto:
The thought of sentencing anyone to life in prison without the possibility of
parole takes your breath away. But after you catch your breath it’s very clear that
we have guidelines. They’re called laws. And we’re required to follow the law.
To that extent, this Court’s responsibility, this Court’s duty is to interpret not only
the conviction of first-degree murder; not only the conviction for armed robbery;
not only the conviction for felony firearm, but to look at how a sentence as an
adult versus disposition as a juvenile will impact the community.
The Court has had a chance to hear quite eloquently from the family of the victim.
They have been consistant [sic] in their appearances before the Court throughout
this lengthy process. I don’t believe there’s any question, in fact it’s not
controverted, the jury found [defendant] guilty of first-degree murder. There is no
more serious crime. The jury also found that even though he was not the actual
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person who fired the weapon that resulted in the death of Mr. Whitlow, that he
was responsible for that.
The record of [defendant], the juvenile record, certainly reflects a number of
contacts. I was a little surprised at some of the testimony offered this morning.
I talked about the law a few moments ago. The law dictates whether people are
innocent or guilty upon the presentation of evidence and a ruling either by a Court
or by a judge or by a jury. To read a report that says there was a dismissal or
there was – there’s insufficient evidence does not begin to tell the whole story.
What I have though based on that information that’s in the file, based on these
reports is there has been consistant [sic] contact with this Court that has resulted
in not one, but now two convictions. One for carrying a concealed weapon and
now this one, which includes – actually three convictions for various felonies
including murder one.
[Counsel for defendant] argued that there is sufficient juvenile programming
available to assist [defendant]. I don’t really think that’s controverted. The
question is did the witnesses come forward with ambiguous recommendations
about – Judge, I think that he ought to be in a juvenile system, but I think he
probably needs to be their [sic] longer than the law allows. That is the crux isn’t
it? It’s what the law will allow. And if you’re saying that he needs to be in there
longer than what the law will allow for a juvenile then you are saying to this
Court that the only option we have available is the adult sentence. He’s not been
successful in the programming requirements relative to this matter.
At the hearing involving Mr. Moore, the Court talked about penalizing the mother
if the law would allow. Now perhaps that was a little unfair. The mother, the
father, family, school, court, you name it, I think that there’s plenty of blame to go
around. But the reality is that when you get finished assessing blame it still gets
us back to what the law demands. If the juvenile disposition will not be sufficient
then from where I sit there is no alternative. As such I will sentence [defendant]
as an adult. The law requires a mandatory life sentence without parole. That’s
all.
This Court’s review of a trial court’s determination to sentence a minor as a juvenile or
an adult is bifurcated. Thenghkam, supra at 41-42; MCL 712A.18(1)(n). The Court must first
review the factual findings supporting the court’s determination regarding each statutory factor
for clear error, focusing on whether the court made a required finding of fact and whether the
record supports that relevant finding. Thenghkam, supra at 41. Second, this Court must review
the ultimate decision whether to sentence the minor as a juvenile or as an adult for an abuse of
discretion. This second part of the analysis scrutinizes how the court weighed its factual findings
to come to the ultimate sentencing decision. Id. at 42.
With respect to the first part of this analysis, defendant asserts that the trial court failed to
make findings of fact regarding each of the factors outlined in MCL 712A.18(n), and that,
therefore, remand for resentencing is required. See id. (“the absence of a required finding of fact
or a factual finding without support constitutes clear error”). The prosecutor responds that the
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statute does not expressly require the sentencing court to make findings on each factor, but
merely to “consider” those factors when determining disposition. The prosecutor nonetheless
acknowledges that the “factual findings” requirement has been a recognized and required part of
this Court’s review for nearly a decade. See e.g., People v Passeno, 195 Mich App 91, 103; 489
NW2d 152 (1992), overruled on other grounds by People v Bigelow, 229 Mich App 218; 581
NW2d 744 (1998); People v Miller, 199 Mich App 609, 612; 503 NW2d 89 (1993). To that end,
the prosecutor argues that, although the trial court did not specifically set forth findings with
respect to each of the required factors, it is apparent that it made the relevant considerations and
that this Court should therefore affirm the trial court’s sentencing decision. We disagree.
Although a fair reading of the trial court’s remarks at sentencing arguably establishes that
it made the relevant considerations, the sentencing court was required to “sort the logical,
reasonable, and believable evidence on the record from the incredible or irrelevant,” Thenghkam,
supra at 67, and then, based on those findings, “consider and balance all the factors to decide
whether to sentence a defendant as a juvenile or adult.” Id. citing People v Cheeks, 216 Mich
App 470, 478-479; 549 NW2d 584 (1996). Without the required findings of fact, it cannot be
said that the sentencing court effectively fulfilled its duty in this regard. As this Court stated in
Thenghkam, supra at 48:
[A]s with all judicial decisions that do not rest solely on the law, a trial court
deciding whether to sentence a defendant as an adult or a juvenile must point to
the requisite facts to justify its decision. Consequently, and aside from the
question of clear error, if the trial court fails to make findings of fact, it cannot
fully exercise its discretion by giving proper weight to the various factors it must
consider to make its decision under the sentencing statute. [(Citations omitted).]
The prosecutor argues, nonetheless, that should this Court determine that the trial court’s
failure to articulate its findings of fact requires remand, remand should be limited to requiring
that the trial court place its findings of fact on the record, much like the situation where a
sentencing court fails to articulate its reasons for exceeding the sentencing guidelines’
recommended range. See People v Triplett, 432 Mich 568, 573; 442 NW2d 622 (1989); People
v Johnson, 187 Mich App 621, 630-631; 468 NW2d 307 (1991). However, given that the trial
court “cannot fully exercise its discretion” without first establishing the facts upon which it will
balance the statutory factors, Thenghkam, supra, the matter must be remanded for a full
resentencing.5
Because the trial court’s failure to render its findings of fact requires remand for
resentencing, we do not address defendant’s claim that, in light of the “overwhelming” evidence
in favor of a juvenile sentence, the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him as an adult.
As noted above, review of the trial court’s ultimate sentencing decision requires that this Court
“scrutinize[] how the court weighed its factual findings.” Id. at 42. Accordingly, without the
required findings of fact, any meaningful review of the trial court decision is not possible.
5
However, see note 8, infra.
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III
Additionally, defendant argues that imposition of a nonparolable life sentence upon a
fifteen-year-old convicted of aiding and abetting a felony murder violates our state’s
constitutional prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment. See Const 1963, art 1, § 16.
Although we have concluded that remand for resentencing is required as a result of the trial
court’s failure to articulate its findings of fact in connection with imposing this sentence, we
nonetheless address this matter, as the trial court may decide to impose the same sentence on
remand.
This Court reviews constitutional questions de novo. People v Conat, 238 Mich App
134, 144; 605 NW2d 49 (1999). In deciding whether a punishment is cruel or unusual, this
Court must look to the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; compare the
penalty to those imposed for other crimes in this state as well as the penalty imposed by other
states for the instant offense; and consider the goal of rehabilitation. People v Launsburry, 217
Mich App 358, 363; 551 NW2d 460 (1996). Here, an analysis of the aforementioned factors
leads us to conclude that a nonparolable life sentence does not constitute cruel or unusual
punishment when imposed upon a fifteen-year-old convicted of felony murder convicted under a
theory of aiding and abetting.
First, our courts have held that, given the seriousness of the offense, a mandatory life
sentence without the possibility of parole is not an unduly harsh sentence for felony-murder,
People v Hall, 396 Mich 650, 657-658; 242 NW2d 377 (1976), though applied to a minor,
Launsburry, supra at 363-364. Second, as noted in Launsburry, supra, our state imposes
mandatory, nonparolable life sentences for a myriad of other offenses. Third, defendant
acknowledges that a number of other states allow the imposition of mandatory, nonparolable life
sentences on minors. Finally, in the context of a mandatory life sentence, our Supreme Court has
noted that rehabilitation and release are still possible because a defendant has available the
possibility of being pardoned. Hall, supra at 658. Accordingly, because our Legislature has
made a policy decision that conviction under a theory of aiding and abetting warrants
punishment as if the defendant directly committed the offense, MCL 767.39, we find that
imposition of a nonparolable life sentence on remand would not constitute cruel or unusual
punishment.
IV
Defendant further argues that he is entitled to be resentenced because his sentence was
based on inaccurate information. We disagree.
A defendant has the right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate information. People v
McAllister, 241 Mich App 466, 473; 616 NW2d 203 (2000). Accordingly, a sentence based on
inaccurate information is invalid. People v Miles, 454 Mich 90, 96; 559 NW2d 299 (1997).
Here, defendant asserts that the trial court was uninformed that the “psychosexual conflicts”
testified to by social worker Anthony Keeling at defendant’s sentencing hearing. Mr. Keeling
testified that the source of defendant’s “acting out” during his pretrial incarceration were the
result of defendant’s sexual exploitation by a juvenile detention worker. Defendant also says
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that his attorney was similarly not aware of such information at the time of sentencing and thus
could not effectively cross-examine Keeling as to the ramifications of such exploitation.6 As a
result, defendant argues, the information presented to the trial court was substantially inaccurate
because the court was not in a position to fully understand defendant’s behavior. We agree with
the prosecution that defendant has waived this issue.
A criminal defendant may forfeit a right by failing to timely assert it. See Carines, supra
at 763. Although a forfeited right may still be reviewed for plain error, the intentional
relinquishment of a known right constitutes a waiver that extinguishes the error. People v
Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215-216; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). Here, the record reflects that defendant
voluntarily abandoned an earlier challenge, proffered on these same grounds, to the accuracy of
the information relied upon by the trial court at sentencing. Having affirmatively relieved the
trial court of having to rule on this question, defendant has waived this issue on appeal. Id. at
214 (“‘[a] defendant may not waive objection to an issue before the trial court and then raise it as
an error’ on appeal”), quoting People v Fetterley, 229 Mich App 511, 518-519, 583 NW2d 199
(1998).
In any event, this issue is moot to the extent that remand for resentencing is required
under Part II of our opinion, supra. However, because defendant waived the error only insofar
as this appeal is concerned, see Carter, supra at 214-216, he is not foreclosed from developing
the substance of his claimed exploitation on remand.
Defendant also argues that he is entitled to resentencing because he was not afforded his
right to allocution before the trial court announced its sentencing decision. Although this issue
is similarly moot in light of the need for remand, we address the matter for purposes of guiding
the trial court’s treatment of this matter on remand.
MCR 5.955(C) provides that, once it is decided that a juvenile will be sentenced as an
adult, the sentencing procedures outline in MCR 6.425 apply. MCR 6.425(D)(2)(c) provides that
the trial court must, before imposing sentence, give the defendant a reasonable opportunity to
advise the court of any circumstances the defendant believes the court should consider when
imposing sentence. Where the trial court fails to comply with this rule, resentencing is required.
People v Jones (On Rehearing), 201 Mich App 449, 453; 506 NW2d 542 (1993).
The prosecution contends that, once the determination was made to sentence defendant as
an adult, the sentence was established by statute, i.e., mandatory life without the possibility of
parole, and that, therefore, allocution would have been meaningless. While we do not dispute
the logic of the prosecution’s argument, our Supreme Court has long mandated strict compliance
with the rule of allocution and has required that the trial court separately ask the defendant
whether he wishes to address the court before sentencing. See People v Berry, 409 Mich 774,
780-781; 298 NW2d 434 (1980). Moreover, where, as here, the only true discretion afforded the
sentencing court is whether to impose a juvenile or adult sentence, it would seem that a
6
Defendant also argues that the juvenile detention worker, as a state actor, deprived him of his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a critical stage of trial by interfering in his relationship with
defense counsel. However, this issue is not preserved because it was not raised in defendant’s
statement of questions involved on appeal as required by MCR 7.212(C)(5).
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defendant should be permitted his right to allocute before such decision is rendered, as this might
be the only effective chance he will have to make a statement that could impact the sentence
imposed. Accordingly, the trial court should ensure that defendant is afforded his right to
allocute on remand, prior to resentencing and before the decision to sentence defendant as a
juvenile or adult is made.
V
Also, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial as a result of improper statements
by the prosecutor during opening and closing arguments. We disagree.
In challenging the prosecutor’s opening statements to the jury, defendant argues that,
although there was no evidence to support his remarks, the prosecutor referred to defendant as
Moore’s “lieutenant,” and characterized the robbery-homicide as a “training session,” wherein
defendant counseled Moore “from the sidelines.” Because defendant failed to preserve this issue
by objecting to these allegedly improper statements at trial, People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713,
720; 613 NW2d 370 (2000), this Court’s review is for plain error that affected his substantial
rights, People v Wyngaard, 462 Mich 659, 668; 614 NW2d 143 (2000).
Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the prosecutor’s statements were not improper as
unsupported by the evidence. “Opening argument is the appropriate time to state the facts to be
proven at trial.” People v Johnson, 187 Mich App 621, 626; 468 NW2d 307 (1991). Although a
prosecutor may not make a statement of fact to the jury that is unsupported by the evidence,
Shutte, supra at 721, a review of the prosecutor's remarks reveals that the prosecutor was merely
summarizing the facts it planned to place in evidence during trial and encouraging the jury to
draw reasonable inferences from those facts. This was not improper. As noted in the discussion
under Part I of this opinion, evidence presented at trial showed that defendant selected Whitlow
as a target for Moore and then aided him in containing Whitlow within the boundaries of the
street. Evidence that, after Whitlow had been shot, defendant offered Moore direction while
standing on the side of the street was also admitted at trial. Given Moore’s young age, it was not
unreasonable for the prosecutor to argue that in conducting himself in this manner defendant was
“training” or “counseling” Moore in the manner of conducting of a robbery. A prosecutor need
not confine his argument to the “blandest of all possible terms,” but has wide latitude and may
argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences from it. People v Marji, 180 Mich App 525,
538; 447 NW2d 835 (1989); People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995).
Because the prosecutor’s remarks were not improper, defendant has failed to show plain error
affecting his substantial rights. Wyngaard, supra.
Defendant further argues, however, that the prosecutor continued to mischaracterize
evidence during closing argument when he stated that defendant had been outside the
delicatessen “waiting to rob and kill” Whitlow, that defendant had been heard yelling directions
to Moore from across the street, and that Fitzgerald had “consistently” testified that Whitlow was
chased into the street by two people. We again find nothing improper in the challenged
statements.
In his statement to police, defendant acknowledged that he had seen Whitlow inside the
delicatessen prior to the robbery and knew that he had money. Moreover, both Durham and
Fitzgerald testified that, following the shooting, defendant yelled to Moore from his position
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across the street. Although Fitzgerald was unable to decipher what was yelled, Durham
specifically testified that defendant ordered Moore back to Whitlow’s body for a second check of
the victim’s pockets. Moreover, contrary to defendant’s assertion, the prosecutor’s reference to
Fitzgerald’s testimony as “consistent” was not a mischaracterization of the evidence.
Defendant’s argument in this regard is premised upon a claim that Fitzgerald testified at the
preliminary examination that only one person was involved in the chase that led Whitlow onto
Woodward Avenue. However, a review of the transcripts provided to this Court on appeal
reveals the following testimony offered by Fitzgerald at the preliminary examination:
There was a second gentleman, too, because when they first went out into the
street there were two gentlemen chasing, but the second gentleman went across
the street in front of the gas station, . . . .
Accordingly, defendant has failed to show that the prosecutor’s comments in this regard were
erroneous.
Finally, defendant claims he was denied his right to a fair trial when the prosecutor
attempted to evoke the sympathy of the jurors by arguing that it could have been any one of them
who was targeted that night. Although prosecutors should not resort to arguments that appeal to
the fears and prejudices of jurors, such comments during closing argument will be reviewed in
context to determine whether they constitute errors requiring reversal. Bahoda, supra. Having
reviewed the remarks in context, we do not conclude that the challenged remarks denied
defendant a fair and impartial trial. The comments occurred at the end of a lengthy discussion of
the evidence and were followed by further comments on the evidence. Moreover, the remarks
were isolated, and, as noted above, the prosecutor's argument was otherwise proper.7 See People
v Mayhew, 236 Mich App 112, 123; 600 NW2d 370 (1999). Further, the trial court instructed
the jury to not be influenced by sympathy or prejudice. Under these circumstances, defendant
was not prejudiced by the prosecutor's remarks, and reversal is accordingly not required.
We affirm defendant’s convictions but remand for correction of the judgment of sentence
and for resentencing.8 We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
7
Because the remainder of the prosecutor’s argument was proper, we reject defendant’s claim
that, even if each individual act of alleged misconduct does not alone require reversal, reversal is
required on the basis of their cumulative effect.
8
In remanding for resentencing, we express no opinion as to the propriety of the sentence
initially imposed or whether, upon proper consideration of the factors set forth in MCL
712A.18(1)(n), defendant should be sentenced as a juvenile or adult.
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