IN RE RENNY MIKOYAN MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of RENNY MIKOYAN, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
April 19, 2002
Petitioner-Appellee,
No. 235447
Washtenaw Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-024749-NA
V
JONATHAN MIKOYAN and JANET
MIKOYAN,
Respondents-Appellants.
Before: Gage, P.J., and Griffin and Buth*, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondents-appellants appeal as of right the May 17, 2001 order terminating their
parental rights to the minor child Renny Mikoyan pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii), (j)
and (k)(iii). We affirm. This case is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR
7.214(E)(1)(b).
I
Respondents-appellants claim that the trial court erred in denying their motions to
adjourn the preliminary hearing. We disagree. A trial court's decision to grant or to not grant an
adjournment is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re Jackson, 199 Mich App 22, 28; 501
NW2d 182 (1993). At issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in not finding good
cause to adjourn the preliminary hearing pursuant to MCR 5.923(G)(2). Although an indigent
respondent has the right to court-appointed counsel in child protective proceedings, MCL
712A.17c and MCR 5.915(B)(1), he has no right to select that counsel. Additionally, although
Janet Mikoyan’s attorney requested more time to review the file, her performance at the
preliminary hearing shows that she was sufficiently familiar with the case to represent her
client's interests. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the motions to adjourn.
II
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Respondents-appellants next claim that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay
testimony at the preliminary hearing and relying on that testimony to establish jurisdiction over
the child. In substance, this argument challenges the trial court’s jurisdiction over the child. It is
well established that a respondent in a child protective proceeding cannot collaterally attack the
trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction in an appeal from the order terminating the respondent’s
parental rights. In re Hatcher, 443 Mich 426, 444; 505 NW2d 834 (1993); In re Bechard, 211
Mich App 155, 159-160; 535 NW2d 220 (1995). Furthermore, the trial court in the instant case
did not base its jurisdiction on hearsay testimony, but rather on respondents-appellants’ no
contest pleas. MCR 5.971(C)(2).
III
Respondents-appellants contend that they were denied the effective assistance of counsel.
Respondents-appellants did not move for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, this
Court’s review of this issue is limited to matters apparent from the record . In re Schmeltzer, 175
Mich App 666, 673; 438 NW2d 866 (1999). In analyzing claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel at termination hearings, this Court applies by analogy the principles of ineffective
assistance of counsel as they have developed in the criminal law context. In re Simon, 171 Mich
App 443, 447; 431 NW2d 71 (1988). A criminal defendant claiming ineffective assistance of
counsel must satisfy the two-part test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). People v Pickens,
446 Mich 298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). First, the defendant must show that counsel
made errors so serious that counsel was not performing as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment. People v Carbin, 463 Mich App 590, 600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001). This requires
overcoming the strong presumption that the counsel’s performance was sound trial strategy. Id.
Next, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which
requires a showing of a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Id. Because the defendant bears the burden of
demonstrating both deficient performance and prejudice, the defendant necessarily bears the
burden of establishing the factual predicate for his claim. Id.; see also People v Hoag, 460 Mich
1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999). Here, the record does not show that any of respondents-appellants’
attorneys’ alleged errors were either sufficiently serious or prejudicial to their clients’ position.
Accordingly, respondents-appellants are not entitled to relief on this issue.
IV
Respondents-appellants claim that it was “inappropriate” for petitioner-appellee and the
trial court to consider evidence that their older child suffered a similar injury to the one that led
to this case. However, they do not explain why they believe it was inappropriate for the trial
court to rely on this evidence. They do not cite any rule of evidence or any other authority in
support of their claim. Consequently, this issue lacks merit because a party may not merely
announce a position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for the claim.
American Transmission, Inc v Channel 7 of Detroit, Inc, 239 Mich App 695, 705; 609 NW2d
607 (2001). Additionally, the issue is waived because respondents-appellants failed to cite
supporting authority. Caldwell v Chapman, 240 Mich App 124, 132; 610 NW2d 624 (2000).
Nonetheless, we will briefly address the issue because it is entirely appropriate for a family court
to consider a parent’s conduct toward a sibling. This Court has recognized that how a parent
treats one child is probative of how that parent might treat another. In Re Powers, 208 Mich App
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582, 588-589 (1995). Accordingly, respondent’s treatment of Donny is probative of how they
might treat Renny. Furthermore, evidence that both children suffered a femoral injury during
infancy, and that respondents lied both times about how the injury occurred, makes it more
probable than not that the injuries were not accidents, but deliberate abuse.
V
Finally, we find no merit to respondents-appellants’ claim that the trial court erred in
declining to find that termination was not in the child’s best interests. When the petitioner
establishes by clear and convincing evidence that a statutory basis or bases for termination exists,
the court must order termination of parental rights unless it finds from evidence on the record
that termination is not in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5), In re Trejo Minors, 462
Mich 341, 353; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). This Court reviews the best interests decision for clear
error. Id., 356-357. Evidence that three witnesses believed that respondents-appellants’ parental
rights should not be terminated is not sufficient to establish that termination is not in the child’s
best interests in light of the injuries suffered by Renny and his older brother.
Affirmed.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ George S. Buth
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