TRULA SCHUTT V LOCAL UNION NO 2074
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
TRULA SCHUTT, CATHERINE HILDRETH,
and JOYCE CUMMINS,1
UNPUBLISHED
April 19, 2002
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
LOCAL UNION NO. 2074, COUNCIL 25, and
UNION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY, and
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES,
No. 228504
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 99-000172-CK
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Owens, P.J., and Markey and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from a trial court order granting defendants’ motions for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). Plaintiffs, as union members, had claimed
that defendants’ failure to file grievances on their behalf constituted a breach of contract,
negligence, and gross negligence. We affirm.
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred by granting defendants’ motions for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), which was based on the trial court’s conclusion that
the six-month statute of limitation had expired before plaintiffs’ complaint was filed. Generally,
we review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. Todorov v
Alexander, 236 Mich App 464, 467; 600 NW2d 418 (1999). Similarly, absent disputed issues of
fact, we review de novo a trial court’s determination that a statute of limitation bars a cause of
action. Id.
Specifically, plaintiffs challenge the trial court’s conclusion that a six-month statute of
limitation was applicable to their lawsuit. As a preliminary matter, we note that plaintiffs
conceded that, although their claims were brought under various common law theories, the
gravamen of their lawsuit is that the union breached its duty of fair representation, MCL
423.210(a). In Ray v Organization of School Administrators & Supervisors, Local 28, AFL-CIO,
1
We note that this plaintiff signed her name “Cummings,” rather than “Cummins.”
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141 Mich App 708, 711; 367 NW2d 438 (1985), we recognized that a six-month period of
limitation applies to a union member’s claim that his or her union breached its duty of fair
representation. In fact, we applied this ruling in several subsequent cases.2
Here, plaintiffs were suspended from their employment at Grand Valley State University
(“GVSU”) on or about November 14, 1997. On November 21, 1997, two plaintiffs, Schutt and
Hildreth, resigned, and several days later GVSU terminated plaintiff Cummings’ employment.
However, plaintiffs did not file the instant complaint until January 8, 1999. Thus, plaintiffs’
lawsuit was commenced well beyond the applicable six-month statute of limitation.
However, plaintiffs contend that our Supreme Court’s decision in Rowry v University of
Michigan; 441 Mich 1, 8; 490 NW2d 305 (1992), was “an unequivocal and unambiguous
repudiation” of Ray and its progeny, to the extent that these decisions mandated application of a
six-month statute of limitation. We disagree. The Rowry Court reviewed the propriety of this
Court’s extension, by analogy, of the Ray decision to a situation where an employee filed a claim
in circuit court seeking to enforce the terms of an arbitrator’s decision on an unfair labor practice
claim. Id. at 4-6. The Rowry Court merely found that the facts before it were not properly
analogous, and overruled our extension of Ray. Id. at 8-9. Thus, we are not persuaded that the
Rowry decision affected our decisions applying a six-month statute of limitation to a breach of a
duty of fair representation claim. Accordingly, we reject defendants’ contention that Ray and its
progeny are no longer “good law.” Consequently, we conclude that the trial court properly
applied a six-month statute of limitation to plaintiffs’ lawsuit.
Nevertheless, plaintiffs contend that, even if the six-month statute of limitation generally
applies to their lawsuit, several principles of law render dismissal of their lawsuit erroneous.
Specifically, plaintiffs reference the principles of accrual, tolling, and equitable estoppel.
Indeed, we have ruled that the limitation period is tolled “where a plaintiff-employee has
no knowledge or reason to know of an unfair labor practice.” Huntington Woods v Wines, 122
Mich App 650, 651; 332 NW2d 557 (1983). Similarly, in regard to “accrual,” we opined that the
“six-month limitation period begins to run from the time a final decision regarding the
employees’ grievance has been made or from the time the employees discovered, or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have discovered, that no further action would be taken with
respect to their grievance.” McClusky v Womak, 188 Mich App 465, 469; 470 NW2d 443
(1990).
Here, plaintiffs contend that they did not know that grievances were not going to be filed
on their behalf because the union steward knowingly mislead them by stating that he would “get
back to them” regarding their grievances. However, we note that plaintiffs consulted an attorney
in December 1997. This fact belies their implicit suggestion that they had no reason to know that
the grievances were not going to be filed on their behalf. Moreover, plaintiffs do not allege that
any contact occurred with the union steward that further delayed them, or their attorney, from
2
See Silbert v Lakeview Ed Ass’n, Inc, 187 Mich App 21, 25; 466 NW2d 333 (1991); Leider v
Fitzgerald Ed Ass’n, 167 Mich App 210, 214-217; 421 NW2d 635 (1988); Meadows v Detroit,
164 Mich App 418, 434; 418 NW2d 100 (1987); and Carlson v North Dearborn Heights Bd of
Ed, 157 Mich App 653, 663; 403 NW2d 598 (1986).
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ascertaining that grievances had not been filed on their behalf. Thus, while some tolling
attributable to the union steward’s purported misrepresentations might be justifiable, the amount
of tolling that we would find reasonable under the circumstances would still fall well short of the
several months of tolling necessary to make plaintiffs’ lawsuit timely filed. Further, plaintiff
Hildreth’s affidavit indicates that she “got into an argument” with the union steward on
November 21, 1997, because she suspected that he thought plaintiffs were “troublemakers.” In
other words, there was some indication at that early date that the union steward was not properly
representing their interests. As such, it is far from clear that plaintiffs are necessarily entitled to
tolling based on accrual principles. Regardless, we believe that any tolling that plaintiffs were
entitled to was insufficient to allow their lawsuit to proceed.
A party may be equitably estopped from arguing a statute of limitation defense where it is
established “that there has been a false representation or concealment of material fact, coupled
with an expectation that the other party will rely upon this conduct, and knowledge of the actual
facts on the part of the representing or concealing party.” Lothian v Detroit, 414 Mich 160, 177;
324 NW2d 9 (1982). Again, however, even assuming the veracity of plaintiffs’ allegations
regarding the union steward’s misleading conduct, we are not persuaded that plaintiffs were
entitled to several months of tolling based on equitable estoppel. Indeed, plaintiffs promptly
sought legal representation the following month, notwithstanding the union steward’s alleged
suggestion that grievances would be filed on their behalf. Therefore, we believe that the trial
court did not err by refusing to toll plaintiffs’ claims based on equitable estoppel principles.
Consequently, we conclude that the trial court did not err as a matter of law by dismissing
plaintiffs’ lawsuit pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7).
Finally, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred by denying their motion for leave to
amend their pleadings. The trial court, having already concluded that the statute of limitation
barred plaintiffs’ lawsuit, denied the motion on the basis of futility.
Generally, a trial court’s decision to deny a motion to amend a pleading is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. Weymers v Khera, 454 Mich 639, 654; 563 NW2d 647 (1997). Although
a motion to amend a pleading should ordinarily be granted, a trial court need not do so where the
amendment would be futile. Id. at 658, quoting Ben P Fyke & Sons v Gunter Co, 390 Mich 649,
658; 213 NW2d 134 (1973). Here, plaintiffs’ lawsuit was time barred no matter how sufficiently
pleaded. As such, correcting any deficiencies in the pleadings was certainly futile. As a result,
we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs’ request to
amend their pleadings.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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