RONALD SMITH V NEW CENTER STAMPING CO
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RONALD SMITH,
UNPUBLISHED
April 23, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 224285
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-829824-NO
NEW CENTER STAMPING COMPANY,
Defendant,
and
CENTURION STAFFING, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Smolenski and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the circuit court order granting summary disposition in
favor of defendant Centurion Staffing, Inc. We affirm.
Defendant Centurion is a staffing company engaged in the business of providing
temporary employees to fill staffing needs at other companies. Defendant New Center Stamping
Company, one of Centurion’s clients, makes metal stampings for the automotive industry. While
employed by Centurion, plaintiff performed work at New Center’s facility. Below, plaintiff
alleged that Centurion illegally discriminated against him on the basis of a disability, when
Centurion terminated his employment at New Center. The circuit court granted summary
disposition to Centurion, ruling that Centurion had never terminated plaintiff’s employment.
Plaintiff challenges that ruling on appeal.
We review a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition de novo.
Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). When considering
a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court considers the affidavits,
pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence submitted by the parties, in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Morales v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 458 Mich 288,
294; 582 NW2d 776 (1998). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is
properly granted if there is no genuine issue of material fact, entitling the moving party to
judgment as a matter of law. Id.
-1-
The terms of an employment application constitute part of the contract of employment
between an employee and employer. Timko v Oakwood Custom Coating, Inc, 244 Mich App
234, 244; 625 NW2d 101 (2001). Further, employment contracts are subject to the same rules of
construction as other contracts. Bruno v Detroit Institute of Technology, 36 Mich App 61, 64;
193 NW2d 322 (1971). The main goal in the interpretation of contracts is to honor the intent of
the parties. Mikonczyk v Detroit Newspapers, Inc, 238 Mich App 347, 349-350; 605 NW2d 360
(1999). Courts must look for the intent of the parties in the words used in the contract itself.
UAW-GM Human Resource Center v KSL Recreation Corp, 228 Mich App 486, 491; 579 NW2d
411 (1998). If the language of a contract is subject to two reasonable interpretations, factual
development is necessary to determine the intent of the parties and summary disposition is
inappropriate. Meagher v Wayne State University, 222 Mich App 700, 722; 565 NW2d 401
(1997). When contractual language is clear, its construction is a question of law for the courts.
Id. at 721. Courts must not create ambiguity where one does not exist. UAW-GM, supra at 491.
Below, plaintiff argued that he never understood that he was an employee of Centurion,
rather than New Center. Further, plaintiff argued that when he was told to leave the New Center
assignment, he believed that he was being terminated from employment. Plaintiff claimed that
he did not understand that he worked for a temporary staffing company, and that he did not know
that he could receive an assignment from Centurion, other than his initial placement at New
Center. However, the lower court record demonstrates that plaintiff completed an employment
application with Centurion. That application states, in relevant part:
I understand that I am not required to wait at this office for a work assignment,
that I may feel free to report here if I so desire, that pay starts when I report to
Centurion Staffing’s customer ready for work; that I am not required to return to
this office at the end of a work assignment, that I may mail in my time slip when
my work assignment is completed for the week. If I do not contact the temporary
services office after completing an assignment, the temporary services [sic] may
assume that I am no longer ready, willing, or able or otherwise available for work.
“‘The law presumes that the parties understand the import of a written contract and had
the intention manifested by its terms.’” Zurcher v Herveat, 238 Mich App 267, 299; 605 NW2d
329 (1999), quoting Zurich Ins Co v CCR & Co (On Rehearing), 226 Mich App 599, 604; 576
NW2d 392 (1997). When contract language is clear, unambiguous, and has a definite meaning,
courts do not have the ability to write a different contract for the parties, or to consider extrinsic
testimony to determine the parties’ intent. UAW-GM, supra at 491. Given the clear and
unambiguous language of plaintiff’s employment application, the circuit court properly
presumed that plaintiff understood (1) that he worked for Centurion and (2) that he was a
temporary employee who could be assigned to a new worksite by contacting Centurion’s office.
Further, the circuit court could not consider extrinsic testimony that defendant did not know he
could receive other assignments from Centurion. Id. Therefore, the circuit court appropriately
-2-
ruled that plaintiff had been dismissed from his temporary placement with New Center, but had
not been terminated by Centurion.1
Finally, plaintiff argues that the circuit court demonstrated prejudice in its rulings and
that the circuit court judge should have been disqualified from participation in this case. We
disagree. We review the factual findings underlying a ruling on a motion for disqualification for
an abuse of discretion, while we review application of the facts to the law de novo. Cain v Dep’t
of Corrections, 451 Mich 470, 503 n 38; 548 NW2d 210 (1996). We conclude that the circuit
court did not err when it denied plaintiff’s motion for judicial disqualification.
Grounds exist for the disqualification of a trial judge when he cannot impartially hear a
case, including situations where the judge is personally biased or prejudiced for or against a party
or attorney. MCR 2.003(B)(1); In re Forfeiture of $1,159,420, 194 Mich App 134, 151; 486
NW2d 326 (1992). Generally, a showing of actual personal prejudice on the part of the judge is
required to disqualify a judge under the court rule. Cain, supra at 495. The party asserting
judicial partiality bears a heavy burden of overcoming the presumption of impartiality. Id. at
497.
Plaintiff asserts that the trial judge was prejudiced against him because the judge had a
predisposition against persons addicted to drugs. However, plaintiff provides no evidence
whatsoever to support his argument. Because a showing of actual bias or prejudice on the part of
the judge is required to support disqualification, and because plaintiff provided no such evidence,
plaintiff has not overcome the presumption of impartiality. Id. Furthermore, the fact that
plaintiff was using drugs was a central issue to this case, and the circuit court was required to
make rulings based on that fact.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
1
Given our resolution of this issue, we need not address plaintiff’s other arguments regarding
application of the Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights ACT (PWDCRA), MCL 37.1103 et
seq., to the present case.
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.