PEOPLE OF MI V HENRY L RIDNER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 23, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 229698
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-004693-01
HENRY L. RIDNER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: White, P.J., and Murphy and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his bench trial convictions of malicious destruction of
police property, MCL 750.377b, and resisting and obstructing a police officer, MCL 750.479.
Defendant was sentenced to five years’ probation. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that his convictions must be reversed because the trial court erred
in applying MCL 750.377b, the statute proscribing the malicious destruction of personal property
of the police, to this case where real property was involved. We disagree.
Defendant did not raise this issue before the trial court; hence, this issue has not been
properly preserved for appellate review. People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 374 n 4; 624
NW2d 227 (2001). In order to avoid forfeiture of an unpreserved issue, defendant must establish
that errors occurred, the errors were plain, i.e., clear or obvious, and the errors affected
defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 761-764; 597 NW2d 130
(1999).
Defendant argues that his conviction should be reversed because his actions could not be
punished under MCL 750.377b, which statute requires the destruction or injury to personal
property, while the intercom system that he damaged is a fixture or real property. In People v
Fox, 232 Mich App 541, 553; 591 NW2d 384 (1998), this Court determined that “personal
property” consists of “everything that is the subject of ownership not coming under
denomination of real estate.” The Court defined “real property” as “‘[l]and, and generally
whatever is erected or growing upon or affixed to the land.’” Id. The Court indicated that a
fixture is not personal property, but rather, falls under the definition of real property. Id. The
Court described a three-pronged test that may be used in determining whether property is a
fixture: (1) the property is annexed to the realty, whether the annexation is actual or
constructive; (2) its adaptation or application to the realty being used is appropriate; and (3) there
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is intent to make the property a permanent accession to the realty. Id. The prosecutor does not
argue that the intercom was not personal property.
Although the intercom was a fixture and not personal property for the purposes of MCL
750.377b, defendant’s conviction also related to the destruction or injury to a mattress, which is
not a fixture.1 Therefore, defendant has failed to demonstrate plain error affecting his substantial
rights.
Defendant next argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of
malicious destruction of police property.2 We disagree. When reviewing a claim regarding the
sufficiency of the evidence, this Court examines the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution to determine if a rational factfinder could find that the essential elements of the
offense were proved by a reasonable doubt. People v Joseph, 237 Mich App 18, 20; 601 NW2d
882 (1999).
To prove malicious destruction of police property the prosecutor must show that
defendant (1) willfully and maliciously destroyed or injured; (2) personal property belonging to
the police department. People v Richardson, 118 Mich App 492, 494; 325 NW2d 419 (1982).
This Court has determined that, for purposes of malicious willful and malicious destruction, the
words “willful and malicious” require a specific intent to damage property or injure its owner.
People v Culp, 108 Mich App 452, 458; 310 NW2d 421 (1981).
Defendant contends that he did not act maliciously when he damaged a mattress located
in a cell because he was using the mattress cover to warm himself because his clothes were taken
from him. There was testimony that defendant destroyed an intercom system in his first cell, and
that he had to be moved to a second cell. Defendant then assaulted an officer while he was being
escorted to the second cell. Defendant admitted that he was drunk and belligerent, which led to
the officers restraining defendant. Although defendant was naked in the second cell, where he
tore the cover off the mattress, there was testimony that his clothes were not taken away from
him until he was moved to a third cell. His clothes were removed at that time because defendant
was using the buttons on the clothes to unscrew screws.
1
Defendant was first charged with two counts of malicious destruction under MCL 750.377b. In
closing, the prosecutor asked the court to find defendant guilty of only one count, stating
there’s cases [sic] that say when somebody is engaged in a transaction like that
involving multiple items, you can only have one count., So I would ask the Court
to find him guilty of one count of malicious destruction of police property, and
one count of resisting and obstructing a police officer.
2
Defendant’s second and third issues alternatively state that the verdict was against the great
weight of the evidence. However, defendant’s arguments were based entirely on whether the
evidence was sufficient, rather than that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.
Therefore, we review defendant’s claims for sufficiency of the evidence, as defendant has failed
to argue the merits of his allegations that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.
See People v Jones (On Rehearing), 201 Mich App 449, 456-457; 506 NW2d 542 (1993).
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Thus, there was evidence from which the trial court could have concluded that defendant
was acting out of malice throughout, and that if he was cold he could have put his clothes back
on or told the officers that he was cold.
Third, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a verdict of guilt
for his conviction of resisting and obstructing a police officer. We disagree. Defendant argues
that he wanted to move to a private cell, and therefore had no reason to assault the officer when
the officer was transferring him to such a cell, which raises a reasonable doubt as to whether
defendant resisted or obstructed the officer. The officer testified that as he was taking defendant
from the first cell to the second cell, defendant pulled away, turned, swung, and punched the
officer in the chest. After defendant hit the officer, it took two officers to restrain defendant. In
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court will not interfere with the factfinder’s role
of determining the credibility of the witnesses. People v Lee, 243 Mich App 163, 167; 622
NW2d 71 (2000). The officer’s testimony, apparently believed by the trial court, was sufficient
evidence to support defendant’s conviction of resisting and obstructing an officer.
Affirmed.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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