PAUL L BRICKER V ATTORNEY GENERAL
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PAUL B. BRICKER,
UNPUBLISHED
April 23, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ATTORNEY
GENERAL,
No. 230409
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-834044-CZ
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Smolenski and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this interlocutory appeal, defendant appeals by leave granted from an order denying its
motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Plaintiff, an attorney within
defendant’s Collections Division, contended that he did not receive two promotions – for a First
Assistant position in 1997 and for a Section Head position in 1998 – because of his age,1 and the
trial court ruled that his age discrimination claim should be submitted to a trier of fact. We
reverse.
Defendant argues that the trial court should have granted its motion for summary
disposition because plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.
Defendant further contends that even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff established a prima facie
case of age discrimination, the trial court nonetheless should have granted defendant’s motion
because plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether defendant’s
articulated, nondiscriminatory reason for the failure to promote was merely a pretext for age
discrimination.
We review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for summary
disposition. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). In
evaluating a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10), we consider the affidavits, pleadings,
depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. MCR 2.116(G)(5); Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d
817 (1999). The moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law if the proffered
1
Plaintiff was fifty-five and fifty-six years old, respectively, when he sought the positions.
-1-
evidence fails to establish a genuine issue with regard to any material fact. See Maiden, supra at
120-121.
To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, a plaintiff must show that (1) he
was a member of the protected class, (2) he suffered an adverse employment decision, (3) he was
qualified for the position sought, and (4) a younger person received the position. Lytle v Malady
(On Rehearing), 458 Mich 153, 177; 579 NW2d 906 (1998). Elements 1, 2, and 4 are not in
dispute. Defendant claims that plaintiff did not establish element 3 because the desired
promotions required interpersonal skills that plaintiff lacked. However, E. David Brockman, the
head of the Collections Division and one of plaintiff’s supervisors, explicitly testified that he
considered plaintiff “qualified” for the 1998 Section Head position. Moreover, the evidence
shows that the 1997 First Assistant position was similar to the 1998 position, thereby raising a
reasonable inference that plaintiff was also qualified for the 1997 position. Additionally,
plaintiff’s overall performance appraisal rating in April 1997 was between “meets” and
“exceeds” expectations. Under these circumstances, we conclude that plaintiff did indeed
establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.
Because plaintiff established a prima facie case, defendant bore the burden of production
to demonstrate “some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.” Meagher v Wayne
State University, 222 Mich App 700, 711; 565 NW2d 401 (1997). Defendant did so. With
regard to the 1998 Section Head position, Brockman testified that he declined to recommend
plaintiff for the promotion because of his relatively poor interpersonal skills, which were also
noted on plaintiff’s April 1997 performance appraisal. Moreover, the evidence demonstrated
that the First Assistant, Marci McIvor, concurred in this assessment, and presumably, Attorney
General Frank Kelley relied on the recommendations of these individuals in ultimately choosing
Daniel Levy for the position.2 Accordingly, defendant proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for failing to promote plaintiff in 1998.
With regard to the 1997 First Assistant position, Deputy Attorney General Joe Sutton
testified that he recommended McIvor for the promotion because “I just found her to be the
person that I knew that I had worked with that had the people skills that I thought would . . .
serve [defendant].” This statement, combined with the unfavorable comments plaintiff received
on his April 1997 performance appraisal with regard to his interpersonal skills, sufficed to
demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason – again, poor “people” skills – for
defendant’s failure to promote plaintiff in 1997.
Plaintiff appears to contend that defendant cannot be deemed to have articulated a
legitimate reason for the failure to promote him because it is not clear who the decision makers
were with regard to the promotions. This argument is disingenuous. Indeed, the testimony was
consistent that Kelley was ultimately responsible for choosing promoted supervisors and that he
relied on others’ recommendations in making the decisions.3 The “others” decided that plaintiff
did not possess the requisite interpersonal skills for the positions.
2
Deputy Attorney General Joe Sutton testified that any position of a supervisory nature would
ultimately be filled by Kelley.
3
While Kelley did not specifically remember choosing McIvor for the 1997 position, he noted
(continued…)
-2-
Because defendant proffered a legitimate reason for failing to promote plaintiff, plaintiff,
in order to avoid summary disposition for defendant, was then required to raise a genuine issue
of material fact regarding whether “the legitimate reason offered by the defendant was a mere
pretext.” Id. at 711. As stated in Meagher, id. at 712:
A “mere pretext” may be proved (1) by showing that the reason(s) had no basis in
fact, (2) if the reason(s) had a basis in fact, by showing that they were not actual
factors motivating the decision, or (3) if the reason(s) were motivating factors, by
showing that they were jointly insufficient to justify the decision. However, the
soundness of an employer’s business judgment may not be questioned as a means
of showing pretext. Moreover, unfairness will not afford a plaintiff a remedy
unless the unfair treatment was because of age discrimination. [Citations
omitted.]
We conclude that plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding a
possible pretext. Indeed, the testimony and performance appraisals established plaintiff’s lessthan-stellar interpersonal skills, and plaintiff himself admitted to shortcomings in this area.
Plaintiff also admitted that good interpersonal skills are necessary for supervisory positions.
Moreover, there was simply no evidence that plaintiff’s lack of these skills was not the
motivating factor in the adverse employment decision and that age, instead, was the motivating
factor. First, Kelley himself was in his seventies when he made the choices, and a reasonable
inference is that a member of a protected class will be less likely to discriminate against one of
his own. Second, the evidence showed that in 1997, over fifty percent of available promotions
with defendant went to individuals over the age of fifty. Third, Kelley denied ever using age as a
factor in deciding whom to promote. Finally, and most importantly, plaintiff simply presented
no evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, of an age bias with regard to the promotion decisions.
Plaintiff points to a July 21, 1997 letter from Brockman to Sharon Whitmer, the Division
Coordinator, and alleges that this letter proves that the job description of the First Assistant had
to be rewritten to accommodate McIvor’s shortcomings in the enforcement area. However, the
letter indicates that Brockman was in fact satisfied with McIvor spending her extra time on
bankruptcy work and in no way considered McIvor’s lack of enforcement experience to be a
problem or shortcoming. Moreover, McIvor’s 1998 overall performance appraisal rating was
“outstanding.” Additionally, even assuming, arguendo, that defendant rewrote the job
description to fit McIvor’s qualifications, this alone does not establish age discrimination. There
could very well have been other reasons, besides her youth and in spite of her alleged
shortcoming, for defendant to favor McIvor over defendant. Indeed, defendant proffered such a
reason: McIvor’s superior interpersonal skills.
Plaintiff also points to Sutton’s testimony that in 1997, in the wake of a number of early
retirements, “there was concern about continuity of the advice to agencies in the department.”
Plaintiff alleges that this establishes a motive for age discrimination, because “[d]efendant
wanted to stabilize things by promoting younger people, who would presumably be there
longer.” This argument is mere speculation. Indeed, as noted by defendant, a rational approach
(…continued)
that this was because many positions were all being filled around that same time due to the
institution of an early retirement program.
-3-
to the need for continuity would be to promote older, more established employees, not younger
ones with new ideas and advice. Sutton’s testimony does not raise a question of fact regarding
pretext.
Plaintiff also points to an affidavit in which he alleges that Brockman gave him lower
performance ratings in order to justify raises for younger employees. This affidavit failed to
create a question of fact regarding pretext. Indeed, plaintiff does not dispute that the allegedly
undervalued performance ratings did not affect his salary. Moreover, Brockman allegedly
undervalued plaintiff’s overall performance ratings and not, specifically, his ratings with regard
to his interpersonal skills, and there is no allegation that Brockman intentionally falsified the
unfavorable comments about plaintiff’s interpersonal skills that he made on plaintiff’s April
1997 performance evaluation or that other evidence about plaintiff’s interpersonal skills was
falsified. The testimony established that it was plaintiff’s interpersonal skills that were the
deciding factor in the promotional decisions. Under these circumstances, the affidavit did not
raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext.
In light of all the circumstances described above, we conclude that plaintiff failed to raise
a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether defendant’s proffered reasons for failing to
promote him were merely pretextual. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying defendant’s
motion for summary disposition.
Reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of defendant. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.